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My project uncovers and explores the democratic sources of political cynicism.  I 
contest the conventional view that the expanding gap between the near-universal acclaim 
accorded democratic principles and the near-total absence of democratic political 
practices is a product of either “market society” or liberal political systems.  Instead, I 
argue that the particular form of the contemporary contempt for all-things-political - the 
reflexive assumption that politics is necessarily corrupt and even absurd - is inscribed in 
modern democratic culture.  In relation to the sublime freedom and equality of the idea of 
democratic openness, democratic political action and association cannot but be 
experienced as impoverished and unfree.  In this sense, I argue that democracy is self-
subverting, undermining the possibility of political argument and reform.  I conclude by 
 v 
sketching out a prescription in the American context for robust democracy based upon 
this diagnosis.  By rhetorically reorienting self-perceptions about what we are doing 
when we engage in politics around the elevated but not transcendent notion of 
participating in an ongoing constitutional project, we can transform our anti-political 
dispositions.  Beyond issues of political legitimacy, I argue that the symbolic order of the 
Constitution might foster political vitality by framing a politics experienced as potentially 
meaningful and worthy of respect.  One might say that I offer Madisonian means to 
Jeffersonian ends.   
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Introduction: Democracy as Self-Subverting 
Every government harbors within itself a natural flaw that seems inextricably 
intertwined with the very principle of its existence     
       - Tocqueville 
Over the past half century, polling data has conveyed the American people’s 
increasing “dissatisfaction” with and “distrust” of their government.  Perhaps the most 
striking trend in more than three decades of the General Social Survey, for example, is 
the near-collapse of “confidence” in political institutions (even as opinions on a wide 
array of other issues have remained remarkably static).  When one considers this trend in 
conjunction with the long term decline in voting rates and other forms of political 
engagement, a general contempt for contemporary politics is hard to deny.  As the belief 
that America is “on the wrong track” grows more pronounced, the political process is 
rejected as a means to make things better.  Indeed, beyond a failure to provide solutions, 
politics is cited as a large part of the problem.  While “politics” has probably always been 
in some sense a dirty word, nowadays it seems exclusively and irretrievably so.  Even 
cursory debate is shut down by the ubiquitous bad-faith accusation, absurdly cast by 
politicians at one another, of “playing politics” in the electoral “silly season.”  It seems 
unimaginable that partisanship can be anything but “petty” and “bickering,” but also that 
compromise represents anything but an unprincipled lack of “core conviction.”  The 
alternatives would seem to be either “playing the blame game” or “flip-flopping.”  And 
even as the majority of Americans apparently consider it self-evident that politicians are 
self-serving and corrupt, the chronic compliant is that these degenerate characters “don’t 
get anything done.”  How have we ended up with such a stultifying, no-way-out political 
vocabulary?  And how can we work our way out of this theater of the absurd when 
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arguments are just a priori assumed to be “spin,” meant to conceal the real motives 
behind any and all political activity?  How can we reform our politics when such 
uncritical cynicism blocks critical reflection and action? 
While surveys and such observations attest to the fact that Americans hate 
politics, I work toward a diagnosis of why, and so how, Americans hate politics.  Given 
the long-term nature of the phenomenon, an explanation cannot follow exclusively from 
current circumstances and immediate causes (for instance, the policies and personalities 
of the Bush administration).  Any explanation has to look to more sustained conditions, to 
relatively longstanding characteristics of American society and the American political 
system, or even to broader trends of which America is a part.    
Explanations of this sort typically revolve around the characterization of ours as a 
liberal democratic political system embedded in a “market society.”  To simplify, the 
reasoning here generally follows one of two paths.  First, in our modern, middle-class, 
commercial republic people are otherwise occupied and so “rationally ignorant” of and 
uninterested in a political process that daily effects them little and over which they 
individually have no control.  Political drama might engage the attention, political issues 
and policies not so much.  In turn, the running of the government is entrusted to 
institutional mechanisms and elected representatives (except perhaps under extraordinary 
circumstances).  Second, with their desire for political power channeled into the merely 
symbolic act of voting in occasional elections, citizens are reduced to spectators of a 
political system dominated by oligarchic “elites” and “special interests,” whether of the 
left or the right.  In our age of globalizing capitalism, politics becomes just economics by 
other means.  “Democracy” is reduced to an empty rhetoric, co-opted by those in power 
to keep those out of power quite.  In the first line of reasoning, the reigning popular 
 3 
sovereign largely abdicates direct rule; in the second, a citizenry longing for more 
meaningful political participation is materially locked out of political space.  
Neither view is wholly convincing, though.  The first (wherein the liberal 
democratic political system makes possible the public governance of an apolitical 
populace) predicts political apathy, not the contempt for politics so widely and vocally 
expressed today.  The majority describes itself less as apolitical than as anti-political; a 
deep lack of respect for all-things political accompanies any lack of interest.  The second 
view (wherein the liberal democratic political system obstructs more radical democratic 
action and association) misrepresents the expressed aspirations of the majority of the 
American people.  Recent research shows an almost equally low regard for direct 
democratic participation and popular power as for liberal political institutions and 
procedures.1  In their political roles and capacities, people have no more faith in each 
other, or even in themselves, than in their politicians.  American’s aversion to politics 
runs deeper than the radical democratic account allows, below the liberal political system. 
 Of course, some argue that the people have been seduced into such attitudes, and 
so into political powerlessness - buying into the need-satisfaction of bourgeois 
“consumerism” as the essence of freedom, accepting governance according to market 
criteria as necessary in a world of competition and complexity, and so forth.  Today, the 
argument runs, the market-order is taken as natural - as given, spontaneous, and 
inevitable.  Moreover, it is even endowed with a sort of religious moral significance.2  
Consequently, politics (along with everything else) is perceived as a wholly economic 
activity, reduced to the language of self-interest and judged by the logic of efficiency.  A 
robustly democratic politics is dismissed by the people themselves as fanciful on both 
counts.  
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Yet, this interpretation of market society as Platonic cave is not wholly 
convincing either.  The very fact that “market society,” “consumerism,” etc., are invoked 
almost exclusively so as to condemn them, never as legitimate or aspirational, 
undermines such a view.  Far from being indoctrinated into an unquestioned capitalist 
consciousness, the costs of capitalism are constantly questioned and regretted.  Every 
word of praise for the efficiency and prosperity of the unplanned and unregulated open-
market is accompanied by scorn for “a culture of fast-food homogenization,” hierarchical 
corporatism (“Big Oil,” “Big Tobacco”), the pervasive influence of money, ubiquitous 
advertising, shallowness, greed, inauthenticity, and so forth.  If Americans are 
materialistic consumers, they are self-loathing materialistic consumers (one might say 
that Rousseau’s critique of the bourgeoisie has been internalized by the bourgeoisie).  As 
much as any reality it represents, the idea of market society captures the imagination to 
such an extent today, I suggest, as the society people perpetually fear is just over the 
horizon.3     
 
In response to the shortcomings of this conventional wisdom, my argument runs 
in two parts.  First, insofar as one can make such general claims about a “society,” 
“culture,” or “age,” ours is rendered more fully intelligible as a democratic society rather 
than as a market society.  Second, a society so-constituted harbors the particular type of 
contempt for politics - the reflexive cynicism, the mix of anger and passivity - so 
widespread today.  Building upon the works of Alexis de Tocqueville, I argue that the 
democratic “social state” or regime tends to be taken by its inhabitants as natural, and 
even as a kind of quasi-religious order; and that both the liberal democratic form of 
government and the radical democratic practice of politics are devalued within the way of 
life sustained by our democratic “mores.”  There is an anti-political prejudice inscribed in 
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the democratic way of understanding, evaluating, and imagining the world.  More 
specifically, “democratic openness” - that all-purpose metaphor for what we take freedom 
in equality to mean today - cannot be put into political forms or realized in political 
practices.  There is a consequent incompatibility between the freedom of democratic 
openness and what Tocqueville calls “political freedom.” 
Taking both lines of my argument together, I write that today’s often remarked 
upon simultaneous triumph of democratic principles and absence of democratic political 
practices is no coincidence.  A recent UNESCO report, for example, declares that “basic 
democratic principles” constitute no less than “a fundamental source of common values 
that can be described as the common heritage of humankind.”4  Even with this sort of 
near-universal acclaim accorded democracy, though, even with its status as sort of moral 
Esperanto mouthed even by its enemies, not only is popular contempt for political 
representatives and institutions growing, but basic participation in deciding things in 
common is almost nowhere to be found.  Everywhere preached but nowhere practiced, it 
is apparently the best of times and the worst of times for democracy.  I argue that these 
two situations occur in tandem.  The virtue of openness enables both an unprecedented 
monopolization of legitimacy by democratic principles, and a widespread cynicism 
toward democratic political association, argument, and action.  There is a Pyrrhic quality, 
we might say, to what Tocqueville terms the “rising empire” of democracy.      
 
To explicate the notion of “democratic society” put forward in the first line of my 
thesis, I argue (incorporating the terminology, if not the sense of rupture, of Bruce 
Ackerman’s schema of America’s political development) that we live in a democratic 
“third republic,” analogous to the laissez-faire “second republic.”  Where market 
competition was once “massively affirmed” as both a fact of the world in which we live 
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and the principle of a free and rightly-ordered society, today democratic openness stands 
as a similarly unquestionable fact/value.  It is taken as at once “natural” (as we 
experience it in time, the world is intrinsically contingent, unpredictable, in-flux and free-
flowing, uncertain, open-ended), and normative (the order of society ought to be similarly 
free of absolutes, pluralistic and inclusive, open to contestation and change).  And where 
the contract once served as a general metaphor for social integration amid competition, 
today expression serves such a function amid openness.  Thus, for example, rights are 
conceptualized not around the value of the contract, but around the value of self-
expression (with the component parts of privacy and recognition).  Progress is understood 
as toward democratic “humanity” (an all-inclusive diversity of free and equal 
individuals), rather than toward bourgeois “civilization.”  And the elision of fact and 
value within the idea of democratic openness fosters the belief that democratic society 
will spontaneously and inevitably spring up the world-over once obstructions of whatever 
sort are removed (democracy is something that “spreads” rather than something that is 
constituted).      
I argue further that while the free-market and consumer capitalism are at times 
affirmed as natural and normative, they are so-affirmed only insofar as they can be 
portrayed as aspects of democratic openness.  Looking at the content of advertising, 
beyond the fact of its pervasiveness, it is apparent that consumerism is itself “branded” 
and sold as democratic.5  Any “ethos of consumer infantilization” today, I suggest, is less 
a product of “global marketers … explicitly infantilizing adults” (as if people were raw 
material to be manipulated) than of the norm of uninhibited openness, expressed in terms 
of youthful vitality and childlike spontaneity.6  And if many have more “faith” in the 
market, or in the basically Malthusian economics of Darwinian biology, than in 
democratic institutions and practices, it is because these notions seem more in accord 
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with the idea of an open world and an open society.  Along these lines, the full picture of 
the love/hate relationship with capitalism (and globalization) in democratic society 
becomes intelligible.   
 
Developing the second line of my argument, I show how, for all the benefits it 
brings, the ongoing democratization of society goes hand-in-hand with the de-
politicization of society.  As democratic openness is increasingly taken as both the 
defining attribute of our modern condition and the sole principle of proper social 
arrangements and relationships, the practice of politics is undermined.  More specifically, 
within democratic society the thought takes shape that we are both incapable of and better 
off without the practice of politics, democratic or otherwise.  Recall Aristotle’s famous 
claim that “the man who is isolated, who is unable to share in the benefits of political 
association, or has no need to share because he is already self-sufficient, is no part of the 
city, and must therefore be either a beast or a god.”7  I argue that, perhaps paradoxically, 
we consider ourselves at once incapable of participating in and in need of nothing from 
politics.  Democratic man does not see himself as a political animal.    
The key here is that the democratic revolution subverts not only hierarchical 
conventions, but whatsoever is perceived as conventional - in the family, religion, 
economics, politics, law, and so forth.  After the revolution, the natural is no longer 
thought to be potentially representable in the conventional social order (for example, 
natural law as partially manifest in positive law; divinity incorporated in the body of the 
king).  The conventional world is “denatured.”  Further, the world of human contrivance 
is taken as the very antithesis of nature, as its negation or suppression (an ancient idea, of 
course, made dominant with the democratic revolution).  Nature and convention 
henceforth appear mutually exclusive and without possible mediation.  At the same time, 
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though, the natural order - successively iterated in terms of equality, competition, and 
openness - remains the standard of judgment of the social order.  The authority of nature 
is hardly more questioned after the democratic revolution than before; the appeal of the 
“all-natural” or “organic” or “green” is hardly diminished.  But “natural” comes to mean 
“spontaneous,” “authentic,” “informal,” “untouched by human hands,” and so forth.  In 
its openness, nature is precisely that which cannot be embodied in conventional form.  
We might say, then, that where the conventional order perhaps once stood as the 
unquestionable instantiation of Nature, with the democratic revolution the conventional 
order is taken as over and against nature - as unnatural.  Nature is disenchanted but hardly 
degraded while conventionality is as such debased.    
The democratic revolution, I go on to argue, launches an unrealizable, self-
radicalizing quest for what we might call a “social state of nature” - society unfettered by 
conventional artifice, democracy that transcends politics, expression deeper than words, 
relationships beyond the need for mediating forms, the immediate experience of the 
events of the world.  All that is meaningful - whether good, true, or beautiful - is 
perceived as above or below, before or after, the surface of the present world.  The 
democratic revolution thus gives birth to a sort of passion for revolution, for overturning 
established norms and forms in the liberating event of opening.     
Freedom’s meaning takes shape around this passion for revolution.  In our social 
state of openness, freedom comes to mean being “undomesticated” by conventional 
norms and forms.  More specifically, freedom comes to mean mastery and escape - power 
over others and a power-free zone without others / in intimate union with others.  This, as 
we shall see, is what Tocqueville describes as the liberty of the savage, as opposed to the 
politically staged freedom he so values.  It is precisely this political freedom - power both 
moderated and made effective in association equal others - that freedom-as-openness 
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undermines.  Political freedom is devalued in comparison to the expansive, sublime 
notion of freedom-as-openness that takes hold of the imagination with the democratic 
revolution.  Along these lines, Tocqueville identifies the common source of both the 
restless activity and energy and the flight into the passivity of isolation and privacy so 
characteristic of those in democratic society.     
The upshot for the utterly conventional politics of liberal democracy is clear.  The 
reflexive contempt for mainstream, scripted, suit-and-tie politics itself becomes 
mainstream.  Appraised within the context of natural openness/conventional closure, a 
political system so heavily reliant upon institutional mechanisms and procedural routines 
can only seem a ridiculous obstacle to plain “common sense” and just “getting things 
done.”  Where a democracy housed in constitutional conventions might once have been 
regarded as a higher form of democracy, nowadays, evaluated on a scale of more-or-less-
open, it is considered even by many of its advocates as less fully democratic, defensible 
only insofar as regrettably necessary.8  And judged by the norms of authenticity and 
informality - by who I would rather have a beer with - politicians playing politics within 
this system can only seem fake and absurd, especially when they try to act authentic (as 
evidenced by the political satire of the day, such as The Daily Show).  
John Edwards, former U.S. senator from North Carolina and at the time potential  
candidate for the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination, expressed this sort of 
contempt for mainstream politics well:  “My own view is the next president of the United 
States, or certainly the one after, is likely to be the single candidate who doesn't sound 
like a politician.  I want to tell you on a personal level, I'm trying every way I know how 
not to (sound like a politician).”  “The problem is that we're so trained and so conditioned 
over a long period of time that being normal and real and authentic requires you to shed 
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that conditioning.”9  Speech that seems scripted is as such devalued, and so demonstrable 
informality and intimacy are to be the technique of the successful (anti-) politician.   
 Fueled in part by an aversion to the apparent phoniness of the contemporary 
political system, proponents of a more radical democracy suggest that democracy should 
be understood not as a system or form of government, but as a practice of resistance to 
domination - not in terms of self-rule, but as unruly action that challenges authority of 
every sort, even of “the people.”  I argue that such dissident democracy is no less 
subverted by the belief in and commitment to democratic openness than are more 
mainstream liberal formulations.  Once a political movement to disrupt authority is 
perceived as a political organization, once it seems more planned than spontaneous, it 
ceases to be experienced as authentically democratic.  The conditions of its effectiveness 
and sustainability bring about a sense of devitalization and a loss of meaning.10   
Sheldon Wolin, today’s leading theorist of radical democracy, thus argues that a 
vital politics of popular power both is and ought to be limited to fleeting, eruptive 
moments in time.  Democracy is at once ideally and regrettably “fugitive.”11  With echoes 
of both Hannah Carl Schmitt, fugitive democratic action and association can only be 
episodic, can only be motivated by the oppression of an enemy (usually anonymous and 
systemic, on Wolin’s account), and should be an epic event of creation/destruction.  
“Fugitive democracy,” in short, is synonymous with “revolution.”  Attempting to cordon-
off the “transgressive” spirit of the democratic “mode of being” from the rationalizing 
economic imperatives of the material realm (where democracy is “domesticated” by 
constitutional forms), Wolin proposes “accepting the familiar charges that democracy is 
… inclined toward anarchy” and “rational disorganization.”12  But what then of 
organization at the level of, for instance, ordinary grassroots association and action?  
Democracy as resistance to domination requires sustained political organization, but such 
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organization would seem to signify the loss of democratic openness.  What starts as a 
theorization of popular power against systemic power results, it would seem, in retreat 
into a sort of pure and pristine powerlessness.  Striving for unconstrained power, the 
“demos” turns to fugitive escape.   
 
Offering a distinct theory of robust (if not radical) democracy, I argue that the 
everyday practice of democratic politics - what Wolin himself at times seems to pursue, 
though increasingly laments as impossible - still has a place in the modern world.  But it 
requires thinking beyond the confines of the order/openness dichotomy, and the 
consequent tendency to formulate associative action as enabled by and confined to 
extraordinary moments of heroic struggle.  The idea of democratic politics should be able 
to accommodate the common action of ordinary people.  When it comes to what counts 
as “democratic politics” I take an ecumenical view.  Voting, deliberative decision-making 
both in and out of institutional settings, protest in the streets, interest group organization 
and community organization; all of these and more are political practices wherein people 
come together in argument and the exercise of power, whether within or against the 
established system.  Now, this power can obviously be employed to more or less 
democratic purposes.  Popular power is a necessary not sufficient element of democratic 
politics, but it is what primarily concerns me here.  As Tocqueville came to recognize, the 
central threats to health of democratic society and politics follow not from a tyrannically 
overactive majority but from a politically passive citizenry.  
Following Tocqueville, I take political association, argument, and action - the 
generation and use of political power - as a necessary means to the experience of a 
meaningful, more than symbolic freedom.  This is a freedom with consequences, 
manifest in the practice of acting in the world with others rather than in the dream of 
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standing over or being away from others.  It is an effective but limited freedom - effective 
because limited.  As Tocqueville writes, the practice of democratic politics teaches us 
how to be free by teaching us “to be independent without arrogance and obedient without 
baseness.”13  My ultimate aim, then, is to formulate ways in which we might give 
political expression to freedom in democratic society.    
Situating this argument within the academic literature, much of my project 
constitutes a sympathetic critique of “postmodern,” “post-structuralist,” or “agonistic” 
formulations of radical democracy (such as appear in the works of Wolin, William 
Connolly, Chantal Mouffe, and Wendy Brown, among others).  I view many aspects of 
the robust democracy described by these writers as both possible and inspiring.  While I 
share many of their goals, though, I question their diagnosis of the reasons behind the 
infirmity of, and in turn their civic and institutional prescriptions for, democratic political 
action and association.   
For instance, Brown argues that the central threats to democracy are what she 
stylizes as neo-conservative fundamentalism and neo-liberal globalization.  Today, the 
“undemocratic citizen” embraces moralistic intolerance, the supposedly unerring 
imperatives of the global market, and even the synthesis of self-righteous religion and 
self-righteous economics, largely to the end of projecting undemocratic state power both 
at home and abroad.  The political sphere comes to be conceptualized around these 
economic and religious models - an extension of the church and/or the business 
corporation, as Brown puts it - as citizens not only concede but actually affirm “de-
democratization.”14  I reverse the explanatory arrow here and ask the overlooked 
Tocquevillian question of how our democratic principles shape common understandings 
and evaluations of politics, economics, and religion.  I argue that the expansive 
rationalities of fundamentalism and globalization actually draw strength from the 
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democratic society within which they are embedded.  Far from being outside threats to 
democracy, they are in part aspects of the idea of democratic openness - of the quest for 
the pre- and post-conventional, a world before and beyond conventional social and 
political, economic and religious forms.  The radicalization of democracy, in other words, 
goes hand-in-hand with the radicalization of religion and economics.   
Such logics of extremism - whether of extreme materialism or extreme 
spiritualism, as it were - are iterations of the same passion for revolution that lies at the 
heart of democracy.  As Tocqueville argues, the types of association affirmed as 
meaningful within the democratic social state are those that seem natural, given and 
spontaneous, “born into” - whether of the pre-conventional family (or in today’s terms, 
the “tribe,” “community,” or “culture”) and of post-conventional humanity (imagined as 
a “global village” or “world wide web”).  The types of freedom affirmed are those of 
total control and of being alone - in either case, the autocracy of the untouched 
individual.  Such norms cannot find expression in democratic political association, 
argument, and action.  In this sense, I argue that the democratic way of life is itself a 
source of, if not exactly the “undemocratic citizen,” than of the anti-political citizen.         
It is in this sense that democracy is self-subverting: the democratic way of life, 
principled upon openness, is both a precondition of and a threat to the political practice of 
democracy and political freedom.    
 
Four chapters follow.  Both following and building upon Tocqueville’s 
interpretation of democratic society, the first chapter takes up the idea of democratic 
education or character-formation in the broadest sense.  It is an exploration of how living 
in a democratic regime shapes what we experience as meaningful - whether good, 
beautiful, or true.  I focus in upon the contradictions Tocqueville identifies within the 
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democratic social state.  Those in democracy, on Tocqueville’s account, are at once the 
most materialistic and most spiritualistic, the most practical and abstract-minded, the 
most restless and docile, the most prideful and the neediest, and so on.  I show that for 
Tocqueville neither extreme is more essentially characteristic of the democratic way of 
life.  Instead, the essential character of democratic society lies in the tendency toward 
extremes.  After the democratic revolution, we imagine the utter degradation of self and 
society, but also their elevation to a similarly boundless grandeur.  As Tocqueville puts it, 
democratic man fears sinking below the level of humanity even while he dreams of rising 
above the level of humanity.  Democratic degradation takes shape as the sense of 
stultifying mediocrity and insignificance and neediness, as the loss of pride and passion, 
and ultimately as domestication.  Democratic elevation takes shape around the ideas of 
openness and limitlessness, indefinite perfectibility and infinite possibility.  To 
paraphrase Tocqueville, the fear of collapsing into the stultifying need for material well-
being is accompanied by a striving to ensure the victory of the democratic idea in the 
world.  The great paradox of democracy, Tocqueville explains, is that both sides of this 
dualism are inscribed in the political principle of equality - in what we might divide out 
as the presence of equality and the absence of hierarchy.  I go on to argue that this 
dialectic manifests itself in the simultaneous idealization of democratic political 
principles and devaluation of democratic political practices.       
In the second chapter, also following and building open Tocqueville, I turn to the 
poles of freedom (mastery and escape) and association (the family and humanity) 
inscribed in democratic society.  On Tocqueville’s account, freedom in aristocratic times 
meant having one’s own place to stand in public, and so to be seen and heard and 
honored by others.  In democratic times, freedom means having the space to restlessly 
move about and take to the open road, as it were, or simply having enough power so that 
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one need not move or compromise or depend upon others.  Association in aristocracy was 
principled upon the political right of command, and so upon the social place into which 
one was born.  Democratic associations too are born into (at least insofar as they are 
experienced as meaningful), but they are principled upon the natural ties of family 
resemblance and humanitarian compassion.  Along these lines, Tocqueville sums the 
movement from aristocracy to democracy as the shift from political bonds to natural 
bonds.  The former were put into practice as intricate, formal codes of manners and 
etiquette demarcating one’s due obligations.  The latter coalesce around the simple and 
relaxed norms of informality and intimacy - the norm of being at home with others, of 
being by oneself even when with others.  In aristocracy, even the family was a sort of 
political entity; in democracy, even political associations aspire to the naturalness of the 
family.   
In the third chapter, I turn to Claude Lefort’s theory of democracy and the 
democratic revolution.  Lefort, a leading interpreter of Tocqueville, wonderfully 
illuminates the source of the idea of democratic openness in the democratic revolution.  
The revolution is the original phenomenon of opening, which Lefort describes as “the 
dissolution of the markers of certainty.”  The revolutionary beheading of the king 
constitutes the symbolic dissolution of the present father-figure, the visible and audible 
incorporation of the father’s authority.  With the disappearance of the body of the king - 
the focal intersection of the divine and the mundane - every claim to authority becomes 
subject to contestation.  Along these lines, Lefort rightly rejects Tocqueville’s claim that 
democracy’s original revolutionary audacity might eventually suffocate under the tutelary 
despotism born of the equalization of conditions.  The passion for equality and the 
passion for revolution are inextricable, inverse sides of the same coin.  Lefort’s 
interpretation helps us to see, I argue, that the rarity of great revolutions in democracy 
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predicted by Tocqueville is a matter not of the loss of the passion for revolutionary 
openings, but of the perceived absence of a political venue for revolution.  At the same 
time, Lefort’s work represents an implicit confirmation of Tocqueville’s prediction that 
we will come to see democratic society, precisely in its openness, as natural - 
providentially given and inevitable.  Through Lefort’s writings, a self-subverting quality 
of openness becomes apparent: the fact/value of openness itself stands as sort of 
unquestionable orthodoxy.  In one sense, as the postmodernist followers of Lefort claim, 
the conventional order is opened to question (no longer received, for example, as 
ordained by God); in another sense, the world of human conventions is as such debased, 
without question.  Principled upon openness, democratic society comes to seem as much 
inscribed in the openness of nature (or more precisely, in the given and inevitable flux of 
history), as aristocratic society once seemed inscribed in the closed hierarchy of Nature.     
In the final chapter I critique Wolin’s theorization of democracy as a “fugitive” 
moment.  Another prominent interpreter of Tocqueville, Wolin is led by his commitment 
to openness to what I describe as an emergency power or executive (as opposed to a 
legislative) notion of democracy.  Here, the unity and energy required for authentic 
democratic collective action can only be a short-lived response to crisis.  Political 
association coheres around collective oppression and suffering, as a fleeting community 
of victims.  But since it is so-limited, this eruptive democratic action always maintains its 
potential for radically creative beginnings and disruptive endings - it is never 
constitutionalized, conventionalized, rationalized, systematized, or organized.  We might 
say that such a restless politics is never domesticated and always maintains its youthful 
vitality.  While Wolin celebrates this radical democratic potential for subverting co-opted 
liberal democratic forms of government, I argue that it further (and for the same reasons) 
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subverts the conditions of its own effectiveness, making even radical democratic political 
association and action less likely.  
I conclude by offering a sketch of a prescription based upon this diagnosis.  As an 
avenue toward reducing American’s reflexive, cynical aversion to politics, I propose 
reorienting self-perceptions about what we are doing when we engage in politics around 
the elevated but not transcendent notion of participating in an ongoing constitutional 
project.  Here, the text and context of the Constitution serve as a sort of super-
conventional place for the democratic practice a politics, and so as a theater for the 
political expression of freedom.  In this sense, I suggest that Madisonian 
constitutionalism might sustain a robust democratic politics.  The Madisonian tradition is 
usually interpreted and appraised solely as an institutional strategy for constraining 
popular power, or as way of representing the abstraction of “the people.”  Viewed from 
the perspective of those intellectual and ethical traits of character Tocqueville terms 
“mores,” however, the politically empowering effects of the narrative and rhetoric 
surrounding the Constitution come to light.  Beyond issues of rights and political 
legitimacy and deliberation, I argue that the symbolic order of the Constitution might 
foster participation and political vitality by framing a politics experienced as meaningful 
and potentially worthy of respect.  
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1 See, for example, John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy: 
Americans’ Beliefs about How Government Should Work (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002).   
2 In one of my favorite iterations of this claim, we hear that: “Economics, as channeled by 
its popular avatars in the media and politics, is the cosmology and the theodicy of our 
contemporary culture.  More than religion itself … it is economics that offers the 
dominant creation narrative of our society, depicting the relation of each of us to the 
universe we inhabit (and) the relationship of human beings to God … . This 
understanding … now serves as the unquestioned foundation of nearly all political and 
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More Than Kings Yet Less Than Men: Tocqueville on Elevation and 
Degradation in the Democratic Imagination  
The heart of man is vaster than people imagine.  It can entertain both a taste for 
the goods of this earth and a love of the goods of heaven at the same time    
        - Tocqueville 
PART I: THE DUALISM OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 
Democracy in America Today? 
Not yet two hundred years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville described the “great social 
revolution” of democracy as “irresistible” and “already so powerful that it cannot be 
stopped.”  Throughout the Christian world, democracy had “destroyed feudalism and 
vanquished kings;” in America, the empire of democracy already held “no less sway over 
civil society than over government.”  The advance of democracy, as Tocqueville 
famously put it, seemed no less than a “providential fact:” “it is universal, durable, and 
daily proves itself to be beyond the reach of man’s powers.”1   
Today, many argue that if anything is inevitable it is the decline and loss of 
democracy.  Sheldon Wolin, for example, stands Tocqueville on his head when he writes 
that we are currently witnessing “the steady transformation of America into an anti-
democratic society.”  We have “become a retrogressive society, evolving from a more to 
a less democratic polity and from a less to a more authoritarian society.”2  If there is an 
irresistible social revolution, it is one of de-democratization; democracy appears already 
so weak that it cannot be resuscitated.  On this inversion, democracy would seem the new 
ancien regime.  
In what is perhaps the mainstream of current academic and popular discourse, 
these two extreme positions are actually conjoined around a principle/practice distinction.  
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In principle, democracy is indeed virtually triumphant; in practice, democracy is in severe 
crisis, with the “warning signs of exhaustion, cynicism, opportunism, and despair.”3  
“Few would seem to dispute today that democracy is the best form of government seen 
from the standpoint of principle,” but “the exercise of democracy in the old-established 
democracies can hardly be judged as inspiring.”4  Democracy is “the sole surviving 
source of political legitimacy,” but “most Americans have lost faith in their democracy.”5  
Even Wolin agrees that one of “the most striking facts about the political world of the 
third millennium is the near-universal acclaim accorded democracy,” and its status as a 
“transhistorical and universal value.”6                 
We are left with the question of why the most elementary democratic practices of 
political association and action have grown increasingly rare even as democracy has 
achieved a normative empire historically unprecedented in its global monopoly of 
legitimacy.  A gap between ideal and reality hardly requires explanation, but we might 
wonder why the practice of democracy has waned seemingly in proportion to the waxing 
of democratic principles.  How can we account for this opposite movement?  The 
mystery is compounded when we reflect upon the fact that even as we expect ever less of 
democracy, we apparently expect ever more from democracy.  Most every good - 
freedom and equality, peace and prosperity, deliberative reason and ethical self-
transformation - is linked today to the principle of democracy.  Yet, as thinking about 
democracy has moved away from “minimalist” notions and toward more participatory, 
deliberative, and radical formulations over the past four decades, the widespread 
impression is that we are less and less living up even to the low standards of minimalist 
democracy.7  Expectations have continued up as voting rates have continued down.  Has 
reality ever fallen so far from ideal?  Everywhere preached but nowhere practiced, 
democracy has taken on the characteristics of a utopia.  
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In what follows, I argue that the simultaneous triumph of democratic ideals and 
decline of democratic political practices is no coincidence.  Democracy is not in crisis 
despite the fact that democratic principles are hegemonic, but precisely because 
democratic principles are hegemonic.   
The diagnosis of this self-subverting, Pyrrhic quality of democracy is, I suggest, 
at the center of Tocqueville’s own work.  While Tocqueville is far from positing Wolin’s 
retrogressive movement toward a more authoritarian and anti-democratic society, he both 
foresees and fears the anti-political inclinations of democratic society.  In his terms, as 
the “moeurs” of our “social state” become more robustly democratic, our politics become 
less so.  This, as we shall see, is because the inhabitants of democratic society are 
predisposed to harbor a reflexive contempt for democratic politics, and for themselves in 
their political roles and capacities.  In democracy, politics ceases to be seen as potentially 
a means to make things better.  It is along these Tocquevillian lines that we can address 
Wolin’s question of why, despite the fact that “all of the elements for radical protest 
appear to be present,” “there has been no general mobilization of outrage,” only an 
“astonishing passivity.”8  
My argument proceeds in four steps (the first in this chapter, the remaining three 
in the next).  First, I explore the apparently contradictory tendencies Tocqueville finds 
within the democratic social state.  Those in democracy are at once the most materialistic 
and most spiritualistic, the most practical and abstract-minded, the most restless and 
docile, the most prideful and the neediest, and so on.  I show that for Tocqueville neither 
extreme is more essentially characteristic of the democratic way of life.  Instead, the 
essential character of democratic society lies in the tendency toward extremes.  After the 
democratic revolution, we imagine the utter degradation of self and society, but also their 
 23 
elevation to a similarly boundless grandeur.  As Tocqueville puts it, democratic man fears 
sinking below the level of humanity even while he dreams of rising above the level of 
humanity.  Democratic degradation takes shape as the sense of stultifying mediocrity and 
insignificance and neediness, as the loss of pride and passion, and ultimately as 
domestication.  Democratic elevation takes shape around the ideas of openness and 
limitlessness, indefinite perfectibility and infinite possibility.  We might say that the 
dichotomy of base and noble that gave aristocratic society its normative dimensionality is 
replaced by the democratic dimensionality of domestication and openness.  The fear of 
collapsing into the stultifying need for material well-being is accompanied by a striving 
to ensure the victory of the democratic idea in the world, to paraphrase Tocqueville.  The 
great paradox of democracy, Tocqueville explains, is that both sides of this dualism are 
inscribed in the political principle of equality - in what we might divide out as the 
presence of equality and the absence of hierarchy.    
Along these lines, I follow Tocqueville in arguing that “democratic society” 
cannot be reduced to “market society.”  In full view, democratic society is part “literary 
society” and part “commercial society,” to use Tocqueville’s terms.  Democratic man, we 
might say, understands and evaluates himself as an artist of the world and also as a 
businessman in the world.  The inhabitants of democratic society exhibit their 
unconstrained idealizing imagination in dreaming of pilgrimage to new worlds, as well as 
an unchecked realism in explaining their actions entirely in economic terms.  I depart 
from Tocqueville, however, to suggest that while he correctly identifies these two 
elements of democratic society, he does not mix them in the right ratio.  For Tocqueville, 
democracy’s literary aspect is largely a relic of its revolutionary birth in France.  Over 
time, the audacious passion for revolutionary rupture and recreation is bound to give way 
to the petty and timid passion for equality and material well-being, and then potentially to 
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a collapse into the arms of a mild and tutelary despotism.  Where Tocqueville at times 
seems to present a sort of narrative arc from the former to the latter - from revolution, 
through bourgeois softness, to socialism - I argue that democracy exists in permanent 
dialectical tension between the passion for equality and the passion for revolutionary 
openness - which is to say between equality and the notion of freedom inscribed in 
equality.  Equality and the freedom born of the dissolution of hierarchical absolutes are 
co-constitutive of democratic society.  If the former makes great revolutions rare, as 
Tocqueville famously predicts, the latter constantly spurs the passion for revolution and 
the idealizing imagination.  
 I go on to argue that by depriving revolution of a political venue, democracy less 
renders revolution rare than renders revolution a private and personal matter - the passion 
for revolution is sublimated, as it were, into the passion for creativity and innovation and 
“experiencing the event.”  If in our modern democratic society we demand constant 
pleasure and security, so too do we demand constant drama and excitement.           
In the second step of my argument, I show that two extreme notions of freedom 
are embedded in our democratic social state.  As openness, freedom comes to mean 
mastery and escape.  The inhabitants of democratic society dream of total autocracy, and 
even of a sort of this-worldly elevation out of material existence, but fear the equally total 
loss of their freedom (to the point where they neither see nor would care that their 
freedom has been lost).  The response to this feared domestication is a restless striving for 
power over others and the world, and for a power-free zone possible only in isolation 
from (or uninhibited communion with) others.  Tocqueville describes this as the 
expansive, wild liberty of the savage as opposed to the politically staged freedom he so 
values.   
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Third, I follow Tocqueville in arguing that the democratic principle of 
equality/openness not only undermines hierarchical conventions, but “cannot fail to 
destroy what is purely conventional.”9  In the spheres of the family, religion, economics, 
and so forth, the democratic revolution gives birth to a quest for a pre and post 
conventional social state of nature (and so to a passion for overturning the artifice of 
conventional norms and forms in the liberating event of opening).  As Tocqueville 
argues, the social bonds affirmed as meaningful and legitimate within this social state of 
nature are those of the pre-conventional, primitive family (or in today’s terms, the 
“community,” “culture,” or “tribe”) and of post-conventional, global humanity 
(represented as the “global village” of the world-market, the world-wide web, and so 
forth).  Certain ideas, I go on to suggest, take hold of the imagination in this context: 
spiritualism free of religious form, materialism free to run its course in the open market, 
expression/communication free of words.         
And finally, I argue that an anti-political prejudice is inscribed in this democratic 
social state.  “Spiritual but not religious” has its cognate, we might say, in “democratic 
but not political.”  After the democratic revolution, we seek a democratic world before 
and beyond politics.  The sublime idea of a democratic way of life cannot find expression 
by means of democratic political action and association, and indeed can only take flight 
outside of the confining forms of political institutions and organizations - whether liberal 
or radical, representative or participatory.  From a different angle: in relation to the more 
expansive idea of freedom-as-openness, “political freedom” seems oxymoronic. 
Much of what I put forward here thus amounts to the proposition that democratic 
man does not consider himself a political animal.  He thinks himself simultaneously 
incapable of participating in and better off without politics.  Recall Aristotle’s reasoning 
that “the man who is isolated, who is unable to share in the benefits of political 
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association, or has no need to share because he is already self-sufficient, is no part of the 
city, and must therefore be either a beast or a god.”10 Tocqueville fears that those who 
live in accordance with democracy will come to see themselves, in their limitless pride 
and their limitless need, as by nature no part of the city.  In their freedom and equality, 
they will imagine themselves at once “more than kings yet less than men.”11  
Democracy as a Social State  
In Tocqueville’s notoriously expansive usage, “democracy” is more the principle 
of a way of life and state of mind than merely a form of politics.  Living in democracy, 
the way we understand and evaluate the world, how we think and feel about ourselves 
and others, what we believe and what we desire, all become somehow characteristically 
democratic.  In this sense, Tocqueville takes up democratic education or “self-
transformation” in the most capacious sense, exploring how living within a democratic 
regime orients what we find meaningful - whether good, true, or beautiful.12  It doesn’t 
seem an exaggeration to say that, for Tocqueville, the democratic revolution transforms 
the human condition and consciousness.  It carries within it the new human type of 
“democratic man,” bringing to the fore previously subordinate elements and even 
producing wholly new ideas and beliefs, passions and instincts.13  Democracy, we might 
say with only a bit of exaggeration, is the Faith of modern man.     
All of this is not to say, however, that the concept of democracy isn’t immanently 
political for Tocqueville.  Even as the idea of democracy expands beyond the political 
sphere, Tocqueville asks us to recognize that this revolution could only have begun in the 
political.  While he often writes about the spread of civilization and enlightenment, 
commerce and industry, he interprets modernity as originally and essentially democratic.  
The pivot of history is a revolution in the principle of authority - in the way by which 
power comes to be represented as legitimate authority.14  At the core of the idea of 
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authority, the aristocratic right of command is supplanted by the right of equal and 
sovereign individuals to consent, contract, and choose.  Even in the relationships of ruler 
and ruled or rich and poor, we hold that, regarding what is most fundamental about the 
two parties, they are equal.  Both equally work for wages, if not for equal wages.  
Inequality persists, hierarchy does not.    
 And it is this political transformation, this shift in the principle of legitimate 
human relations, that utterly reshapes modern existence.  As we shall see, perhaps the 
most basic conceit of Tocqueville’s work is that the transformation in the norms of 
association reorients our beliefs concerning what is real and necessary, possible and ideal, 
and even our perception of time and space.  The idea of a democratically integrated 
society colonizes and reorders every sphere of life, including the life of the mind.  
Democracy is an overall form of society within which are generated characteristically 
democratic types of politics and religion, economics and morality, the arts and sciences, 
public and private life.  For Tocqueville, then, the democratization of the principle of 
authority is the interpretive key to modern society.     
Tocqueville suggests that to recognize the keys to a social state, whether 
democratic or not, one must recognize those instances where fact and value are taken by 
its inhabitants to coincide.  In democratic times, for example, “men do not hold on to 
equality solely because it is dear to them; they also cling to it because they believe that it 
must always endure.”15  And, “all consider society a body in progress and mankind a 
changing tableau in which nothing is or should be fixed forever.”16  The sense that change 
is given and inevitable reinforces and is reinforced by the normative affirmation of social 
mobility, restless activity, novelty, and so forth.  The collapse of the belief in a stable 
hierarchy in nature and society signifies a shift in self-evidence, and henceforth equality 
and impermanence are at once presupposed as natural and embraced as good.  This 
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convergence lends a powerful but unnoticed gravity to the principle of a social state, 
instilling a “natural inclination” in the “minds and hearts” of its people - “to arrive there it 
suffices that they not hold themselves back.”17       
To gain interpretive access to a social state, then, Tocqueville seeks out the 
silence, conspicuous only from a comparative perspective, surrounding those points 
where is and ought are taken to overlap in a sort of second nature.18  For instance: “the 
French were not just friends of monarchy; they could not imagine the possibility of 
putting anything else in its place.  They accepted it as one accepts the course of the sun 
and the succession of the seasons. They were neither advocates nor adversaries of royal 
power.  This is how the republic exists in America: without combat, without opposition, 
without proof, by a tacit accord, a sort of consensus universalis.”19 One of course “meets 
with exceptions” to the generative principle of a social state - with what would be 
considered unnatural aberrations -  but “not with a contrary principle.”20     
 
From his time to our own, Tocqueville has been criticized for attempting to 
generalize to all aspects of life from a democratic starting point.  Given its complexity 
and diversity, how well does it serve us to think about modern society in terms of an ideal 
type of “democratic society”?  Does it make sense to speak of anything as Tocqueville 
does of equality, as the “dominant fact to which all other facts are related” and the 
“principle of action that dominates all others”?21    
Despite such questions, it seems today less like the passion for generalization has 
subsided than that the starting point has changed.  In particular, the notion of a market 
social state is put forth in strikingly analogous terms to those of Tocqueville’s democratic 
social state.  “Market society,” we hear, “is no longer simply a metaphor, or an analytical 
concept.  It is a living reality.  As society becomes a market the values and operative 
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norms of the market become salient to society as well.  That is why consumption, the 
driving force of the market, has assumed a special significance in the contemporary 
world. … It has become existential, the veritable badge of identity.  As we consume so 
we are.  Our economic identity as consumers is increasingly overriding our civic and 
even our human identity.”22  Here, the idea of a society ordered, integrated, and animated 
by market principles colonizes every sphere of life, carrying with it the new human type 
of consumer.      
Wolin again provides a nice contrast to Tocqueville, arguing that we live not in a 
democratic social state but in an “economic polity.” 23  Taken as the “ontological principle 
… underlying reality” and “the ‘real’ constitution of society,” economy, not democracy, 
functions as the “first principle of a comprehensive scheme of social hermeneutics” and 
“an interpretive category of virtually universal application.  It is used to understand 
personal life and public life, to make judgments about them, and to define the nature of 
their problems.  It supplies categories of analysis and decision by which public policies 
are formulated, and it is applied to cultural domains such as education, the arts, and 
scientific research.”24  In our economic polity, “market forces” supplant equality as the 
dominant fact / principle of action.25  Consequently, we are not just friends of the market; 
we cannot imagine the possibility of putting anything else in its place.          
As we shall see, Tocqueville shares many of these characterizations and critiques 
of modern society as essentially bourgeois - as the commercial society of materialistic, 
competing and consuming individuals.  I want to suggest, though, that this is just one 
aspect of the picture of democratic society he presents.  Insofar as we can generalize 
about such things, modern society is rendered more fully intelligible as originally and 
essentially democratic. Insofar as we can issue abstractions about existential badges of 
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identity and ontological principles underlying reality, we get further by beginning with 
the democratic political principle of human association.  
One upshot of this reorienting of our interpretation is that we are able to see that 
free-market consumption and competition are indeed affirmed, often silently, but only to 
the extent that they are taken to conform to and express democratic norms.  Wolin’s 
economic polity is one part of the democratic whole; an equally significant part is an 
extreme contempt for bourgeois materialism.  In this sense, Wolin’s own external critique 
of market capitalism is internal to and indeed constitutive of our democratic social state.  
After the democratic revolution, with the advent of new understanding of what is 
necessary and what is possible, we are at once limitlessly materialistic and limitlessly 
idealistic.  For Tocqueville, as we shall see, democratic society is part “commercial 
society,” but also part “literary society.” 
On Sex Objects and Soul Mates    
In the summer of 2004, Major League Baseball and Columbia pictures announced 
a $3.6 million deal to place logos for the “Spider-Man II” movie on the bases of 15 
stadiums for a weekend.  The subsequent public outcry was fierce and extensive.  Ralph 
Nader called the deal “beyond grotesque” and “a greedy new low.”  U.S. Rep. George 
Nethercutt, a Washington Republican, sent a letter to the league, arguing that “Little 
Leaguers deserve to see their heroes slide into bases, not ads,” and that the game should 
“remain pure.”  Former baseball commissioner Fay Vincent spoke out, saying “I guess 
it’s inevitable, but it’s sad. … I’m a romanticist.  I think the bases should be protected 
from this.”  One day later, the league announced it would not run the ads, relenting to 
polling wherein close to 80 percent agreed that baseball was “selling out.”26     
Can we infer anything about our “culture” or “age” or “zeitgeist” from this course 
of events?  Does it signal that we live in an consumer culture where everything is for sale, 
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or in an age of outrage over everything being for sale?  Does it mean that sports is a 
bottom-line business just like everything else, or that athletic competition is understood 
and valued as a world apart from market competition?  One need only look to the film 
“industry” itself, where artistic expression and bourgeois profit-seeking cohabitate, to see 
this conflict played out on a daily basis.  Everyone cynically recognizes that movies like 
“Spider-Man II” are made to make money, and yet the heroes of these blockbusters (and 
the actors who portray them) invariable scorn such philistinism.  The most romantic love-
stories make the most money.27       
Of course everyone knows sex sells, too.  While prostitution might be the oldest 
profession, pornography is the growth industry of the information age.  By 2006, 
pornography generated more money than Microsoft, Apple, Google, Yahoo!, EarthLink, 
eBay, and Amazon combined, and US pornography revenue exceeded the combined 
revenues of ABC, CBS, and NBC.28  As with the baseball controversy, though, we should 
notice a contrary trend toward the extreme opposite end of the spectrum from the purely 
physical pornographic relationship.  A 2001 Gallup poll commissioned by the National 
Marriage Project at Rutgers University found that “Ninety-four percent of single men and 
women, ages twenty to twenty-nine agree with the statement that ‘when you marry, you 
want your spouse to be your soul mate, first and foremost.’ Eighty-eight percent believe 
that there is one person ‘out there’ who is specially destined to be their soul mate.”  The 
Project report holds: "In a secular society, where sex has lost its connection to marriage 
and also its sense of mystery, young people may be attracted to the soul mate ideal 
because it endows intimate relationships with a higher spiritual -- though not explicitly 
religious -- significance.”  Here, over against pornographic objectification, the “ideal of 
friendship in marriage … has been notched up to a more demanding ideal.  People now 
expect their marriages to be a spiritualized union of souls.”29 (Interestingly, friendship 
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itself is often formulated in “soul mate” terms today - friends are said to form “tribes” 
that provide us with feelings of sublime connection and completion)  
Taking these two trends together, it would appear that the juvenile puerility of our 
culture is matched only by its youthful romanticism.  The contrary extremes of sex 
degraded to the purely material and love elevated to the purely spiritual seem to have 
simultaneously entered the mainstream.30  We are at once utterly superficial and scornful 
of superficiality.  For all of their obvious differences, though, there is a basic similarity 
between these “soul mate” and “sex object” types of relations.  In a common enough 
formulation, one’s soul mate is “someone who completes you” and “accepts you no 
matter what;” “soul mates have two minds, hearts and souls that operate as one.”  And in 
this limitless intimacy, just like in the total lack of intimacy between sex objects, one’s 
soul mate is “someone for whom you would not have to make major compromises.”31     
I want to suggest that Tocqueville, in his exploration of the democratic social 
state, identifies a tendency toward just these borderline extremes in the way we think 
about the possible and proper types of human relations.  Unlike most formulations, 
though (as above, where the soul mate ideal is merely a reaction to the more basic sex 
object disenchantment of secular society), Tocqueville theorizes a fixation on 
transcendent spiritualism and a fixation on the unfettered body as nearly equal aspects of 
democratic society - as opposite expressions of the same idea of democratic openness.    
 
PART II: DEMOCRATIC DEGRADATION: EQUALITY, MEDIOCRITY, DOMESTICATION  
Equality, Mediocrity, and the Loss of Passion   
Now, this interpretation of Tocqueville seems problematic from the outset.  
Tocqueville himself writes that among the various traits of democracy he surveys, “the 
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one that seems to me most general and most striking” is that nearly “all extremes are 
being softened and blunted.  Almost anything that stands out is being wiped out and 
replaced by something average - neither as high nor as low, neither as brilliant nor as 
obscure as what the world once knew.”32  In a process Tocqueville describes as the 
exchange of nobility for the justice of equality, great disparities of authority, honor, 
wealth, education, and so forth are eliminated.  In democratic society, “we should not 
expect to encounter the extremes of degradation and grandeur” that exist in all 
aristocratic hierarchies.33 
Yet, the fear of a sort of extreme degradation characteristic of democratic society 
is a constant in Tocqueville’s writings, from his earliest private letters to his notes for the 
unfinished second volume of The Old Regime.  Indeed, in democracy we run no less a 
risk than of man “sinking gradually beneath the level of humanity.”34  I want to argue 
that, for Tocqueville, a new - and hardly less extreme - type of degradation arises 
precisely with the softening and blunting of aristocratic extremes into democratic 
mediocrity.  Paradoxically, a world without great disparities of authority, honor, wealth, 
and education itself harbors the experience of dehumanization.  In aristocracy, the 
presence of nobility and serfdom simultaneously blurred the lines between man and God 
and between man and animal; in democracy, these lines are no less blurred even as 
nobility and serfdom dissolve into one vast middle-class. 
The inhabitants of democracy have long been represented as tending toward the 
subhuman and animalistic.  With the rejection of the principle of hierarchy, democratic 
peoples end up governed by their base bodily appetites and impulses rather than by the 
essentially human faculty of reason - they are ruled literally by their lower parts (by gut 
and groin) rather than by their heads.  To some extent Tocqueville follows this 
characterization, particularly in Democracy I.  Over time, though, he came to think of 
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democratic dehumanization primarily in terms of the devitalization rather than the 
disorderliness of soul and city.  The collapse of hierarchy degrades less through the 
subversion of order than through the sapping of energy.  The basic danger of equality is 
not anarchy and licentiousness, but a weakening of the intensity of passions and 
convictions.35  For Tocqueville, democratic equality deprives the heart its place in human 
things even more so than the head.  Thus, for instance, the bloodless passivity of the 
majority came to replace the chaotic tyranny of the majority at the center of his thought.  
In democratic times, he would write near the end of Democracy II, “I am far less afraid of 
audacity of desire than of mediocrity.”36     
Tocqueville offers a number of well known connections between equality and the 
loss of vitality.  On a purely contingent level, the ongoing violent upheavals of the 
democratic revolution inevitably gives way over time to fatigue.  More significantly, a 
life of equality - lived without the stable and hierarchical order of aristocracy, and so 
without the possibility of commanding or being commanded - is inevitably one of 
increased uncertainty, and so of increased inactivity.  On a still deeper level, in the 
neediness of their materialism and the felt insignificance of their individualism, the new 
men of democracy will tend to imagine themselves as both soft and small - as both 
subject to all kinds of powerful necessities and as themselves weak and powerless.                
There is another equally important connection, though, which is often overlooked.  
With the collapse of the principle of fixed hierarchy, Tocqueville reasons, the idea of 
striving becomes widespread even as people lose sight of any manifest model toward 
which to strive.  In the great gray sea of democracy, people are mobile but without 
direction because they are without example of greatness.  The nobility, Tocqueville 
writes, had acquired during their “long, uncontested experience of greatness, a certain 
pride of heart, a natural confidence in its strength, a habit of being respected.”  And the 
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very presence of nobility in society “increased the virility of the other classes by its 
example.”37  Here, we might say, inequalities of honor and authority were to the benefit 
of the least well off.  With the breakdown of the closed aristocratic order comes the loss 
of any public vision of elevation.  People are no longer held back but nor do they drive 
themselves forward.  A new sense of possibility and openness is born into the world with 
the end of immutable hierarchy, but with the collapse of the principle of hierarchy all that 
is exceptional and extraordinary - all that stirs the human heart - dissolves into the 
common and ordinary.  In one stroke the democratic revolution liberates and stultifies the 
modern imagination.  
In a formulation he returns to time and again, Tocqueville thus writes that the 
“true nightmare of our period is in not perceiving before oneself anything either to love 
or to hate, but only to despise”38  With the suffocating norm of mediocrity, the “spark and 
grandeur of ambition” fades, “human passions subside and diminish,” and man can 
“scarcely imagine a lofty undertaking.”39  He believes in nothing except the individual 
self-interest that engulfs him, and he hopes for nothing except the material gains he sees 
everyone pursuing.40  And “the same man who cannot tolerate subordination” to others 
ultimately ends up harboring “such contempt for himself that he thinks the only pleasures 
he is made to savor are vulgar ones.  He voluntarily limits himself to mediocre desires 
and never dares to reach for anything high.”41  The collapse of aristocracy is internalized, 
as it were, and even in himself he sees nothing to love or hate, but only despise.       
 
From Revolutionary Excess to Conservative Defect      
For Tocqueville, the sense of a pervasive and inescapable mediocrity thus harbors 
an intrinsically democratic type of dehumanization.  In a world of mediocrity, we find it 
difficult to conceive of the kind of goals and experience the kind of emotions that we 
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would respect.  In this sense, middle-class equality can be as dispiriting as the 
deprivations of the serf were debilitating.  In the absence of great and stirring passions, 
just as in the presence of entrenched barriers, Tocqueville fears that the human race might 
“stop progressing and narrow its horizons.”42    
Tocqueville usually formulates his contempt for the “little democratic and 
bourgeois pot of soup” within which he lives in terms of a fall from the reckless and 
sublime heroism of those who produced the democratic revolution in France - the “men 
of ‘89” - to the short-sighted and self-interested pettiness of those epigones produced by 
the revolution.43   Democratic peoples have apparently liberated themselves from paternal 
authority of every sort not on the way to Kantian maturity, but so as to indulge a sort of 
perpetual childishness.  Increasingly “entranced by a contemptible love of present 
pleasures,” endlessly “hastening after petty and vulgar pleasures with which they fill their 
souls,” they have “raised themselves to sovereign power only to gratify trivial and coarse 
appetites more easily.”44    
As we have already seen from a different perspective, though, this juvenile quality 
comes with none of the enthusiasm, vigor, and bold ambition of youth.  For Tocqueville, 
aristocratic passions no less than aristocratic properties are democratically partitioned 
into innumerable small holdings.  In equality, the grand and often unruly passions of the 
few are divided into the countless small wants of the many.45  Mediocre even in his 
desires, passionless even in his hedonism, democratic man conceives of his pleasure-
seeking only as the banal pursuit of material well-being.  He is too softened and dulled 
even to properly debauch himself - too decent to be really decadent.  Having reduced 
living well to living easily, he “scarcely imagines” human flourishing as anything more 
than “meeting the body’s every need and attending to life’s little comforts.”46  
Irresponsible and undisciplined yet uninspired, his indulgences take the form not of wild 
 37 
and squandering abandon but of securing every little convenience of domestic life.  Thus 
the childish desire for immediate “material gratification does not lead democratic peoples 
into (aristocratic) excesses.  With them, the love of well-being reveals itself to be a 
tenacious, exclusive, universal, but restrained passion.”  Even the wealthy “aim to satisfy 
the least of their desires rather than to experience extraordinary pleasures.  They gratify a 
host of small desires and avoid unruly grand passions.  Thus they lapse into limpness 
rather than debauchery.”47  With the “prevalence of the bourgeois classes … over the 
aristocratic classes,” society is “more pacific” and “less proud,” “calmer and duller, more 
tranquil and less heroic.”48 
And it is in this bourgeois limpness that democratic peoples actually grow 
dependent upon pleasure, ease, and comfort.  They love little and hate little, but feel 
themselves to need much.  Even as their desires become increasingly petty they are 
experienced as increasingly pressing.  They want only material well-being, but believe 
themselves unable to do without such well-being.  Consequently, Tocqueville predicts 
that democratic peoples will be conservative and in a sense virtuous, but for all the wrong 
reasons.  In their “spineless passion” for “material well-being,” and in the “need to obtain 
it at any price,” they will cling to any order that promises security, tranquility, and 
prosperity.49  They will sacrifice everything for well-being, and will not sacrifice well-
being for anything.  And this disposition interlaces with temperate virtues just as easily as 
it does with trivial vices.  The “love of one’s family, good morals, respect for religious 
belief, and even the lukewarm and regular practice of the established religion” combine 
with bourgeois selfishness and greed to render men incapable of great good as well as 
great evil.  In a series of formulations, Tocqueville argues that these tepid virtues promote 
honesty but forbid heroism, limit depravity but not baseness, and lead to orderliness out 
of enervation.50  “I reproach equality,” Tocqueville thus writes, “not for leading men into 
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the pursuit of forbidden pleasures but for absorbing them entirely in the search for 
permitted ones.”  In their “respectable materialism,” which “rather than corrupt souls 
would soften them,” the children of the democratic revolution might end up too well-
behaved - moderate to excess.51  Thus, Tocqueville concludes, “anarchy is not the 
principle evil that democratic centuries must dread, but rather the least of those evils.”52   
As we see in a number of above formulations, Tocqueville characterizes modern 
democratic times as without heroism.  In a theme I return to below, one wonders about 
the accuracy of this characterization given the no less than super-heroism that has come 
to fascinate us of late - as evidenced by dozens us blockbuster books, television shows 
and moves like “Spider-Man II.” 
Aristocratic Pride and Democratic Domestication 
Tocqueville famously wrote at the beginning of Democracy I that the work was 
composed “in the grip of a kind of religious terror occasioned in the soul of the author by 
the sight of the irresistible revolution, which … continues to advance amid the ruins it has 
created.”53  At least by the second volume of Democracy, though, the source of his terror 
was no longer the radicalization of the revolutionary disturbance:  “Standing as I do in 
the midst of ruins, dare I say that what I fear most for generations to come is not 
revolution?”54  As we have seen, Tocqueville instead came to fear that democratic society 
- dominated by the middle-classes’ passionless but desperate search for pleasure and 
comfort - would be peaceful out of lethargy and timidity.55  He sees future generations 
(and at times his own generation in France) abdicating the democratic place of power, 
confining themselves “ever more narrowly within the sphere of petty domestic interests,” 
and there becoming “all but invulnerable to those great and powerful public emotions that 
roil nations but also develop and renew them.”56     
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On Tocqueville’s account, what we come to lack - despite our prosperity and 
enlightenment, and even despite our political sovereignty - is the aristocrat’s proud 
disposition.  In one of the great ironies of history, the democratic revolution liberates 
people from the largely unjust bonds and inequalities of the aristocratic order even as it 
undermines the aristocratic conception of the capacity, potency, and agency of man.  
After the revolution, we are free but believe ourselves powerless.  We are no longer 
subject to commands from on high, but respect ourselves so little as to imagine that we 
are subject to even our basest impulses and instincts.   
Tocqueville narrates the tragic course of modern democracy in France, for 
instance, as “a fall from the heights of limitless pride of 1789.”57  Pride is the virtue par 
excellence of aristocracy, but also of the men who made the democratic revolution.  In 
this sense, they were hybrids of aristocracy and democracy - quasi-aristocratic actors 
striving for democratic ends.  The epic event they produced was necessarily short and 
unnecessarily terrible, but it also had “an incomparable beauty.”  “Everywhere it 
communicated the clarity, the intensity, the freshness of the emotions of youth,” even as 
it displayed the inexperience that is the “chief flaw … of youth.”58  Uniting the 
disposition of nobility with the passion for liberty and a just equality, 1789 was at least 
for a few months a time “of generosity, of enthusiasm, of virility, and of greatness.”59  It 
is true, Tocqueville writes, that the men of ‘89 displayed the aristocrat’s erroneous and 
excessive “confidence in the power that man exercises over himself and in that of peoples 
over their own destiny,” but this was a “noble error.”60  It was an over-confidence that, 
“violent and sublime,” led to “their admirable élan and … their enormous mistakes.”61  
The “French who made the Revolution … believed in themselves” and in “the power of 
man; they readily became impassioned for his glory, they had faith in his virtue.  They 
put in their own strength the prideful confidence that often leads to error but without 
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which a people is capable of nothing but servitude.”62  Those in democratic society tend 
toward the opposite extreme, which is no less an error but much less noble.  “After 
having believed ourselves capable of transforming ourselves, we believe ourselves 
incapable of reforming ourselves; after having had an excessive pride, we have fallen into 
a humility no less excessive; we believed ourselves capable of everything, today we 
believe ourselves capable of nothing.”63 
And it is from this disposition that democratic peoples might decline into type of 
degradation historically unprecedented in its character and extent.  In aristocratic times, 
Tocqueville argues, degradation was largely a matter of the physical conditions in which 
the lowest orders lived.  One “saw inequalities and misery, but souls were not degraded,” 
and so even within the “ignorant and coarse multitude one also found energetic passions, 
generous sentiments, deep beliefs, and uncultivated virtues.”64  In democratic times, the 
experience of degradation enters the soul.  Swallowed up in fatigue and doubt, constantly 
pressed by a felt neediness and insignificance, honored by and honoring no one, even 
oneself, the inhabitants of democracy grow habituated to their contempt-of-self.  The 
reality of being oppressed gives way in democratic modernity to the feeling of being 
dispirited and devitalized.   
Along these lines, it is the idea of man domesticated that ultimately becomes the 
source of Tocqueville’s religious terror.  Democratic degradation takes the particular 
form of “tameness,” Tocqueville explains, which is not the same as servility.  “When we 
say servility we mean something cowardly, low, someone who has the consciousness of 
humiliation, of slavery, and submits himself with a view to the profit gained by servitude. 
… The almost universal disease of our time is different.  It does not seem shameful and 
seems almost natural to those who are struck by it. … It is a kind of feeling of a 
domesticated animal.”65  Like the domesticated animal, uncaged but with broken spirit, 
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docility becomes second nature to democratic man.  In a sense too civilized, democratic 
peoples thus sink below the level of humanity not as the wild beasts of anarchy but as a 
“flock of timid and industrious animals.”66  It is not man-as-wolf but man-as-sheep that 
we must guard against in democratic times. 
And it is from this unreflective, internalized degradation that the democratic 
revolution might end paradoxically in what Tocqueville terms the “mild despotism” of a 
“tutelary power.”  In the culmination of their domestication, democratic peoples might 
welcome any protective power (Tocqueville, of course, focuses primarily on the power of 
the centralized, bureaucratic, administrative state) that “provides for their security, 
foresees and takes care of their needs, facilitates their pleasures,” and ultimately relieves 
them entirely of “the trouble of thinking and the difficulty of living.”67  They abdicate all 
that makes them human for the sake of an extreme sort of assisted living.  Thus, born in 
the epic struggle for liberty and equality, relaxing into a feeble and sleepy mediocrity, 
democratic peoples might end up submitting to a degree of slavishness never before 
seen.68  
For Tocqueville, a simple sense of pride vaccinates us against this democratic 
despotism.  It is hardly an exaggeration to say that Tocqueville’s theoretical project 
amounts to envisioning ways to synthesize in democratic times of mediocrity and docility 
some semblance of the pride that came as-if-naturally to the aristocratic actor.  Perhaps 
the central moral imperatives of democratic times, he writes, is to give democratic 
peoples “a more ample idea of themselves and their species.  Humility is not healthy for 
them.  What they lack most, in my opinion, is pride.”69  The difficulty, of course, lies in 
generating a quasi-noble disposition after the collapse of the principle of hierarchy.  As 
we shall see in the next chapter, democratic political action-in-association is for 
Tocqueville the primary vehicle for introducing a quasi-aristocratic mode of being into 
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democratic society.  It is by raising ourselves onto and acting on the political stage 
(whether to vote, build a school, or resist domination) that we might again honor 
ourselves and be honored by others.    
Domestication in America Today?  
Tocqueville thus takes his place in a critique that runs at least from Rousseau’s 
depiction of bourgeois man, through Nietzsche’s “last man” and Marcuse’s “one-
dimensional man,” to Benjamin Barber’s “infantilized adult.”  Whether we are slouching 
toward a brave new world, amusing ourselves to death, or what have you, Tocqueville’s 
critique continues to resonate.   
For instance, Tocqueville condemns the “universal pettiness,” “universal 
shrinkage,” and “universal weakness” of democratic society.70  Whether he represents this 
movement as a decline into the childish infatuation with present pleasures, the flaccidity 
and impotence of old-age, or the feminine aversion to hardship and preoccupation with 
domestic concerns of security and comfort, Tocqueville’s condemnation only seems to 
have increased in power and persuasiveness.71  While the particulars might have changed 
some, the fear of an encroaching domestication has remained the same.  From worries 
over the creeping decay of manly assertiveness and “core convictions” to the call for the 
unruly disturbance of authority in every walk of life, the specter of tutelary domestication 
lurks.  From the militaristic fascination with the “experience of the front” and the violent 
reality of “the street” to the provocative celebration of nonconformity and subversive 
postmodern play, from every commercial with an absurdly over-sized truck tearing across 
alkali salt flats and narrated by an unnaturally rugged voice to the comic book outlaw-
heroism so ubiquitous across popular culture, a sort of bourgeois loathing of bourgeois 
smallness and softness peaks through.  Perhaps the pervasiveness of this anxiety helps to 
explain Tocqueville’s often noted appeal to both sides of the so-called “culture wars.”72   
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Tocqueville argues that this degradation opens up the possibility of a 
centralization of power into one immense, regulating, coddling state - the vehicle of 
“tutelary power.”  This state power, Tocqueville writes, “would resemble paternal 
authority if only its purpose were the same, namely, to prepare men for manhood.  But on 
the contrary, it seeks only to keep them in childhood irrevocably.  It likes citizens to 
rejoice, provided they think only or rejoicing.”73  While the vehicle of tutelary power is 
most often conceptualized today in terms of the market rather than the state - in terms of 
omnipotent corporations rather than an omnipotent state, a slavish and base consumerism 
rather than bureaucratism, and a stultifying need for constant entertainment rather than 
for welfare - the fear that we are seduced into and pacified by reality-free rejoicing 
remains largely unaltered.74  We will see the most extensive exploration of this new mode 
of tutelary power when we take up Sheldon Wolin’s notions of “postmodern power” and 
“inverted totalitarianism.”         
At the same time, can we say that the undiminished force of Tocqueville’s 
theorization of democratic degradation actually proves the limits of its current 
applicability?  If we follow Tocqueville and say that once domesticated we would not be 
ashamed of or even conscious of our tameness, can we conclude that the ongoing 
resonance of Tocqueville’s warning is itself evidence that we are at least not yet so 
degraded?75  Perhaps some proof that we do not live in a “brave new world” lies in our 
continued recognition of that world as dystopian.  In what follows I argue that 
Tocqueville himself (even if he is not always fully aware of it) identifies the particular 
stance from which we in democratic society “face the future with that salutary fear that 
keeps us vigilant and ready for battle.”76   
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PART III: DEMOCRATIC GRANDEUR: OPENNESS AND THE ABSENCE OF HIERARCHY       
Literary Society and Commercial Society  
Thus far we have seen how, for Tocqueville, the experience of degradation is 
transformed with the collapse of the aristocratic principle of hierarchy and the rise of 
democratic equality.  But is there a comparable sense of democratic grandeur?  Can we 
speak of a democratic type of nobility and of the experience of elevation in equality, or is 
democratic society one-dimensional - reducible to “the obsession with material well-
being and the congenital flabbiness of bourgeois civilization?”77  At one end of the 
spectrum, the deprivations of the serf and the servant in aristocratic times are replaced by 
the anxieties of the bourgeois individual: even in his wealth he feels himself soft and in 
constant need; even in his enlightenment he thinks himself small and insignificant, “lost 
in the crowd” as Tocqueville often puts it.  At the other end of the spectrum we have this 
comparison: in aristocratic times, ideas of the “dignity, power, and grandeur of man are 
widely entertained;” in democratic times, “an ideal and always fleeting perfection 
presents itself to the human mind.”78  While democratic man imagines sinking below the 
level of humanity, he also imagines rising above the level of humanity.  As we shall see 
in the next chapter, in some ways the “common man” of democratic times routinely 
demands of himself what even the loftiest aristocrat would have found incomprehensible.  
He is to be a sovereign individual and self-made man.     
The full picture of democratic society Tocqueville presents starts to come into 
focus here.  If democracy’s inhabitants are “entranced by a contemptible love of present 
pleasures,” so too are they drawn to an “ideal and always fleeting perfection.”  To reduce 
democratic society to the former - to the bourgeois characteristics of the democratic type 
- is to reduce it to what it is not.  In the full picture, democratic peoples’ sense of the 
possible is as limitless as their neediness.  Their humility is matched only by their hubris, 
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and their fear of insignificance by their passion for individuality.  They are as innovative 
as they are timid, and as adventurous as they are domestic - restless, leaving home, 
dreaming and striving, narrating their lives as a series of transformative events, daily 
declaring their independence from even the slightest influence of others.  
In Tocqueville’s terms, democratic society is in part a “literary society” even as it 
is in part a “commercial society.”79  Commercial society takes shape around the motive of 
self-interest, as determined by economic calculations oriented by the bourgeois desire for 
material profit, pleasure, and comfort.  At the heart of literary society is what we might 
metaphorically speak of as the passion for revolutionary openness - for vital, dynamic, 
uninhibited, creative potentiality.  Tocqueville describes the sense of grandeur intrinsic to 
the democratic social state as bound up with this literary standpoint.  In democratic 
society, that which we honor, that which we find meaningful and motivating, is bound up 
with the revolutionary imagining of an always fleeting or fading idea of openness - and 
more specifically, as we shall see, with the freedom of openness.   
And it is from the standpoint of literary society, I suggest, that we still experience 
certain elements of commercial society as degrading - from the soft and tame neediness 
of the materialistic consumer, to the petty self-interest of the competitor.  On the other 
hand, it is by incorporating attributes of literary openness that certain elements of 
commercial society are embraced as manifestations of undomesticated freedom - from 
restless innovation and the open market, to unfettered and even savage competition.  At 
the same time, it is from the standpoint of commercial society, with its hardheaded and 
practical realism, that we scorn the flights of our literary imagination as just so much 
lofty rhetoric and inexperienced naiveté.  Given the economics of our existence, we 
should just grow up and tough it out.  It is, in other words, in between these parallel lines 
of literary and commercial society that democratic society takes shape.  Democratic man 
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is as much artist as businessman, as idealistic as he is materialistic, and as much a great 
dreamer of humanity as self-interested profit-seeker.           
In what follows, I highlight three aspects of Tocqueville’s interpretation of the 
dualism democratic society.  First, this dualism of literary and commercial society is 
characteristic not only of early French democracy, but also of democracy in America.  
Second, the grandeur to which democratic peoples aspire is as limitless as the degradation 
they fear.  And third, there is no intermediate form between these extremes of democratic 
grandeur and degradation - democratic man imagines himself either as creator or as 
creature, as master or as puppet, and seldom as anything in between.          
Making an Idea Triumph in France and America 
Tocqueville is perhaps best known for his remark that the disparate courses of 
American and French democracy is due to the fact that America was born in equality 
whereas France had to induce equality through revolution.  But this should not obscure a 
basic similarity between the origins of democracy in France and America.  In both 
countries, Tocqueville writes, democracy arose out of the attempt to ensure the victory of 
an idea in the world.  While he fears that the democratic way of life will eventually 
narrow into a purely economic way of life, he argues that it is born of a sort of religious 
striving for transcendence.  Democratic society might culminate in pure materialism and 
a base preoccupation with the body, but it begins with a visionary turn toward the 
transcendent life of the mind and the spirit.             
From the very first page of Democracy I, Tocqueville describes the advent of 
democracy as a matter of what we might call the disembodiment of power.  In feudal 
society, all “power stemmed from a single source: ownership of land.”80  Feudal 
aristocracy is “rooted in the soil; it is attached to, and dependent on, land.  It is not just 
privilege that establishes an aristocracy and not just birth that constitutes it; it is property 
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in land, passed on from generation to generation.”  Aristocratic wealth and status is 
essentially “territorial;” the power of the aristocratic family is “materialized in earth.”81  
Society was opened to democratic equality with the disincorporation of the “wellsprings 
of power and influence,” when “works of the intelligence became sources of power and 
wealth.”  This is when the clergy, lawyers, and financiers - “men of letters,” with their 
“ranks … open to all” - took up places of power in society and government.  Thereafter, 
“science was a means of government and intelligence a social force,” while “literature 
was an arsenal open to all.”82  Where the place of power was once “incorporated into the 
earth and represented by it,” in democratic society it is rendered immaterial and without 
place - “intangible and almost invisible.”83  Society, as we shall see below, takes on 
wholly new qualities of abstractness and impermanence with the dissolution of power-in-
land that accompanies the collapse of hierarchy.  It is originally in this sense that 
democratic society is characterized by openness as much as by equality.   
Perhaps Tocqueville’s most famous description of the disembodiment  
characteristic of democratic times lies in his discussion of modern despotism.  “Princes 
made violence a physical thing, but today’s democratic republics have made it as 
intellectual as the human will it seeks to coerce.”  Where once “despotism tried to reach 
the soul by striking crudely at the body,” tyranny in democratic republics “ignores the 
body and goes straight for the soul.”  No longer represented by “chains and 
executioners,” the violence of despotic power is itself rendered abstract and almost 
invisible. 84 
The shift from the physicality to the intellectual and spiritual orientation of 
society is evident from the point of departure of American democracy, with the Puritan 
settlers of New England.  In another well-known passage, Tocqueville writes: “It was by 
no means necessity that forced them to leave their native land.  They left behind enviable
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social positions and secure incomes.  They did not travel to the New World in the hope of 
improving their situation or enhancing their wealth.  They tore themselves away from the 
pleasures of home in obedience to a purely intellectual need.  They braved the inevitable 
miseries of exile because they wished to ensure the victory of an idea.”85  We might say 
that these undomesticated souls stood apart from both aristocratic landedness and 
bourgeois materialism; they were taken up with neither territory nor the pleasures of 
home.         
The French men of ’89 similarly sought to ensure the victory of an idea in the 
world.  Their means were necessarily different - revolution in the Old World versus 
pilgrimage to the New World - but their endeavor was in many ways similar.  Puritanism, 
Tocqueville writes, “coincided with the most absolute democratic and republican 
theories.”86  As such, it “was almost as much a political theory as it was a religious 
doctrine.”87  The tenets of the men of ‘89 constituted a religious doctrine almost as much 
as a political theory.  The Revolution, as Tocqueville put it, became “a new kind of 
religion.”88  Like the Reformation, the French Revolution erased “all the old frontiers 
from the map,” and “established, above all particular nationalities, a common intellectual 
homeland where men of all nations could become citizens.”  The Revolution constituted a 
sort of mass pilgrimage to this intellectual homeland, wherein “questions of territory gave 
way to questions of principle.”89  And like the Puritans, the apostles of the Revolution 
were willing to sacrifice all material well-being and bodily concern to reach this 
homeland.  In its religiosity, the revolutionary movement “tore them away from 
individual egoism, encouraged them to heroism and devotion, and often made them seem 
insensible to all the petty goods which we possess.”90   
Tocqueville marvels at the grandeur of democracy’s point of departure.  Whether 
in revolution or in pilgrimage, there was moment of sublime action to make a universal 
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principle manifest in the world.  As readers of Tocqueville know, he ascribes the tragic 
course of the democratic revolution in France to the chasm between this sublime action 
and any sort of practical political experience (in part due to the administrative 
centralization of the Old Regime which monopolized political experience; in part due to 
the uncompromising idealism and the expansive hatreds of the men who made the 
revolution).  In America, conversely, ideas were moderated by political and even 
commercial experience; principle and practice were never entirely divorced from one 
another.  Regardless, the original rupture by which democracy entered the world was an 
event for all the world and all of  history to behold.91     
As we have seen, Tocqueville’s abiding fear is that democracy’s future (and 
possibly even its present) will be moved to nothing but trivial actions wholly undevoted 
to principle - society less moved by its original intellectual and spiritual passions than 
endlessly agitated by the banal pursuit of bodily well-being.  Tocqueville presents this 
narrative in microcosm when he describes America as already devoid of great political 
conflicts, and so without great political parties.  “The political parties that I call great are 
those that dedicate themselves more to principles than to their consequences; to 
generalities and not to particulars; to ideas and not to men.”  With a sort of aristocratic 
disposition, such “parties generally have nobler features, more generous passions, more 
genuine convictions, and a franker, bolder manner than others.”  By contrast “minor 
parties are generally without political faith.  Because they do not feel ennobled and 
sustained by any great purpose, their character bears the stamp of self-interest.”  Where 
great parties “stand society on its head; minor parties agitate it.  Great parties tear society 
apart; minor parties corrupt it. … America has had great parties in the past, but today they 
no longer exist.  This change has contributed greatly to its happiness but not to its 
morality.”92       
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I want to suggest an alternative narrative, one in which the sense of grandeur 
Tocqueville describes in democracy’s point of departure becomes a permanent and 
determinate aspect of the democratic social state (in this narrative, for instance, the felt 
absence of “great parties” would be experienced as a loss).  Even as they are preoccupied 
by the pleasures of home, democratic peoples continue to inhabit an intellectual 
homeland, established above all particularities, where questions of territory give way to 
questions of principle.  Whether born in revolution or in pilgrimage, there is a sense in 
which the democratic project continues to be about ensuring the victory of an idea.   
Tocqueville himself at times seems to offer this interpretation of democratic 
society, even as he perhaps more often adheres to the decline-and-fall narrative.  In the 
former, pride, passion, heroism, and the experience of being in a sense ennobled by a 
great purpose are not lost to universal banalization and degradation, but are instead 
attached to the possibility of revolutionary, creative rupture with the way things are.  
Democratic man is an imagining animal.  Where normative meaning in aristocratic 
society took shape around the dichotomy of noble and base, in democratic society 
normative meaning takes shape in the dialectical tension between openness - of the mind 
and the heart, of society and the world - and domestication.       
 
Pride, Revolution, and the Audacity of Democratic Abstraction   
While it is true, Tocqueville writes, “that a part of the human mind is drawn to 
that which is limited, material, and useful, another part is naturally drawn upward to the 
infinite, the immaterial, and the beautiful.”93  The human mind simultaneously has what 
we might think of as economic and religious leanings.  We have seen how the idea of 
degradation in democratic societies attaches to the belief that an exclusive preoccupation 
with the former will come to dominate thought, eliminating the latter entirely.  
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Tocqueville himself expresses this fear that the human mind will in all respects cease to 
be “drawn upward.”  At times, though, he offers what seems an exactly opposite analysis 
wherein the idea of grandeur toward which the mind is drawn is not lost but radically 
expanded in democratic times.  The writers of democracy, for instance, “are always 
pumping up their imaginations until they become so unreasonably inflated that they 
forsake the great for the gigantesque.” 94  In one characteristic formulation that combines 
both strands of his thought, Tocqueville writes: “In democratic societies, each citizen is 
usually preoccupied with something quite insignificant: himself.  If he lifts up his eyes, 
he sees only one immense image, that of society, or the even larger figure of the human 
race.  He has either very particular and very clear ideas or very general and very vague 
notions; there is nothing in between.”95  On this account, democracy does not collapse the 
dimensionality of the human mind, which is still drawn upward toward the infinite and 
immaterial - the vast idea of humanity in this case.  Instead, both the economic and the 
religious leanings of the human mind tend toward unmediated extremes after the 
democratic revolution.  I argue below that this tendency of democratic thought to 
eliminate everything in between the material and the ideal - rather than either the 
tendency to collapse thought into the purely economic, or the tendency of democratic 
thought to lose itself in ideals and infinite abstractions - is at the center of Tocqueville’s 
critique of the democratic imagination.          
We have already touched upon how, for Tocqueville, the French Revolution took 
on a religious character.  “Religions,” Tocqueville writes, “consider man in himself, 
without regard for what laws, customs, and traditions of a country have added to the 
common base. … The rules of conduct which religions prescribe … are based on human 
nature itself; they can be equally accepted by all men and they are equally applicable 
everywhere.”  And the more a religion has this “abstract and general character,” the 
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“more it spreads, despite differences of laws, climate, and men.”  Animated by the 
territorially unbounded ideas of universal equality and the rights of man, the “political 
gospel” of the Revolution similarly “considered the citizen in an abstract manner, outside 
of any particular society, … independently of time and place.”96       
With the democratic abstraction mirroring the Christian abstraction in this way, 
we might say that the men who made the Revolution sought to realize in this world 
aspirations Christianity reserved for the next.  Yet, the revolutionary project operated as 
the near-total negation of the present world - the world of particular time and place - so 
as to return to an archaic past / inaugurate a pristine future of, for instance, perfect 
equality and fraternity.  The revolutionary rupture - whether conceptualized as a return to 
beginnings or as a leap into the new - constituted as much a separation from the here and 
now as an attempt to make democratic principles manifest in the world.  From “thick 
treatise to the popular song,” Tocqueville writes, French thought went on a sort of mass 
pilgrimage from the city of experience to a city of imagination.97  “Above the real society, 
whose constitution was still traditional, confused, and irregular, where laws remained 
varied and contradictory, … there was slowly built an imaginary society in which 
everything seemed simple and coordinated, uniform, equitable, and in accord with 
reason.  Gradually, the imagination of the crowd deserted the former to concentrate on 
the latter.  One lost interest in what was, in order to think about what could be, and finally 
one lived mentally in the ideal city the writers had built.”98  At an “almost infinite 
distance” from practical experience, this “literary society” was engineered upon “pure 
theory,” “abstract speculations,” and what filled “dreamers’ imagination.”99     
Striving to ensure the victory of what filled dreamers’ imagination through a 
political program of revolution, Tocqueville writes that even “political life was violently 
driven back into literature.”100  Where political affairs had been conducted by men of 
 53 
action par excellence (aristocrats, statesmen), the politics of revolutionary France was 
conducted by “men of letters” (writers, philosophers, lawyers, economists).  On 
Tocqueville’s telling, these sort of ivory-tower intellectuals’ “profound practical 
ignorance” was matched only by their “taste for the original (and) ingenious.”  Their 
impracticality, we might say, was as much a product of willfulness as of ignorance.  
Laboring to put into action a “literary politics” full of “general expressions, abstract 
terms, ambitious words, and literary turns of phrase,” they were impractical as much out 
of a “contempt for existing facts” as out of inexperience.101  At once beautiful and 
terrible, the result is what Tocqueville calls “the politics of the impossible” - perfectly 
ordered, wholly moral and just, universal in reach, purified of any departure from 
principle by ceaseless revolution, constitutively uncompromising and unrealistic.102       
In the sense of limitless possibility of this “literary” mode of politics and society 
we see a democratic basis for pride and great purpose as expansive as the neediness 
Tocqueville saw in democracy’s future.  In times of hierarchical order, pride attached to 
the lofty station of man, which presented itself to the eye in the pinnacle figure of the 
aristocrat.  In times of democratic openness, with the collapse of hierarchical order, pride 
attaches to the creative capacity of man, which presents itself to the mind in the 
phenomenon of revolution.  In his recognized superiority, the aristocratic stood atop 
society and the rest of creation; even in his recognized equality, the democratic 
revolutionary imagines himself standing above society and creation.  Man as commander 
is succeeded by man as creator.  Where the pride of the aristocrat followed from his 
capacity for action in the world, the pride of the democratic revolutionary follows from 
his capacity for imaginative abstraction from the world - with the thought of breaking 
with, re-imagining, and remaking the world.  Tocqueville calls this the “pride and 
absolute spirit of makers of systems.”103  Aristocratic elevation is not so much lost to 
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early democratic times, then, but rather outstripped by the idea of a sort of transcendence 
or overcoming of fettering reality - from nobility to unlimited perfectibility.    
 
Thus, while the democratic way of life might culminate in the timid flock animals 
of socialism, the revolutionary opening of the world to democratic principles was ushered 
in by no less than a “cult of blind audacity.”104  Indeed, it “became impossible to say what 
unheard of audacities the minds of the innovators would be led to, liberated at one stroke 
from all the limits that religion, custom, and law impose on the human imagination.”105  
Taking these two images together, the wide arc of the democratic character is from the 
extreme elevation of the revolutionary creator to the extreme degradation of the 
materialistic creature.  The story is of the departure from the scene of great men, great 
parties, great principles, great passions, great revolutions, and all those quasi-religious 
aspirations and abstractions of literary society.  With the passing of the revolutionary 
moment, the sensible, practical, unprincipled mediocrity of commercial society is the best 
that remains.  The absurd French Revolution of 1848 and its aftermath confirmed in 
Tocqueville’s eyes the coming of something much worse.          
Tocqueville’s interpretation of democracy in America and of democracy as “ideal 
type,” however, does not exactly conform to this narrative of democracy in France.  
Rather, while the equality of conditions renders the occurrence of great revolutions rare 
in established democracies, it would appear that the passion for revolution - or more 
specifically, for the openness that is inscribed in democracy’s revolutionary heritage - 
might endure.  The idealizing imagination might endure.  Put differently, it would seem 
the collapse of hierarchy produces a permanent belief in infinite possibility as much as a 
stultifying mediocrity.  Tocqueville identifies these “literary” qualities in the America of 
his time and in the concept of democracy, even if not to the unhinged extent to which 
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they were present in the France of his past.  Extending and reproportioning Tocqueville’s 
analysis from the perspective of our own time, I suggest below that democratic society 
does not take shape in the arc from revolutionary audacity to bourgeois (much less 
socialistic) tameness, but in permanent tension between these polar opposites.  The 
democratic character sees himself as at once revolutionary creator and materialistic 
creature.   
The Poetic and the Prosaic in Democracy  
The contrast Tocqueville draws between French democracy and American 
democracy is well known.  The former is a social state wherein democratic equality is 
alloyed with the alien presence, as it were, of revolution - warped by first the act and then 
the memory of revolution.  The latter is a social state of untroubled equality, and so of 
democracy relatively closer to what Tocqueville would consider its true and normal form.  
Put differently, we might look to France to see democratic revolution and to America to 
see democracy as such.   
The contrast of French and America democracy would seem to map onto the 
dichotomy of literary and commercial society.  As Tocqueville describes it, American life 
is directed not by utopian men of letters, with their quasi-religious abstractions and their 
audacious idealism, but by pragmatic men of business.  The settled equality in which 
Americans live turns their thought to the particular and material things of this world.  
They are makers of things rather than of systems.  All men in America - and eventually 
“all men who live in democratic times” - consequently acquire in their equality and 
mediocrity the “habits of the industrial and commercial classes.  Their minds take on a 
serious, calculating, and positive cast.  They gladly turn away from the ideal and aim for 
some visible nearby goal … .106  Where France had economists and political philosophers 
(physiocrats and philosophes), America has businessmen and politicians.  
 56 
A number of intertwined contrasts follow.  Where revolution gave French 
democratic thought an ideological and uncompromising bent alien to an established 
equality of conditions, American democratic thought is empirical and practical - it never 
has “so blind a faith in the correctness and absolute truth of any theory.”107  Where the 
idea of revolutionary rupture induced the French to abandon the real world of facts and 
experience for a world of “general and eternal law(s) … (that) encompass the entire 
human race,” such sweeping generalities “terrify” the minds of Americans, which are 
“accustomed to concrete calculations” and prefer “common sense” to “genius.”108  In 
turn, where French thought is always driving via abstraction toward universality - and so 
toward uniformity, reduction, and systemization - Americans “honor practice above 
theory” and are always “correcting … ideas through experience.”109  Finally, where 
revolutionary democracy was inherently non-territorial and expansionistic, Tocqueville 
describes American democracy as utterly local (only at great pains made national).   
And these qualities of the businessman order other spheres of life beyond the 
economic.  For instance, as we shall see, the practice of the sciences in America conforms 
to the norms of commercial society.  “In America, the purely practical part of the 
sciences is admirably cultivated,” even while “almost no one in the United States devotes 
himself to the essentially theoretical and abstract aspects of human knowledge.”110 
 
But democracy is not without its literary qualities.  In the full picture Tocqueville 
presents, the dualism of literary society and commercial society is hardly less 
characteristic of American democracy and of democracy in general than of democracy in 
Europe.  Americans are almost as idealistic as they are pragmatic, almost as taken with 
the immaterial and infinite as they are obsessively materialistic, and nearly as liable to 
lose themselves in vast and abstract generalities as in the practical and particular.  And 
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Americans are not just conservative and rooted in the local; they “have always 
demonstrated a decided taste for the sea,” and “already reach well beyond” the “limits” of 
their “territory.”111  Nowhere does the American “perceive the limits that nature may have 
imposed on man’s efforts,” and this makes him “ardent in his desires, enterprising, 
adventurous, and above all innovative.”  Amid the “universal movement that dominates 
everything else in the United States,” an “American experiences all life as a game of 
chance, a time of revolution, a day of battle.”112  The difference between the French men 
of ’89 and the average American here starts to sound like one more of degree than of 
type.             
 We have already seen how the point of departure of democracy in American was 
about ensuring the victory of an idea, just as in France.  To some extent, of course, the 
necessity of ensuring this victory through revolutionary rupture with the present world 
was contingent upon the French social and political condition - the old world had to be 
torn down to make way for a return to the primitive / creation of the pristine.  American 
democracy took shape differently because it did not need to undergo the terrible labor of 
revolution.  Born equal into the new world, it did not need to be born-again.  Moreover, 
administrative centralization paved the way to revolution by depriving the French of any 
chastening practical political experience, as well as by habituating them to the thought of 
changing everything at once from the top down.  American democracy was born local 
and built from the bottom-up with hands-on experience, and for this reason too it took 
shape differently.  Americans didn’t have to fight very hard to ensure the victory of the 
democratic idea.  
 At the same time, though, Tocqueville’s interpretation of democracy in America 
shows that the idea of revolutionary rupture is constitutive of the democratic way of life 
as such, rather than merely contingent upon French circumstances.  The abstraction of 
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universal equality, for instance, places the schism of “literary” idealism and 
“commercial” realism permanently at the center of democracy, just as Christianity has at 
its center the schism of this world and the next.113  The passion for revolutionary 
abstraction from the here and now is as basic to democracy as the desire for material 
well-being in the present moment.  The democratic revolution, we might say, is as 
temporally unbounded as it is territorially unbounded - as recurrent in time as it is 
expansive in space.             
However much Americans - and the democratic type in general - prefer prosaic 
common sense to genius, Tocqueville makes clear that when they “dream … of what will 
be … their imagination knows no bounds.  It stretches and grows beyond all measure.”114  
This becomes apparent when we look at the poetry natural to democratic times.  Poetry, 
on Tocqueville’s account, “is the search for and depiction of the ideal.”115  As such, a 
study of the poetry of democracy illuminates the course and tendencies of the idealizing 
imagination of democracy society more generally.  On first take, it would seem that 
democracy will be without sources of poetry.  Democratic thought is drawn to material 
pleasures and gains, and so “almost exclusively preoccupied with conceiving the useful 
and representing the real.”116  Moreover, equality “not only discourages portrayal of the 
ideal but also reduces the number of objects to be portrayed.”  Principled upon 
hierarchical difference and rooted in the locality of landedness, the era of feudal 
aristocracy was one of deeply ingrained diversity.  This turning toward particularity 
rather than generality or universality was reflected in the religious practices of aristocratic 
peoples.  What seized the imagination was not the axial unity of the faiths (as we see 
today with the wildly popular works of Karen Armstrong, for instance), but the 
irreducible differences between the faiths.  Consequently, religion in aristocratic times 
was not simplified of all save God and man but rather populated by all sorts of particular 
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“supernatural beings” and “secondary agents.”  “An aristocratic people,” Tocqueville 
writes, “will always be inclined to establish intermediate powers between God and man.”  
The distant grandeur of these figures, as well as the only slightly less distant grandeur of 
the aristocrat himself, gave the poets of feudal aristocracy “a thousand diverse subjects to 
portray.”117   
What is there left in democratic mediocrity and uniformity - “where all men are 
insignificant and very much alike” - to idealize?118  The answer is the very unbounded 
vastness that becomes thinkable with the democratic abstraction.  The democratic sense 
of grandeur forsakes the great for the gigantesque.  At first this course of the imagination 
turns democratic peoples to inanimate nature.  “As they lost sight of heroes and gods, 
they sought first to depict rivers and mountains.”  Idealizing the “material and inanimate 
things that cover the earth” is, however, “only a passing phase.”119  In the end, even 
material nature proves insufficiently vast to spur the democratic imagination, which 
drives on to the exclusively immaterial and infinite.  In the idea of “indefinite 
perfectibility,” for example, democracy “opens the future” to poetry.  Nobility is 
supplanted by openness to the possible as a source of poetry.  And ultimately, the very 
“similitude of individuals, which makes each of them an unsuitable subject of poetry, 
enables poets to embrace all in a single image” as the “nation as a whole” lends itself to 
the portrayal of the ideal.120      
Democratic abstraction does not stop with the nation or the state, though.  In their 
particularity and territoriality they fall short of the democratic imagination’s reach, which 
drives on to the idea of the merging of all nations into “one vast democracy.”  For “the 
first time in history,” Tocqueville writes, the democratic abstraction makes it possible to 
envision “the human race as a single whole.”121  The poets of aristocracy “never dared to 
embrace the destinies of all mankind,” looking up only as far as to the relatively 
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insignificant actions of passing aristocrats and their particular figures of faith.  The 
democratic imagination is not so limited.  “As individuals look beyond their own country 
and at last begin to perceive humanity as such, God reveals ever more of himself to the 
human spirit in his full and entire majesty.”  If belief in “intermediate powers” fades, 
democratic peoples “are nevertheless apt to form a far vaster idea of Divinity itself and to 
see its intervention in human affairs in a new and brighter light.”122  Tocqueville thus 
concludes that “equality does not destroy all the subjects of poetry; it reduces their 
number but enlarges their scope.”123           
We have already touched upon the sort of disembodiment that is constitutive of 
the democratic point of departure.  We see now how this idea of formlessness - of being 
without incorporating and determinate territory or body  - remains present in the 
idealizing imagination of democracy.  “Democratic poets will always seem petty and cold 
if they venture to bestow corporeal form on gods, demons, and angels and bring them 
down from heaven to vie for the earth.  But if they seek to link the great events they 
narrate to God’s general design for the universe [as does Tocqueville himself], and to 
reveal the sovereign master’s thought without showing his hand, they will be admired 
and understood, because the imagination of their contemporaries naturally follows this 
same route.”124  A similar tendency is apparent in the ultimate source of democratic 
poetry - democratic man, who is taken to be man as such, “apart from time and country 
and set before nature and God.”125  Man as abstract figure of humanity supplants the 
aristocratic as visible figure of hierarchy in the poetical imagination.  The portrayal of the 
ideal in democracy thus requires “sounding the depths of (man’s) immaterial nature,” 
depicting “passions and ideas rather than persons and actions” and ultimately delving 
“beneath the surface revealed by the senses to catch a glimpse of the soul itself.”126  
Unlike the bourgeois individual, democratic man is not at all superficial.     
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It seems thus that the revolutionary “politics of the impossible” is mirrored by a 
generally democratic poetry of the impossible.  “Finding no more material for the ideal in 
what is real and true, poets give up on truth and reality altogether … .”127  Democratic 
idealization is drawn away from corporeality - above or below the territory of the present 
moment - and toward the wholly immaterial and infinite.  Implicit in Tocqueville’s 
analysis, it would seem, is that the moment even the vast abstractions of democratic 
modernity - nation, state, the people, man as such, humanity, human rights, and so forth - 
are given representative form, as soon as they are objectified by definitional borders and 
boundaries, the idealizing imagination will be left cold and turn elsewhere.  Public 
opinion will be inviolable as amorphous “common sense,” for instance, but will lose its 
normative weight the moment it is represented in poll form.  The divine will be sapped of 
its grandeur the moment it is made manifest in finite, particular religious form.128  In this 
way, the poetry of democracy drives ceaselessly toward the unrealizable and 
unrepresentable in its representations of the ideal.  It seeks to depict not the elevated and 
distant figures of aristocracy, but rather things essentially elusive and transcendent.  
There is a sort of revolutionary contempt for existing facts intrinsic to the idealizing 
imagination of democracy.  
 
Democracy, then, is not without its poetical sense of grandeur.  The world as 
experienced in equality, with its correlates of materialism and mediocrity, is lost to 
poetry.  But the world as experienced with the collapse of hierarchical absolutes, with its 
correlate sense of openness and being without limits, presents a vast canvass for the 
idealizing imagination.  Indeed, forsaking the great for the gigantesque, the poetry of 
democracy is animated by ideas so sublime that the poetry of aristocracy seems by 
comparison timid and petty.     
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These poles of prosaic equality and poetical openness - of mediocrity and 
possibility - give the democratic social state its dimensionality (as with nobility and 
baseness in the aristocratic social state).  On Tocqueville’s account, we might say that the 
democratic way of life takes shape between its science and its poetry.  On one hand, the 
collapse of hierarchy turns the mind toward a constitutively unrealistic openness - toward 
the infinite possibility that fills the dreamers’ imagination.  On the other hand, equality 
turns the mind toward the tactical - toward negotiating the “real world” of empirical 
“facts on the ground” in pursuit of the “useful.”  Preoccupied by everyday material 
existence, democratic thought is disposed to value pragmatic calculations, instrumental 
rationality, and practical experience.  Tocqueville argues that this state of mind comes to 
dominate the sciences in democracy.  “People who cultivate the sciences in democratic 
nations are always afraid of losing their way in utopian ideas.  They distrust systems and 
like to stick very close to the facts, which they prefer to study for themselves.”129  As 
opposed to the revolutionary, poetical contempt for existing facts, democratic men of 
science have a “taste for the tangible and real in all things.”130  
Tocqueville thus puts forward both of the following: “Equality does not destroy 
the imagination …, but it does limit it, forcing it to hew close to the earth as it flies;” but 
also, “I have no fear that the poetry of democratic peoples will prove timid or quite 
mundane.  I worry, rather, that it will constantly be losing itself in the clouds and end up 
depicting worlds that exist only in the imagination.”131  This sort of bipolarity is reflected 
in democratic language.  With their sober, scientific, commercial cast of mind, democrats 
favors “plain language” to “bandying about big words.”132  At the same time, democratic 
peoples have “a taste and often a passion for general ideas” and “vagueness,” which 
“manifests itself in democratic language through the constant use of generic terms and 
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abstract words.”133  In these things, I suggest, Tocqueville does not contradict himself,  
Rather, he envisions the dualism of the democratic social state.      
We see the whole pictures of democratic society in a minor but telling chapter 
from Democracy II: “Why Americans Build Such Insignificant and Such Great 
Monuments at the Same Time.”  In democratic times, “man’s imagination shrinks when 
he thinks of himself as an individual and expands without limit when he thinks of the 
state.”  Reflecting these poles of the imagination in their works, democratic men 
“produce a host of trifling works but also erect a small number of very great monuments.  
Between these two extremes … there is nothing.”134  
Humanity and the Individual 
Tocqueville is of course less than enraptured by the literary abstractions that 
capture the democratic imagination.  At times he seems as wary of the democratic sense 
of grandeur as of democratic degradation.  Interpreters of Tocqueville have long 
emphasized his warning that individuality and diversity might be lost to the experience of 
limitlessness characteristic of democratic times.  Forsaking the great for the gigantesque, 
the individual feels insignificant before the very vastness he idealizes.135  This fear 
manifests itself in Tocqueville’s work in a variety or forms - as the feeling of being “lost 
in the crowd” amid the monolithic sameness of mass society, as conformity to public 
opinion, as the tendency to drain the world of its particular qualities and to reduce human 
judgment to simple numbers counting.  Tocqueville fears above all that democratic 
abstraction - the turning of the mind from the particular to the general in all things - paves 
the way for centralization and the loss of the rights of the individual to the right of “the 
social power.”136  Being without territory, the democratic movement might well be 
encapsulated as from the utter localism and particularity of feudalism to the uniformity 
and centralization of socialism.  
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 Indeed, for all of his praise of the audacity and selfless abandon of the 
revolutionary men of ’89, Tocqueville argues that their beautiful abstractions and 
universal systems only streamlined things for further concentrations of power.  Perhaps 
paradoxically, the passion for revolutionary transcendence no less than the passionless 
need for material well-being harbors the tendency toward centralization.  By contrast, 
Tocqueville famously praises the American conduct of “public business.”  Like the 
merchants who “will not entertain ideas having to do with business until they have 
examined them,” and even then will “accept them only tentatively,” the everyday 
business of American politics “force each citizen to be concerned with government in a 
practical way, (and to) moderate the excessive taste for general theories in political 
matters that equality encourages.”137  Carrying the pragmatic and empirical caste of mind 
of commercial society into political life, Americans check the centralizing bent of the 
poetical imagination by virtue of prosaic, first-hand experience.                     
It would be a mistake, however, to take Tocqueville’s wariness as an outright 
condemnation of democratic abstraction.  He writes, for instance, that the “taste and … 
passion for general ideas” is a consequence of the “inherent virtues and defects” of the 
democratic mind, and that the “great merit … as well as the great weakness” of 
democratic language lies in the “constant use of generic terms and abstract words.”138  
 One of these weaknesses is an obscurity of thought and vagueness of language.139  
On a more troubling level, the passion for general ideas threatens the notion of human 
agency.  In aristocratic times, the “world stage” is occupied by a small number of 
“leading actors;” the “influence that a single individual can exert” upon the course of 
history is obvious to all.  In democratic times, “when all citizens are independent of one 
another and each of them is weak,” society “seems to proceed on its own owing to the 
free and spontaneous cooperation of all its members.  This naturally prompts the mind to 
 65 
look for the general reason that could have struck so many intellects at once and 
simultaneously reoriented them all.”140 In democratic society, one is “far more aware of 
acts and far less of actors.”  The disappearance from the stage of the commanding 
aristocratic actor opens the door to explaining human action in terms of such ideas as “the 
nature of races” and “the spirit of civilization,” - or to update the language, in terms of 
evolutionary programming, market forces, and other such unseen and impersonal 
ordering powers.141  In turn, it becomes “tempting to believe” that human action in 
general “is not voluntary, and that societies are unwittingly obedient to a superior force, 
which dominates them.”  Even if it is of this world, any “cause vast enough to apply to 
millions of people at once and strong enough to move them all in the same direction 
might easily seem irresistible.”  Here again the sublime abstractions of the democratic 
imagination can be as degrading as the need for comfort, security, and pleasure.  The 
democratic individual readily submits to the thought that he “has no power over either 
himself or his surroundings” - that he is, for instance, wholly a creature of market 
necessities or evolutionary imperatives.142                         
At the same time, though, Tocqueville argues that the abstract thought and 
language of democracy captures as much as it obscures of what is true, good, and 
beautiful.  First, general causes really do “explain more things in democratic centuries 
than in aristocratic ones, and particular influences explain less.”143  Tocqueville even 
identifies his own use of the word equality “in an absolute sense” and “without applying 
it to something in particular” as an example of democratic abstraction.144  Second, for all 
of his praise of American’s business-minded tendency to check general theories and 
grand principles through their practical application, Tocqueville writes that if “the 
sources of our enlightenment were ever to die out, they would dwindle gradually,” as we 
“limit ourselves to applications, (and) … lose sight of principles.”145  Where dissolving 
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individuality and agency into the vast abstractions of democracy “would soon paralyze 
the new societies and reduce Christians to Turks,” losing sight of those abstract principles 
and theories in an exclusive preoccupation with practical concerns can only lead to “the 
singularly static character of the Chinese mind.”146  
Tocqueville’s full ambivalence comes into view with his discussion of that 
grandest of democratic generalities: humanity.  In times of equality, man “sees around 
him only people more or less like himself, so he cannot think of any segment of humanity 
without enlarging and expanding his thought until it embraces the whole of mankind.”147  
On one hand, Tocqueville fears that individuality will be swallowed up in this recognition 
of resemblance.  The reductive, expansive power of abstraction here obscures the 
particular qualities of people and nations, leaving apparent only the homogeneous 
generalities of “the mass.”  On the other hand, in pre-democratic times people lost sight 
“of the common thread that ties (people) all together into the vast bosom of the human 
race.”  Even the “most profound geniuses of Greece and Rome … never hit upon the very 
general yet at the same time very simple idea that all men are alike and that each is born 
with an equal right to liberty.”  Again associating the democratic abstraction with the 
Christian abstraction, Tocqueville writes that “it took the coming of Jesus Christ to make 
people understand that all members of the human race are by nature similar and equal.”148  
I would suggest that Tocqueville is concerned less with the abstract mode of 
democratic thought and speech as such than with the tendency to extend this mode to 
exclusive extremes.  Democratic abstraction, for instance, has greatly advanced the cause 
of freedom.  The recognition of human resemblance, and in turn of the general principle 
of the rights of man, exposes the practice of slavery as unjust and based on false 
doctrines.  But this very idea of sameness, when taken to extremes, threatens the 
individual and his rights, producing the image of humanity as herd - as one vast, 
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undifferentiated multitude.  As we shall see in the next chapter, for Tocqueville the health 
of the democratic social state requires perhaps above all the presence of intermediate 
forms or “secondary bodies” of human association between the insignificant individual 
and infinite humanity.  
Conclusion: Principle Versus Practice in Democratic Society               
Thus far I have attempted to sketch out Tocqueville’s view of how the transition 
to democratic modernity signifies a transformation in the ways we imagine and 
experience degradation and grandeur.  I suggested that on his account degradation takes 
shape as domestication, which he associates with the inescapable mediocrity, the loss of 
pride and passion and purpose, and the need for material well-being characteristic of 
democratic society.  Compared to the proud aristocrat and the audacious revolutionary, 
the bourgeois individual of democracy is petty, timid and soft.  I argued that 
Tocqueville’s thoughts on this front are of interest not because they accurately gauge our 
present condition, or even our likely future condition, but because they precisely capture 
our paramount fear of being tamed by tutelary power, whether political, social, economic, 
or so on.  That Tocqueville’s fears are our own attests to the point that we are not yet at 
least so shamelessly domesticated.  Put differently, when reflecting upon who we are as 
an “age” or “culture,” we are better off thinking of this sort of creeping degradation as a 
constitutive fear rather than as a present of looming reality.      
At the other end of the spectrum, a sense of grandeur takes shape around the idea 
and experience of what I have called democratic openness.  Such openness is bound up 
with what Tocqueville describes as the democratic passion for revolutionary rupture, and 
for the unfettered creative possibility that is the product of rupture.  The democratic 
individual draws his driving purpose and passion from the thought of an ideal and always 
fleeting perfection.  Tocqueville argues that the sense of sublime vastness inherent in 
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democratic openness might paradoxically be experienced as degrading when the 
individual feels himself overawed and overwhelmed - when the particular qualities of self 
and world are swallowed up into the general and the infinite.  The democratic sense of 
grandeur, we might say, is not necessarily elevating.   
I went on to suggest that at times Tocqueville himself seems to present a picture 
of democratic society that is not bound up with a narrative of decline-and-fall into 
tutelary despotism.  Here, the democratic way of life is normatively ordered and animated 
by a constant tension between the fear of domestication and the hope for openness.  
Tocqueville captures this dualism of democratic society in his notions of commercial 
society and literary society.  We imagine the collapse of society into the purely economic 
- into bourgeois materialism, petty competition, calculating self-interest, the meaningless 
pursuit of bodily pleasures, and so forth.  At the same time, we imagine a sort of quasi-
religious pilgrimage of moral and spiritual transcendence - abstracting from the fetters of 
all things material, physical, bodily, territorial.  It is in this vein that I offered the sex-
object and the soul-mate as metaphors for the opposite extremes inscribed in democratic 
society.  
The key here is that the character of life in democracy is not captured by either 
extreme, but rather by the simultaneous tendency toward both extremes.  We should 
expect the inhabitants of democracy to be as immoderate in their materialism as in their 
spiritualism, and as radical in their cynicism as in their idealism.  The correlate of the 
unlimited possibility we idealize is the unlimited need we fear possible.  That which 
makes indefinite perfectibility thinkable at the same time makes indefinite corruption 
thinkable.  We might say that a sense of hierarchical extremes (of noble and base) is 
supplanted by a sense of democratic limitlessness.  Heroism becomes super-heroism, 
power becomes super-power, servility becomes domestication.     
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What Tocqueville shows is that both aspects of democratic society - both 
democratic degradation and democratic grandeur; both commercial society and literary 
society - are principled upon equality, or what I have divided out as the presence of 
equality and the absence of hierarchy.  The leveling of the former is conjoined to the 
openness of the latter.  Thus, the “same equality that allows each citizen to entertain vast 
hopes makes all citizens individually weak.  It limits their strength in every respect, even 
as it allows their desires to expand.”149  Equality “drives men forward and at the same 
time holds them back, spurs them on yet keeps them tethered to the earth.”150  Here we 
have the full picture of life in democracy. 
As just one instance of the democratic affinity for all-or-nothing notions of 
degradation and grandeur, take the terms of the debate surrounding today’s so-called 
“genetics revolution.”  Michael Sandel, for example, writes that it is possible “to view 
genetic engineering as the ultimate expression of our resolve to see ourselves astride the 
world, the masters of our nature.”  Sandel offers the following from molecular biologist 
Robert L. Sinsheimer as an early and exemplary statement of this Promethean resolve: 
“‘As we enlarge man’s freedom, we diminish his constraints and that which he must 
accept as given.’ Copernicus and Darwin had ‘demoted man from his bright glory at the 
focal point of the universe,’ but the new biology would restore his pivotal role. … ‘We 
can be the agent of transition to a whole new pitch of evolution.  This is a cosmic 
event.’”151  Ethicist Julian Savulescu recently offered an even more radical formulation of 
the same aspiration.  In light of our newfound biotechnological powers, the “next stage of 
human evolution may be rational evolution, where we select children who not only have 
the greatest chance of surviving … , but who also have the greatest opportunities to have 
the best lives.”  Evolution need no longer be a pitch at all. The choice is ours: “the natural 
lottery or rational choice.”  To fail to exert our power over nature “is to be responsible for 
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the results of the natural lottery.”  “Our future is now in our hands, whether we like it or 
not.”152 
Even as innovations in biotechnology have allowed us to entertain vast and lofty 
hopes, however, we apparently take ourselves to be ever more firmly tethered to the 
earth.  With statements like Savulescu’s,  Sandel worries that the power to rewrite our 
genetic constitutions will lead to a radical expansion of responsibility.  As we “attribute 
less to chance and more to choice,” “humility gives way (and) responsibility expands to 
daunting proportions.”153  Yet, as new modes of brain imaging have seized the 
imagination the very concept of responsibility is called into question.154  We have the 
power to “reprogram” our genetic codes, but we are powerless to escape our material 
“hardwiring.”  We slide between the image of ourselves as (far beyond aristocratic 
commanders) the masters and re-creators of the reality we inhabit, and as puppets on 
evolutionary strings.155  As Tocqueville fears, we paradoxically take ourselves to live in a 
wholly determined world wherein everything is becoming possible - everything is given 
and nothing is given.  Amidst the “cosmic event” of the “genetic revolution,” we think 
ourselves always teetering on the brink of both rising above and sinking below the level 
of humanity - of collapsing into dehumanization and leaping into the “post-human.”  In a 
single stroke the lines are blurred between man and God, and between man and animal.     
 
At this point we can return to the question with which we began: how might we 
understand the simultaneous waxing of democratic political principles and waning of 
democratic political practices?  Following Tocqueville and extending my own 
Tocquevillian analysis, I have argued that this contrary movement is inscribed in the 
democratic social state itself.  It is born of the more general divergence of the “literary 
world” of ideas and speech (which takes shape as a sort of this worldly transcendence of 
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the here and now), and the “commercial world” of action (which is reduced to purely 
economic rationalities and formations).  When we think and talk about democracy we are 
prone to flights of poetical idealism.  We have a dream of a world reordered exclusively 
in accordance with democratic principles - a world of openness, of universal freedom-in-
equality where anything we can imagine is possible.  As I take up in the following two 
chapters, nowadays this democratic world seems as natural as the world of hierarchy 
seemed in the past - any sort of walling up of self, society, or world is destined for the ash 
heap of history.  At the same time, we are prone to cynically degrade the prosaic world 
within which we act - whether politically or otherwise - to the status of wholly 
unprincipled.  Within the confines of the material world, we are experienced enough to 
know that ideas are decidedly immaterial, talk is cheap, deliberation is a naïve waste of 
time, and arguments are just “spin” meant to manipulate.  This sort of world seems 
natural too - real, given, and inescapable.  Taken together, the revolutionary triumph of 
democratic principles seems as inevitable as the basic practice of democratic politics 
seems impossible.       
With this divorcing of the world we imagine and the world we experience - of 
thought and action, principle and practice - democratic society appears populated by two 
polar opposite characters.  There is the man of business, the decider, the practical man of 
action who just gets things done.  And there is the man of letters, the dreamer and artist 
who represents the call for change of the next generation.  (As I write this, the degree to 
which Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton have come to almost embody these two poles 
in the Democratic presidential primary is striking.)  What is of interest, I suggest, is that 
the synthesis or mediation of these two types seems almost inconceivable today.  The 
dreamer is all principle and no practice, the businessman is all practice and no principle, 
and there is nothing in between.  In relation to the latter, the former seems 
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uncompromising and/or impotent; in relation to the former, the latter seems calculating 
and corrupt.  The choice is between meaninglessness and powerlessness.  The marriage 
of principle and practice by the statesmen gives way to the split between the sell-out 
politician just “playing politics” and the naïve and/or moralistic political preacher.156     
Principled upon openness, then, democratic politics can only be a politics of the 
impossible.  A contempt for existing facts is not contingent upon conditions and events, 
but intrinsic to democratic society.  This is because by its very nature the principle of 
openness cannot be realized as an existing fact.  We can never quite ensure the final 
victory of the democratic idea in this world.  The attempt to put the principle of openness 
into practice is thus at once self-radicalizing and self-defeating. It is self-defeating 
because any determination of a course of action on behalf of the principle of openness 
can only be experienced as a loss of openness itself - as the decision that puts an end to 
questioning, as the making up of one’s mind that signifies the end of possibility.  The 
democratic politics of openness is a politics of buyer’s remorse.  The pursuit of an open 
society and an open world is self-radicalizing because, paradoxically, we end up 
experiencing progress as a sort of regression.  Tocqueville famously wrote that the 
“inevitable evil that one bears patiently seems unbearable as soon as one conceives the 
idea of removing it.”157  In times of democratic openness, we conceive the idea of 
removing every evil, of “indefinitely perfecting” the world and ourselves in one way or 
another.  Consequently, we grow increasingly sensitive to and frustrated by those evils - 
those inequalities, injustices, immoralities, and limitations to our freedom - that persist 
precisely because they seem more absurd and contingent as they seem more slight.  Put 
differently, as openness comes to seem increasingly natural and inevitable, every 
limitation, border, boundary, and material necessity seems increasingly unnatural, and so 
increasingly intolerable.  “The weight, although less heavy, seems then all the more 
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unbearable.”158  As society grows increasingly democratic, then, might it seem as though 
it were increasingly undemocratic?   
   
In the next chapter I argue that, for Tocqueville, the political practice of 
democracy is integral to the health of democratic society because politics potentially 
serves as a venue for the mediation of principle and practice.  Political society stands in 
between the extremes of literary society and commercial society.  The citizen reconciles 
the artist and the businessman.  
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Civilization Without the Discontents: Tocqueville on Democracy as the 
Social State of Nature 
After having lent liberty a thousand imaginary qualities, people no longer saw its 
real charm          
       - Tocqueville  
PART I:  FREEDOM, EQUALITY, AND POWER 
Freedom’s Meaning: Mastery and Escape 
In America today, freedom has taken on two polar opposite meanings.  This is the 
conclusion put forward in 2005 by moral psychologist C. Fred Alford, based upon a 
series of interviews he conducted with primarily young Americans.1  On one hand, Alford 
writes, most of the people he spoke with associate freedom with “the possession of 
money and power, or they devalue freedom compared to money and power.”  The 
“formal freedoms … enshrined in the Bill of Rights for example,” are largely dismissed 
as “effete rights” and “mere symbols.”  Being allowed to say what one wants means little 
relative to the power to do what one wants.  “Money and power are real;” real freedom 
requires “total control.”2  Alford suggests that the “view of freedom that comes closest to 
that of young people is the ancient Greek view of freedom as autokratôr … .  The 
difference is that for the ancient Greeks the term autokratôr generally (but not always) 
referred to the freedom of the polis, a city state with sufficient power to govern itself. … 
For most people I spoke with, each individual is or would be his or her own city state.  
‘Freedom is being the CEO of my own life,’” as one of Alford’s respondents put it.3   
This notion of what Alford calls “freedom as mastery” takes shape not out of any 
will-to-power or self-affirmative aspiration to extend one’s dominion, though, but out of 
a fear of being dominated or victimized and a perceived need to defend oneself amid 
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ceaseless competition.  The drive to power is born of felt weakness; one must be 
predatory lest one is preyed upon.  Seeing “civilized society in the terms, if not the 
extremes, of Hobbes’s state of nature,” Alford writes, what is “desired above all else is 
the power to protect oneself against the incursions of others.  Insulation becomes 
freedom.”4  In a world where I am vulnerable and everyone else is aggressive, I must 
preemptively “amass enough power over others” so as “not to be subject to another’s 
will.”5   
In turn, feeling always under siege and trapped in a sort of arms race, “the 
mastery that most young people seek is not idealized as much as it is regretted, as though 
there were no other choice. … They wish they did not have to trade freedom for power, 
but dare not refuse, lest they end up with neither.”6  In their pursuit of power they “claim 
not virtue, but only necessity.”7      
Out of this very same logic follows a second dimension of freedom, what we 
might call freedom as escape.  Freedom here is not about the exertion of power over 
others, but about the retreat into a power-free space away from others.  The alternative to 
autocracy is isolation.  Alford describes this second dimension as “the freedom of 
passivity and submission,” of “losing control of oneself, or at least letting go of one’s 
need to control the world.”  It is experienced “often in darkness” - in “sleep, hot baths, 
relaxation” - when “the cares of the world, all the constraints and demands of the day, 
slip away, and one is free to just be, subject to a part of oneself kept under lock and key 
during the day.”  This is the part of the self that is unleashed - set free to roam and stretch 
out and play and dream - either when one is asleep, or “when everyone else is asleep.”8   
An alternative experience of freedom as escape follows from “relaxing with 
friends,” when one is with others but without the need to “monitor” oneself.9  We might 
think of this as the experience of being at home with others.  To return to the previous 
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chapter’s metaphor, if freedom as power over others is what we might call the “sex-
object” formulation of freedom, freedom as power-free relaxation with friends is the 
“soul-mate” formulation.  Only from the relational positions of being on top or being 
alone do I feel free.  The social alternative to these two positions lies in the experience of 
being by myself with others.  The line between “I” and “we” is blurred here, whether in 
the frictionless communion of lovers or friends, in the authentic community of one’s 
culture, or in facile communication across humanity.  In what follows, I suggest that 
these become the dominant norms of social relations in democracy precisely because they 
convey this soul-mate sense of being by oneself with others.    
 
The Tocquevillean framework developed in the previous chapter helps us 
interpret the apparent coalescing of freedom’s meaning around the poles of mastery and 
escape in three further respects.  
First, the experiences people associate with freedom have just as much to do with 
equality.  Freedom takes shape as mastery and escape within the normative context of 
equality.  Alford writes that it was apparent how “power to get what one wants becomes 
the only standard” and the “universal medium of moral exchange in a world in which all 
values are equal.”10  Freedom is devalued relative to power in a world without recognized 
authority.  When competition between equals replaces hierarchical command as the 
immanent ordering principle of social relations, success becomes more significant than 
freedom.  By the same token, freedom as total independence - as escape from power into 
even “emotional autarky” - is embraced in a world where dependence of every sort is 
experienced as degrading.11  “Not having to ask permission turned out to be a leading 
example of freedom,” Alford writes, because “having to ask permission reveals the power 
differential between the parties, and it is the knowledge of that differential that is 
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humiliating.”12  Further, the passion for equality seems in a sense turned inward when 
freedom is experienced as the loss of control and “letting go” even of oneself - freedom 
as the collapse of even internal hierarchy.      
Second, as we saw with the notions of degradation and elevation, freedom-in-
equality tends toward exclusive extremes.  Alford calls this freedom’s “borderline 
quality.”  The people he spoke with seemed to suggest that there was no intermediate 
point in between “the extremes of all and nothing at all;” “if they can’t be completely 
free, then they want none of it.”13  Most people expect their freedom to be “real, … 
complete and total;” they “assume that they should be able to do what they want.”14  Here 
again we encounter the idea of a sort of commonplace rising above the level of humanity.  
The ordinary people of democracy simply assume a measure of mastery to which no king 
in history had aspired.  When this proves impossible, the experience is of being wholly 
unfree, degraded below the level of humanity.  Every limitation of freedom, every 
compromise or need to ask permission, seems an outright negation of freedom.  Along 
these lines, Alford identifies the same dialectic of “idealization and devaluation” that was 
at the center of the previous chapter.15 
Alford attributes this borderline quality of freedom to the fact that his respondents 
“have grown up in a consumer society in which the commercial media panders to 
narcissistic fantasies of total control,” wherein one lives “in a world without boundaries 
or limits, free of all entanglements and obligations, able to do anything one wants.”16  I 
suggested previously that we must look to the larger whole of life after the democratic 
revolution - of which “consumer society” is but a derivative part - to understand our 
passion for the idea of a world without limits.  The commercial media panders to the 
narcissistic sex-object and soul-mate fantasies that take shape within a society principled 
upon democratic openness.   
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And third, Alford makes clear that even as people imagine absolute freedom, they 
don’t believe their ideas have any impact upon the workaday world.  The “economic 
world they live in … is harsh, competitive, and relatively unforgiving, like Hobbes’s state 
of nature.”17  They “do not expect their imaginations to have any influence on the world, 
or the world on their imaginations.  Rather, imagination and material reality belong to 
separate categories of existence that never meet.”18  The same divergence of powerless 
thought and meaningless action we touched upon last chapter recurs here as freedom’s 
dualism.  In principle we are entirely free, but to approach this freedom we must retreat 
from the world into utter privacy or utter intimacy - into a “literary” world of our own 
making.  In practice freedom is immaterial and we are entirely subject to necessity.  
Alford picks up a hint of this, reporting that when just talking about experiences of 
freedom, people spoke in terms of respite and relaxation; when asked to define freedom, 
people spoke of mastery, money, and power.19 
We should distinguish between two distinct lines of logic in this relationship 
between freedom’s dimensions.  On one hand, we might collapse into the peace of respite 
and relaxation because we are fatigued by the reality of the war of all against all.  At the 
same time we might devalue freedom in the regrettable necessity of seeking self-
defensive control over our environment.  In either case freedom is subverted by external 
circumstances.  On the other hand, imagining an ideal of absolute freedom, we might 
abandon the idea and practice of freedom because we are disappointed with and even 
indignant over our inevitably limited share.  In this case freedom is self-subverting, 
undermined by its own expansiveness.  Freedom in society and the world is cynically 
devalued in relation to the idealization of freedom from others and the world.  From this 
angle, we might say that freedom as escape is the freedom of transcendence.  Analogous 
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to the revolutionary contempt of existing facts discussed in the previous chapter, a 
contempt of existing freedom follows from this logic.   
Freedom-in-Equality: Competition and Intimacy  
In this chapter I continue to explore and extend Tocqueville’s envisioning of our 
democratic way of life in an attempt to interpret these dimensions of modern freedom.  
Tocqueville is perhaps best known for his argument that modern democratic peoples 
might sacrifice freedom to their overriding passion for equality.  “They want equality in 
liberty, and if they cannot have it, they want it in slavery.  They will suffer poverty, 
servitude, and barbarity, but they will not suffer aristocracy.”20  For all of Tocqueville’s 
celebrated powers of prediction, it seems like this most famous prognosis might well be 
the furthest from the mark.  Far from being our “principal passion,” as he puts it, one 
wonders if anyone even cares about equality anymore.  We certainly don’t hear much 
about it in these times of great and growing inequalities.  If anything is held to be self-
evident today, it would seem to be that “the rich get richer, the poor poorer.”  By contrast, 
freedom is constantly invoked as, in Alford’s words, “an all purpose word for everything 
that is good about our way of life.”21    
I think we can account for this situation from within Tocqueville’s theory of 
democracy, though.  What is affirmed as everything that is good about our way of life is 
freedom of a particular sort, freedom-in-equality, in the absence of hierarchical absolutes.  
This is the freedom of what I have been calling “democratic openness.”  Equality of 
authority is the unseen background picture we accept silently, as neither advocates nor 
adversaries, like the course of the sun and the succession of the seasons.  And it is against 
this background picture that freedom comes into relief as everything that is good - and 
true, as we shall see - about our democratic way of life.  Democratic freedom is to the 
principle of equality what aristocratic command is to the principle of hierarchy.  We 
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might say that we are oriented by the principle of equality and animated by the spirit of 
freedom.    
As Hobbes makes so clear, the equality of authority does not preclude and in 
many ways exacerbates the struggle for power.  The condition of equality turns easily 
into one of competition, and so of winners and losers.  Inequality thus persists in 
democracy but hierarchy does not.22  The inequalities produced by open competition 
supplant the inequalities that justify command.  Tocqueville himself draws on such a 
distinction in the above passage when he distinguishes between servitude and 
aristocracy.23   
Along these lines, I suggest that Tocqueville accurately interprets our social state 
as premised upon the equality of authority, but to an extent misses the inextricable link 
between democratic equality and democratic freedom.  I argued in the previous chapter 
that Tocqueville’s own work can be read to show how equality does not subvert the 
passion for revolution (even if it does make great political revolutions rare).  Along 
exactly the same lines, I argue in this chapter that equality does not subvert the passion 
for freedom (even if it does make its political expression seem impossible).  I argued that 
the democratic social state, defined by the presence of equality/absence of hierarchy, 
harbors a permanent tension between extreme notions of human degradation and 
grandeur - between the fear of collapsing into domestication and the revolutionary 
aspiration of rising above or delving below superficial and fettering materiality to make 
the idea of openness triumph in the world.  I extend this analysis here, arguing that 
freedom-in-equality takes on its “borderline” meanings over against the fear of 
domestication.  We respond to the prospect of domestication by striving for mastery 
and/or escape - fight or flight.  
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Alford describes how many of the people he interviewed saw society as a less 
extreme version of Hobbes’s state of nature.  The reasoning, it would seem, is that the 
social compact at best renders the natural war of all against all a sort of cold war.  This 
should not surprise us.  The social state of equality cannot but mirror many of the features 
of the natural state of equality.  Hobbes’s state of nature is characterized by the absence 
of authority and the irreducible potential for force in all interactions - there is no basis for 
command and a constant struggle for control.  This condition of insecurity may be 
attenuated in society, but never be eliminated.  The notion persists that - when we get past 
all the talk and down to the truth of the matter - human relations are at bottom power 
relations.  And so while a may not longer fear for my life in society, I remain vulnerable 
to being over-powered by others - economically, intellectually, emotionally, and so forth.  
Insofar as I perceive myself as weak, such domination might extend to domestication.24   
What’s more, as Locke recognizes, the construction of new social, political, and 
economic power centers and systems actually introduces a whole new level of threat - the 
wolf is replaced by the lion.  Now I am potentially subject to far vaster and in a sense 
unseen concentrations of power than were present in the state of nature.  And insofar as I 
perceive these impersonal powers as conventional, as the product of human intentions, I 
encounter them as the power of another’s will over me.  In this sense, the potential for 
both controlling and being controlled is greatly expanded in the socialized state of nature.  
In the zoo that is society, the threat of death is supplanted by the specter of domestication.  
And in the zero-sum game struggle to be the so-called “alpha-male,” every influence of 
one over another may seem to portend domestication.25         
As we have seen, though, the struggle for mastery that follows from this logic is 
often experienced as a regrettable necessity.  To extend Alford’s representation, if his 
respondents feel trapped in Hobbes’s state of nature, they imagine escaping into 
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Rousseau’s state of nature.  Circumstances force conflict and the striving for power over 
others, but what people really want is a different sort of freedom, a different sort of 
wildness - the pastoral freedom of privacy or utter intimacy.  This is a power-free 
condition outside the economic necessities of material reality.  Here I need fear neither 
death nor domestication.  I am free to let down my guard and relax into inaction, to just 
stretch out and dream.                   
In what follows, I argue that these two notions of wildness stand as central norms 
of human relations within the democratic social state.  We take a watered-down version 
of Hobbes’s state of nature as the truth we simply cannot deny in our open society.  At 
the same time, we affirm socialized aspects of Rousseau’s state of nature as all that is 
potentially good and beautiful about our open society.  In a sense, we might say that 
democratic society rejects the terms of the liberal contract under which liberty is traded 
for security, holding that even in society insecurity is inevitable and liberty is properly 
unlimited.  In turn, democratic society tends to be represented as a market (a social 
construct, of course, but one which is taken to be natural, a mirror of the Hobbesian - or 
Darwinian - way the real world works), or in the terms of “culture” (another social 
construct, but which mirrors the deep, authentic blood-bond of family resemblance).  
What captures the imagination in democracy are those relationships wherein we feel 
together-as-one or in total combat, wherein we see others as our community or our 
competitors.26  I go on to argue that democratic politics comes to seem alien to 
democratic society, which is taken as either a pre-conventional world before politics or a 
post-conventional world beyond politics.  Political argument is represented accordingly, 
not as the debate between citizens but as a “war” between “cultures.” 
I argue that Tocqueville’s most prescient concerns are thus most precisely 
formulated not as the threat to freedom in equality, but as the threat to democratic politics 
 90 
in democratic freedom.  We should be less concerned with despotism born of equality 
than with de-politicization born of democratic openness.  By “de-politicization” I mean 
the widespread acceptance of the view that democratic politics - arguing and acting in 
association with equal others toward the collective use of power - is basically an 
incoherent idea.  As Tocqueville explains, this loss is significant beyond the political 
sphere.  De-politicization threatens the overall health of society because the political 
practice of democracy is perhaps the sole remedy to the pathologies of freedom-as-
openness.         
PART II: THE FREEDOM OF OPENNESS  
The Savage and the Slave 
I believe we can read Tocqueville’s story of the slave and the savage as an 
account of modern freedom’s dimensions of mastery and escape.  Tocqueville writes 
toward the end of Democracy I of how once, “while traveling through the forests,” he 
encountered an “Indian woman” who was “holding the hand of a little girl of five or six, 
of the white race … . A Negro woman followed along behind.”  In appearance and 
demeanor the savage and the slave were mirror opposites.  The “savage women,” who 
“was not married,” “looked free, proud, and almost fierce.”  The “Negress wore 
European clothing that was almost in tatters,” and exhibit “a servile fear” in her 
relationship to the child.  For her part, the child “displayed a sense of superiority that 
contrasted oddly with her weakness and her age.”  Yet, alone together in the wilderness, 
the group seemed like a little family, the two women showing an “almost maternal 
attachment” to the little girl.  There was “something particularly touching” in this scene 
of “nature … striving to bring them together” in a “bond of affection,” despite the “vast 
distance that prejudices and laws had placed between them … .”  Tocqueville ruined it 
 91 
all, though.  Upon noticing his presence, the Indian “abruptly stood, rather roughly 
pushed the child away, and with an irritated glance in (Tocqueville’s) direction set off 
into the forest.”27     
Can we take these two types - the savage and the slave - as theoretical markers of 
how we think about freedom and its loss in democratic times?  Can we say that the slave 
represents the possibility of utter domestication, and that the savage reaction to the 
presence of power and its domesticating potential represents the alternatives of mastery 
and escape?  
 Tocqueville writes elsewhere that while violence has deprived the slave “of 
nearly all the privileges of humanity,” “habituation to servitude has given him the 
thoughts and ambitions” of a slave.  He “enjoys all the privileges of his baseness in 
tranquility.”28  How far is Tocqueville’s description of the slave from today’s near-
ubiquitous notion that we have become the tame creatures of commercial society, 
stripped of our individual identities and our human capacities, equating the privileges of 
our base servitude to the market - consumer choice and purchasing power - with 
freedom?  Habituated to the thoughts and ambitions of consumers, we are contentedly 
domesticated.    
Where the “Negro exists at the ultimate extreme of servitude, the Indian (exists) at 
the outer limits of freedom.”  The slave “is ashamed of himself.  In every one of his 
features he sees a trace of slavery, and if he could repudiate himself altogether, he would 
gladly consent to do so.”  He “has learned only how to submit (to) and obey … his 
needs.”  Conversely, the “Indian’s imagination is filled with the supposed nobility of his 
origins.  He lives and dies amid dreams inspired by his pride” - not unlike the French 
“men of ’89.”  The slave “finds his joy and pride in servile imitation of his oppressors” 
and “aspires, by imitating them, to become indistinguishable from them.”  The savage “is 
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afraid of resembling the Europeans” and “clings to his opinions and to the least modicum 
of his habits with a lack of flexibility unparalleled in history.”  The “Negro (is) the 
proprietor of nothing, not even his own person.”  The “savage is his own master from the 
moment he can act. … He has never bowed to the will of another man.  No one has 
taught him to distinguish between voluntary obedience and shameful subjection, and he 
knows nothing of law, not even the name.  For him, to be free is to escape from nearly 
every social bond.”  He “revels in his barbarous independence” and is unwilling to 
“sacrifice any part of it.  Civilization has little purchase on such a man.”29  To what extent 
does Tocqueville’s description of the savage’s prideful pursuit of all-or-nothing 
independence into isolation capture the borderline norms of freedom given by Alford’s 
respondents?       
On Tocqueville’s account, I argue, democratic society’s characteristic 
individualism and materialism both take shape around these poles of domestication and 
savage independence.30  
Democratic Individualism: Sovereignty and Insignificance  
Tocqueville’s metaphor for the organization of aristocratic society is that of a 
chain.  “Aristocracy linked all citizens together in a long chain from peasant to king.”  
Born into their station within immutable and hierarchical networks of influence and 
service, each member of society is bound to his place, and also to those members in the 
places above and below him.  Association is obligatory.  In this sense, aristocratic society 
is the public society par excellence: “men who live in aristocratic centuries are almost 
always closely tied to something outside themselves and are often disposed to forget 
about themselves.” 31    
Democratic society is organized not as a chain but via revolutionary rupture.  
“Democracy breaks the chain and severs the links.”32  This is in part a consequence of the 
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way democratic equality was born into the old world via revolution.  Revolution, to 
paraphrase Thucydides, is a violent teacher, and the hatred it generates drives people 
apart.  Moreover, post-revolutionary society is populated “by men who, having achieved 
independence only yesterday, are drunk with newfound power,” and “have a 
presumptuous confidence in their own strength.”33  But the breaking of the social chain is 
also a consequence of equality itself.  In equality, each man “seeks to be self-sufficient 
and prides himself on subscribing to his own peculiar beliefs about all things.”34  While 
hatred fades as the equalization of conditions gives way to settled equality, the stance of 
self-sufficiency persists.  While “democratic revolutions encourage (people) to shun one 
another,” then, democratic equality “tends to make men unwilling to approach their 
fellows.”35  Even in revolution-free America, democratic man follows the maxim: “In 
everything that regards himself alone, he remains master.”36             
This maxim takes root at the level of the republican political unit, but is adopted 
by each individual within democratic society.  In the relationship between family 
members, citizens, and Protestants, what Tocqueville terms the “dogma of popular 
sovereignty” becomes the “law of laws.”37  The “generative principle of the republic is 
the same principle that governs most human actions.  Hence the republic penetrates, if I 
may put it that way, into the ideas, opinions, and general habits of the Americans … .”38  
For perhaps the first time in human history the utterly audacious idea of being one’s own 
exclusive authority presents itself to each member of society - every man a king.  
“Equality fosters in each individual the desire to judge everything for himself;” 
henceforth “each man seeks his beliefs” and his “rules of judgment solely from within.”39  
Ultimately, people are even “pleased to think that their fate lies entirely in their own 
hands”40  These norms of self-sufficiency and personal sovereignty are one aspect of 
democratic individualism.     
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We might say that the outer-directed members of aristocratic society are 
supplanted by the inner-directed individuals of democracy.  In aristocratic times, “all men 
are connected with and dependent on one another.  All are linked by a hierarchical bond, 
which helps to keep each individual in his place and enforce obedience in the body as a 
whole.”  In democratic society, a wild and disobedient streak persists: “Accustomed to 
subjecting his movements to no rule other than his personal impulses,” the democratic 
individual “finds it difficult to bend to rules imposed from outside.”  And this 
inflexibility, which takes root with the republican political principle of self-government, 
rebounds to make collective action more difficult.  Even if the democratic individual 
“consents to join with others in pursuit of a common goal, he wants at least to remain his 
own master, cooperating in the common success as he sees fit.”41 Democratic society, in 
turn, becomes the private and personal society par excellence; democratic man is never 
disposed to forget about himself.   
This proud and powerful stance of independence is only one aspect of democratic 
individualism, though.  The flip side of the self-made man is the feeling of being just one 
small self alone among innumerable others.  Democratic individuals believe that they 
“owe nothing to anyone,” but also that they can “expect nothing from anyone.”42  As 
much as the individual imagines himself standing self-sufficient and sovereign, he feels 
himself helpless and compelled to retreat before society and the world.  “Each person … 
retreats within the limits of the self and from that vantage ventures to judge the world.”43  
Democratic individuals “have neither superiors nor inferiors nor habitual and necessary 
associates,” and so their “natural inclination” is “to fall back on themselves and consider 
themselves in isolation.”44  Democratic man ends up the CEO of a company of one.     
Not unlike Hobbes’s state of nature, then, the experience of individualism in the 
social state of equality is one of being “free but vulnerable.”  “Equality of conditions 
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makes men aware of their independence but at the same time points up their weakness.”45  
And their weakness seems to them as limitless as their independence.  Inflexible pride 
inverts to soft neediness as each person realizes he is not up to the impossible task of self-
sufficiency.  The sovereignty of the savage inverts to the slave’s “servile imitation” of 
others-en-mass, and even to a sort of self-repudiation.  Wildness inverts to domestication.  
Tocqueville’s argument on this front is well know: desperate for intellectual, spiritual, 
and emotional guidance and support but too proud to admit to any sort of dependence 
one’s equals, the overt influence characteristic of aristocratic society gives way to the 
covert conformity of democratic society.  “In democratic countries it is common for large 
numbers of citizens to make for the same point,” Tocqueville writes, even as “each one 
… flatters himself that he does so … wholly of his own accord.”46  Even as he “feels with 
pride that he is equal” to the particular people around him, the democratic individual is 
“immediately overwhelmed by his own insignificance and weakness” in relation to the 
innumerable similar individuals that surround him. 47  Engulfed in a vast sea of numbers, 
he is carried along by the majority current.  He never forgets himself, but he does end up 
in a sense losing himself - “lost in the crowd and easily swallowed up in the common 
obscurity.”48  This is the other aspect of democratic individualism.  “In the most civilized 
nations of the globe it is common for an unfortunate individual to find himself as lonely 
amid the crowd as the savage in his woods.”49       
In their individualism, Tocqueville concludes, democratic peoples “are constantly 
wracked by two warring passions: they feel the need to be led and the desire to remain 
free.”50  As we shall see, Tocqueville argues that to combat the former democratic 
individuals must combat the latter, at least insofar as the exclusivity of the desire to 
remain free subverts itself, inverting to powerlessness - to feelings of isolation and 
insignificance.  To remain free, citizens of democracy must be “forced to know and 
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accommodate one another.”51  The democratic individual must be made to wake up from 
the dreams inspired by his pride and see “that he is not as independent of his fellow men 
as he initially imagined,” and that it is at times “in his own interest to forget himself.”52  
To remain free he must resist his natural, savage, revolutionary inclination to escape from 
nearly every social bond and instead “learn the art of joining with his fellow men.”53   
The Heroic Materialism of Democratic Times  
We see a similar dualism in Tocqueville’s description of the materialism of 
democratic society, at least in America.  In the previous chapter, we looked at 
Tocqueville’s analysis of the pacifying impetus of democratic man’s need for “material 
well-being.”  There is, for instance, “nothing more opposed to revolutionary mores than 
commercial mores.”  Commercial peoples oppose “revolutionary instincts” with 
“conservative interests,” “impetuousness” with “inertia,” and “adventurous passions” 
with “homely tastes.”54  But this is only half the picture of democracy’s commercial 
society.  Even as commercial mores might sap their vigor and spiritedness, potentially 
rendering them “a flock of timid and industrious animals,” democrats in America display 
a certain wildness in their materialism - a “commercial recklessness,” an “audacity” and 
“boldness in industry.”55  Far from only opposing revolutionary mores, their passion for 
gaining and love of chance and risk simulates a sort of passion for revolution within their 
commercial mores.   
Whatever homely tastes and conservative interests a life of commerce inculcates 
are accompanied by an adventurous spirit of “intense competition (and) endless 
experimentation.”56  Indeed, Tocqueville identifies a sort of predatory passion in 
American materialism that the exactly opposes the soft and stultifying need for bodily 
pleasure, comfort, and security.  Hardly resembling the timid sheep that might lie in 
democracy’s future, Tocqueville writes that it “would be difficult to describe the avidity 
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with which the American hurls himself upon the immense prey that fortune offers him. 
… A passion stronger than the love of life constantly spurs him on.”  The “desire for 
well-being has become an anxious, burning passion that grows even as it is satisfied;” it 
drives the American to, for instance, “fearlessly brave the Indian’s arrows and the 
maladies of the wilderness.”57  The American, in other words, sacrifices his material well-
being for the sake of a passion that manifests itself in the striving for material well-being.   
“Those who live amid democratic instability,” Tocqueville explains, generalizing 
beyond the case of America, “have the image of chance constantly before their eyes, and 
eventually they come to love all undertakings in which chance plays a role.  Hence they 
are all propelled toward commerce, not only for the promise of gain it affords but also for 
the love of the emotions it occasions.”58  Democratic peoples love the gamble as much as 
the gain.  They love the drama of the economic game - the chance of rising and even the 
risk of falling - that reflects the open-ended uncertainty of the democratic way of life.  In 
this sense, commercial society takes shape and is affirmed as an aspect of the democratic 
mode of being; materialism is as much an opportunity for adventure, mobility, and 
innovation as it is a doctrine of timidity, submission, and neediness.   
Tocqueville himself goes so far as to say that there is “a kind of heroism” in the 
entrepreneurial American’s “avidity for profit;” there is “something heroic about the way 
Americans do business, … not just responding to a calculation but obeying the dictates of 
his nature.”59  There is even something of the Napoleonic spirit of the French in 
American businessmen: “What the French did for victory, they do to cut costs.”60  
Tocqueville writes: “The American navigator sets sail from Boston to buy tea in China. 
… During a crossing of eight to ten months, he has drunk brackish water and lived on 
salted meat.  He has battled constantly with the sea, with disease, and with boredom.  But 
upon his return, he can sell his tea for a penny a pound less than the English merchant: 
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his goal has been achieved.”61  It is this sort of warrior materialism, as it were, this 
bourgeois heroism, that “fires the imagination of the crowd” in democratic times.62   
For Tocqueville, then, there is a dualism to both democratic materialism and 
democratic individualism.  Whether lost in the crowd or lost in the herd, whether in 
isolation and insignificance or in the need for material well-being, democratic man may 
suffer a boundless loss of freedom.  The opposite path of materialism and individualism 
leads toward an equally unbounded freedom - whether of the untouched and self-
sufficient individual or of the bold soul who risks all in uncharted and unpredictable 
waters.  This freedom - the freedom of being untamed in the wild, so to speak - takes 
shape as restlessness within the social state of what I have been calling “democratic 
openness.”  While less obvious, this path has its own dangers.                
Democracy’s Compulsive Restlessness 
Tocqueville argues that France’s revolutionary sequels, in particular the 
revolution of 1848, were self-conscious imitations of the original rupture of 1789 (rather 
sentimental sequels at that).  Analogously, I want to suggest that what Tocqueville 
describes as the characteristic “restlessness” or “restiveness” of American democracy can 
in part be understood as an ongoing re-enactment of America’s founding rupture of 
pilgrimage to the freedom of the New World.  Restlessness and freedom are intertwined 
in America’s migratory epic.  The pursuit of the original and the new, the notion of never 
being bound to place, the passion for openings and openness: these become the animating 
spirit of the lives of Americans, of their economics, their religion, and their politics.  
Tocqueville, as we shall see,  develops this picture in what is perhaps his master trope of 
the different freedoms of aristocratic hierarchy and democratic equality: in aristocracy, 
freedom means having a place to stand; in democracy, freedom means having space to 
move.            
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For Tocqueville, the democratic revolution seems the precondition for imagining 
change in the world.63  It is almost as if the very concepts of the new and the possible 
come into the world with democracy.  In centuries of hierarchy, “conditions seemed fixed 
forever, and the whole society seemed so static that no one imagined that anything could 
ever stir within it.  In centuries of equality the human mind takes on a different cast.  It is 
easy to imagine that nothing stays put.  The mind is possessed by the idea of 
instability.”64  Democracy, we might say, is the milieu of open-mindedness.  And this 
shift in the mode of thought leads to a shift in the mode of action.  “Aristocracy seeks to 
maintain things as they are rather than to improve them.”  In democracy, the “improving 
spirit” rules.  There “exists an urge to do something even when the goal is not precise, a 
sort of permanent fever that turns to innovation of every kind.”65  This fever manifests 
itself even in democratic expression.  “In aristocracies, language inevitably partakes of 
the general ambience of repose.  Few new words are created, because few new things 
come to pass. … By contrast, the perpetual fluidity that is so prominent a feature of 
democracy is forever reshaping the face of language … .”  Democratic peoples 
“sometimes feel a desire to change words even when there is no need.”66               
This same basic contrast runs throughout Tocqueville’s writings.  Aristocratic 
society is dominated by a stillness that would seem like death in democratic times.  
Democratic society is dominated by a flux that would seem like Pandemonium in 
aristocratic times.67  There is one constant we should not overlook, though.  In 
democracy, as in aristocracy, the order of society and the order of the world reflect one 
another.  Norm and nature, ought and is, take the same shape.  Before the revolution, 
Nature and society paralleled each other in their hierarchical solidity, which was 
considered at once given and good.  Every change seemed to signify corruption, and the 
idea of the old was coupled with that of the proper.  In America, by contrast, where 
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“everything seems to be in constant flux,” “every change seems to mark an advance.  
Hence the idea of the new is coupled … with the idea of the better.”68  On Tocqueville’s 
account, the order of the democratic social state seems hardly less natural to its 
inhabitants than the aristocratic social order did to its inhabitants.  The principle of 
openness seems inscribed in the truth of the world after the revolution, just as the 
principle of hierarchy once seemed inscribed in the Truth of the world.  Now, reality is 
full of dynamic change and newness, society is full of dynamic change and newness, and 
perhaps providentially this means not decay and corruption but vitality, innovation, 
evolution, even progress.  “In the midst of the universal movement that surrounds him,” 
the American considers “change … the natural state of man,” and comes to “love change 
for its own sake.”69  Consequently, all come to “consider society a body in progress and 
mankind a changing tableau in which nothing is or should be fixed forever.”70   
For example, Tocqueville writes that in the conflict over the Second Bank of the 
United States the people did not necessarily understand the complex issues at stake, but 
opposed the institution on the grounds of its independence and its permanence.  “In a 
society where everything is in flux, this immovable object is offensive to their eyes, and 
they want to see if they can oblige it to change along with everything else.”71  
Impermanence becomes as much a matter of value as of fact; that which is static seems 
an unnatural aberration.   
As much as the material bounty of the New World shaped this view of society and 
the world, it doesn’t appear to be limited to America.  At the time of the Revolution, the 
French too had a “taste for instability and risk.”  The difference lies in Tocqueville’s 
assessment of this “love of change for itself.”  As we shall see, the consequences in the 
American context are mixed.  In France, this outlook is a symptom of what Tocqueville 
wholly condemns as “the revolutionary disease” - the “disgust at and horror for rules and 
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authority, even for rules one has made and authority one has established.”72  The love of 
change in the French context turned to a lust for violence, and the taste for instability to 
reflexive insubordination.  Tocqueville makes clear that while the symptoms of this 
disease will never be as acute as at the moment of revolution, they will henceforth be 
chronic.  This is because “the accidental illness finds itself with living roots in the 
permanent social state, the habits, ideas, and lasting mores that the revolution has 
founded.”  Its “particular character comes in part from the fundamental characteristics of 
the society created by the Revolution.  Therefore some of it will necessarily remain, even 
after the revolutionary period is completely over.  This something will be a certain 
disquiet and chronic instability, and a permanent disposition to relapse easily into the 
revolutionary disease.”73  A residual passion for revolution persists as habitual 
rebelliousness.  In France, as in America, the founding event resonates; neither people 
should ever be expected to fully settle down.   
 
This new sense of possibility and mobility - of being able to take to an open road, 
as it were - gives rise to what Tocqueville describes as the compulsive restlessness of 
democratic society.  In the “universal tumult” of democratic times, “men never stand still. 
… (They) are constantly on the move, and there is always something unexpected and in a 
sense improvised about their lives.”74  And this restlessness seems as inescapable in 
democracy as tradition seemed in aristocracy.  If aristocratic man can never move, 
democratic man feels like he can never stop.  “Equality,” Tocqueville writes, “allows 
anyone to go anywhere.”75  But this sense of openness inverts to a sort of imperative; able 
to move, the democratic individual feels enjoined to move.  To stand still when all is in 
motion, to stay at home when one can go anywhere, is to seem unfree, somehow 
constrained - even in a way not “fully alive.”   
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Democratic society thus settles into its determinate form as amorphous - 
constituted as a “state of constant agitation” wherein “everything is in flux” and “in a 
permanent state of transformation.”76  Uniform and routine, restlessness is the new rule.  
“Democratic centuries,” Tocqueville concludes, “are times of trial, innovation, and 
adventure,” but they are not times of chaos.77  All is in motion, but all motion is animated 
by the same spirit.  The experience of life in the fluidity of democracy is not so much of 
being uprooted and left adrift as of being “daily swept along and buffeted about by the 
impetuous current that carries all things before it.”78   
This compulsive restlessness drives the material life of Americans.  The American 
brings a “fervent ardor … to the pursuit of well-being.”  He “grasps at everything but 
embraces nothing and soon lets things slip from his grasp so that he may go chasing after 
new pleasures. … He settles in one place only to leave it a short while later to pursue his 
changing desires elsewhere.”79  It is as if his well-being lies in the pursuit of well-being 
more so than in the state of well-being - his pleasure lies in the chase, what he really 
desires is change itself.  “No one can work harder at being happy than Americans do.”80  
Interestingly, Tocqueville argues that the “vast competitive arena” that arises when 
“everyone is constantly seeking to change places” actually constrains the restless 
movement of democracy’s economic sphere.81  Democracy comes to almost resemble 
aristocracy: “Having destroyed the obstructing privileges enjoyed by some of their fellow 
men,” democratic peoples “run up against universal competition.  The form of the 
obstacle has changed, but the obstacle remains.”82     
The spiritual life of Americans is at times similarly restless and agitated.  As we 
have seen, Americans demonstrates a sort of disregard for bodily needs in their quest for 
material well-being.  They abandon what they have today in pursuit of what they will 
abandon tomorrow.  An analogous recklessness manifests itself when Americans turn 
 103 
away from the here and now and toward matters of the soul.  Tocqueville writes that this 
manifests itself in eruptive moments “when their souls seem suddenly to cast off all 
material bonds and fly impetuously toward heaven.”  In this flight,  Americans neglect 
“even their most pressing bodily needs.”83   
Tocqueville explicitly presents this spiritual restlessness as a “powerful reaction” 
to democratic society’s deadening preoccupation with material well-being.  “The soul has 
needs that must be satisfied, and no matter what pains one takes to distract it from itself, 
it soon grows bored, anxious, and agitated among the pleasures of the senses.”  The 
“American spirit,” narrowly confined to the search for well-being, “feels imprisoned 
within limits that apparently it cannot transgress.”84  But perhaps the feeling of being 
imprisoned within limits and the urge to transgression are rooted deeper in democratic 
society than the search for well-being, and indeed determines what democratic man 
thinks of as his well-being, whether material or spiritual.  Here, democratic man isn’t 
spiritually restless because of the material well-being he pursues, but rather pursues 
material and spiritual well-being the way he does because he is restless.  His “fervent 
ardor” in pursuit of material well-being is of a kind with his “impassioned, almost wild 
spiritualism.”85  Not boredom with the pleasures of the senses but the passion for 
freedom-in-equality gives rise to restlessness.86  As with France’s revolutionary rupture, 
democratic man’s occasional flight from “the fetters of the body” is a manifestation of 
how he imagines freedom in the social state of openness.   
Pilgrimage Into the Wild         
In the previous chapter, we saw how Tocqueville interpreted the founding 
pilgrimage to the New World as motivated not by any material need, but rather to ensure 
the victory of an idea.  He describes America’s ongoing westward migration in analogous 
terms.  Americans “daily depart the place of their birth to create vast estates for 
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themselves in far-off places.”  “Millions of men march together toward the same point on 
the horizon” in a “migratory flow (that) is never-ending.”87  “These people left their 
original homeland in search of the good life.  They left their second homeland in search 
of a still better one. … They long ago broke the bonds that attached them to their native 
soil and have formed no bonds since.”  And while this emigration “began as a need; 
today it has become a game of chance, which they love as much for the emotions it stirs 
as for the profit it brings.”88  While the French take up a sort of perpetual rebelliousness, 
the American vocation is perpetual restlessness; these are the adaptations of the same 
passion for revolutionary openness to different social, historical, and physical 
environments.  
Along these lines, Tocqueville argues, the shift from aristocracy to democracy is 
largely constituted by the shift from landedness to openness as the ordering, animating 
virtue of society - from territoriality to “breaking the bonds” of territory.  It is in this 
sense that he writes of the American West as “democracy pushed to its ultimate limit” - a 
sort of instantiated ideal type of democracy in its permanent state of transformation.89  It 
is primarily in the West that one encounters the “wild spiritualism” and “bizarre sects” of 
American religion.90  And it is in the West - where society was “organized only yesterday 
(and) is still but a swarm of adventurers and speculators” - that one encounters the full 
extent of American’s wild materialism.91  In these lands upon which people don’t so 
much settle as pass over, freedom-in-equality is pushed to its ultimate limit.  “The 
Americans who flee the Atlantic coast and rush headlong westward are adventurers 
impatient of discipline of any kind … . They arrive in the wilderness as strangers to one 
another and find there nothing to restrain them - not traditions or family spirit or 
examples.  The law has little power over them, and mores even less.”92  These 
adventurers stand as the ideal of democratic individualism in action - sovereign, self-
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sufficient, isolated, insignificant.  They live the socialized savage life.  “Many of the 
Americans who live in the West were born in the woods, and in them the civilization of 
their fathers is conjoined with ideas and customs drawn from the savage life. … Men 
exert less control over one another, because they barely know their neighbors.  (They) 
therefore exhibit the inexperience and unbridled ways of nascent peoples.”93  In these 
new societies that “sprang up in the wilderness overnight,” people “escaped the influence 
not only of great names and great wealth but also of that  natural aristocracy which 
derives from enlightenment and virtue.”94   
In the always new world of the frontier, then, with its absolute equality and 
unbridled independence, democratic openness comes close to being realized in the world.  
And it is this freedom of the frontier that continues to take hold of the American 
imagination:  freedom as the insecure condition of the “wild west” in which we “really” 
live when the comforting illusions of liberal civilization and polite society are stripped 
away; freedom as the escape from power and external influence into the untouched wild.  
This is the freedom of the state of nature - of life in the irreducible turmoil of Hobbes’s 
state of nature; of life on one’s own in Rousseau’s state of nature.95  
Freedom’s Meaning: From Place to Space     
Thus far I have argued that for Tocqueville the restless style of American 
individualism and materialism, along with the habitual rebelliousness of the French, 
follow in part from the idea of freedom inscribed in democratic equality.  This is the 
freedom experienced when conditions are in flux and one can move about unconstrained, 
unobstructed, uninhibited.  Tocqueville seems of two minds about this notion of freedom.  
In a description that would seem to align freedom with democracy and the lack of 
freedom with aristocracy, Tocqueville writes that in a free country “bustle and activity 
are everywhere,” in an unfree country “everything seems calm and still.”96  Tocqueville 
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goes on to exalt the “universal movement that dominates everything else in the United 
State, the frequent reversals of fortune, the unforeseen shifts in public and private wealth 
- all of these things combine to keep the soul in a sort of febrile agitation, which 
admirably disposes it to effort of all kinds and keeps it above the common run of 
humankind.”97  This elevating agitation is not confined to the “private industry” of 
Americans, shaping even their “religious doctrines.”98  And democratic government 
introduces this “ceaseless agitation” into politics, which then transforms “civil society.”  
The practice of democratic government “spreads throughout society a restless activity, a 
superabundant strength, an energy that never exists without it, and which, if 
circumstances are even slightly favorable, can accomplish miracles.”99  Animated by this 
restless sort of freedom, what one finds in America “is an image of strength, a little 
untamed, to be sure, but full of vigor; and of life, not without mishaps, to be sure, but also 
dynamic and energetic.”100  With its messy but vitalizing freedom, the democratic way of 
life in America seems almost synonymous with being fully alive.  
By the time of volume II of Democracy, however, Tocqueville comes to believe 
that this agitation and restlessness might actually end up sapping the energy and halting 
the activity of democratic peoples.  We have seen how democratic restlessness is a sort of 
moderated form of the democratic passion for revolution.  But this very moderation, this 
lack of revolutionary audacity, troubles Tocqueville.  A “perpetual motion is ubiquitous 
in (democratic) societies and rest is unknown, but that agitation is confined within certain 
limits that are seldom exceeded.  Men in democracies change, alter, and replace things of 
secondary importance every day but are extremely careful not to tamper with things of 
primary importance.”101  Democratic man, Tocqueville fears, will “exhaust his energies in 
petty, solitary, and sterile changes,” and “humanity, though constantly on the move, will 
cease to advance.”102  In exact opposition to the sentiment expressed in the above 
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passage, Tocqueville writes that what is “common in democratic nations … is a 
somewhat troubling restlessness, a constant turnover of people, which disturbs and 
distracts the mind without stimulating or elevating it.”103 
Perhaps in his ambivalence Tocqueville leads us to a sort of paradox of the 
democratic condition of freedom and restlessness, which is characterized by the opening 
of the imagination and the elevating sense that anything is possible, but also by a doubt 
and uncertainty - an inability to focus amid the constant flux -  that disturbs and distracts 
the mind.  In this sense, perhaps democratic freedom is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of a vitality of thought and action.    
  
At other times, Tocqueville identifies and embraces what he describes as the 
freedom specific to aristocratic times.  While democratic freedom is about having space 
to move, aristocratic freedom is about having one’s own place to stand in public.  The 
latter freedom takes shape not so much as acting and speaking without constraint, but as 
being seen and heard.     
In times of democratic equality, Tocqueville explains, “all are insignificant and 
none stands out from crowd.”104  Democracy, in turn, offers the freedom of anonymity, of 
being nobody in particular, invisible in the audience rather than up on stage.  This is the 
freedom of the frontier, as Tocqueville describes it, where everyone is a stranger and one 
barely knows one’s neighbors.  Mobile, the traveler escapes power and evades 
surveillance (thus the compulsive restlessness of his freedom).  Tocqueville describes this 
in one of his finest passages:  “Men living in the democratic centuries upon which we are 
now embarking have a natural taste for independence.  They are naturally impatient of 
rules; the permanence of the very state they prefer tires them.  They like power, but they 
are inclined to scorn and hate the man who exercises it; and their very minuteness and 
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mobility makes it easy for them to evade his grasp.  These instincts will always be found 
because they stem from the depths of the social state, which will not change.  For some 
time to come they will prevent the establishment of any form of despotism … .”105  Here 
is Tocqueville’s picture of democratic freedom, which we have been tracing throughout 
this chapter, painted more or less in its entirety.      
By contrast, aristocratic peoples prevent the establishment of despotism not 
through their mobility but through their visibility.  “Among aristocratic peoples,” 
Tocqueville explains, “all ranks are different, but all are also fixed.  Each individual 
occupies … a place that he cannot quite, and he lives among other men similarly moored 
all around him.  In such nations, no one can either hope or fear that he will not be seen.  
No man is placed so low as to be deprived of a theater and likely to escape blame or 
praise by dint of obscurity.”106  In the first place, one draws strength from the permanent 
group in which one is stuck.  There is a sort of automatic sense fellowship and mutual 
obligation (rather than otherness) in aristocracy, and one simply cannot slip into the 
insignificance of isolation.  And in the second place, one is influenced - almost forced - to 
be free as a matter of what in democratic times would be called “keeping up 
appearances.”  Always on stage in front of others, one is going to be judged and so one 
seeks to be judged well by putting on a noble show of freedom.  Aristocratic man is an 
actor in every sense of the word.   
Conversely, in times of democratic equality, freedom is precisely about being 
uninfluenced by the judgments of others - or at least about putting on a show of being 
inflexible before or untouched by the power of others.  We might say that aristocratic 
freedom attaches to being seen as noble, while democratic freedom attaches to being seen 
as authentic, or to being unseen.  In the former, freedom is driven by the pride of being 
honored, in the latter by the pride of being undomesticated.   
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In aristocracy, then, freedom takes shape as a matter of having a place upon which 
to stand up to power, rather than as being able to evade power.  In this sense, aristocratic 
freedom follows from what I have referred to as that social state’s generative 
fact/principle of “landedness.”  Owning actual property is one aspect of aristocratic 
standing.  For instance (and in perfect contrast to the pride and independence of the 
savage hunter), Tocqueville writes of the French peasant of late feudalism that the “little 
piece of dirt that belongs to him in this vast universe fills him with pride and 
independence.”107  But Tocqueville also offers a more figurative sense of having a place 
to stand.  The bourgeoisie of the old regime, for example, had a sense of standing and an 
“independent mind” because the “old construction of society had made each profession 
… a little stage.”  There “was no one, whatever his rank, who did not believe that he had 
a certain part to fill, a certain place to occupy, and spectators to judge his attitudes and his 
acts.”108  Further, the legal rights and privileges the bourgeoisie enjoyed “made of them a 
pseudo-aristocracy which often showed the pride and spirit of resistance of real 
aristocracy.”  The standing conveyed by legal rights ensured that their holder could not 
“lose himself in the crowd and hide his cowardly subservience.  Every individual found 
himself on stage, in a very small theater … and there had a permanent audience that was 
always ready to hiss or applaud.”  The rights of certain classes were less a form of private 
insulation than a sort of public platform.  Finally (and more democratically), the 
organization of the judicial system, with its public hearings and formal procedures, 
“assured the oppressed a way to make themselves heard … .”109    
Of course, aristocratic freedom is not without its downside on Tocqueville’s 
account.  In democracy, the individual tends to get lost in the very space that constitutes 
his freedom.  In aristocracy, one is locked into the place that belongs to him, and to which 
he belongs.  The aristocratic actor is bound to a public place and a public role that he 
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cannot quite, and bound to others by a chain of mutual obligations.  As we have seen, this 
social arrangement can come to seem very much devoid of the vitality of freedom - 
ossified, still, and stagnant, as with the slave-holding American South.  Moreover, 
Tocqueville writes that the freedom-in-hierarchy of the old regime was “reduced and 
deformed.”  “There was much more freedom then than in our day: but it was a kind of 
freedom that was irregular and intermittent, always contracted within the limits of a class, 
always linked to the idea of exception and privilege, and almost never went so far as to 
furnish the most natural and necessary guarantees for all citizens.”110  Aristocratic 
freedom took on the features of nobility but was unjust; it was politically beneficial but in 
a sense unnatural.  And it was linked to class privileges and divisions, which paved the 
way for the collapse of the aristocratic society old regime, for revolution, and for the rise 
of democratic society.  No less than democracy, aristocracy contains its own internal 
flaws and self-subverting elements.                  
 As is usually the case, Tocqueville takes up the cause not of returning to the 
conditions of aristocracy, but of incorporating select features of aristocracy into the 
democratic social state.  Democracy is made better than itself, as it were, when alloyed 
with the elements of aristocracy that can be synthesized by democratic means: democratic 
associations replicate the power and standing of the aristocratic actor, lawyers introduce 
into democracy some of the aristocratic taste for continuity, and so forth.  For instance, 
Americans do well to reproduce the sense of public place and standing through the use of 
newspapers.  These “give visibility” to otherwise anonymous people and unnoticed ideas 
and feelings.111   
In the conclusion to this work I suggest analogously that, far from undermining 
the political practice of democracy, the American Constitution can potentially serve as a 
sort of public stage upon which citizens may stand and be seen and heard.  The extent to 
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which we should consider the American Constitution either democratic or undemocratic 
hinges in part upon the extent to which it creates a “constitutional theater,” as it were - a 
venue for quasi-aristocratic political freedom.   The Constitution is defensible on 
democratic grounds to the extent that it harbors a sort of freedom that does not reduce to 
either mastery or escape.  
PART III: NORMS OF ASSOCIATION IN DEMOCRACY  
Political Bonds and Natural Bonds                
Thus far I have argued that freedom in times of democratic openness manifests as 
a sort of compulsive restlessness.  In what follows, I argue that association in times of 
democratic openness take shape around the norms of intimacy and informality.  The key, 
as Tocqueville explains, is that democracy weakens the political bonds of society even as 
it strengthens those bonds that seem natural.    
We would be mistaken to conclude that democratic freedom leads exclusively to 
disassociation - to the “atomization” or “fragmentation” of society.  Individualism 
captures only half the picture of human relations in the democratic social state.  In the 
whole picture we see that the individual disengages from others in his pursuit of a sort of 
savage liberty, but also engages others in certain ways that seem in accord with such 
liberty.  The individual feels free when by himself, but also when he feels by himself with 
others.  This is what I have been calling the “soul-mate” norm of human relations - the 
norm of being together-as-one, effortlessly and without compromise, in a way that seems 
spontaneous, authentic, and natural.  In such a relationship, one enjoys the liberty of the 
savage without suffering his isolation, loneliness, and insecurity. 
I shall argue that in general two types of association convey this experience of 
being alone with others: the very tight ties of family (or of the extended family of one’s 
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“culture” or “community”), and the very loose ties that unites all humanity.  Along with 
the independent individual, the blood-bond of family and the blood-bond of species 
constitute the central norms of human relations in the democratic social state.  Such are 
the ways of being free in society, of being in society without civilization’s discontents.  
Principled upon openness, democracy captures the imagination as a sort of social state of 
nature.  Democratic freedom thus leads not so much to disassociation and the dissolution 
of society (as if such a thing were possible), but rather to the depoliticization of 
association. 
To unpack this a bit, we might say that association in democratic society takes 
shape around two intertwined paradoxes.  First, the inhabitants of democracy are as 
fixated upon resemblance and unity as upon individuality and uniqueness.  Whether in 
terms of our biology or our morality, our hopes or our fears, that we are all basically the 
same will be as celebrated as that we are all different and diverse.  And second, seizing 
upon relations that seem natural - that seem power-free - as a way of experiencing 
freedom and belonging at the same time, the principle of inheritance again takes center 
stage, trumping the principle of democratic choice.  Locke above all sets forth the 
modern, liberal project of banishing the norm of filial inheritance from social and 
political thought, replacing paternalism with consent as authority’s source.  But relations 
based upon choice are problematic in democratic society because intention implies the 
exercise of power (whether legitimate or otherwise).  To live under social arrangements 
that are the product of choice (even when one is for a brief moment in time one amongst 
the many choosers), is to live under the sway of others.  Conversely, to live under social 
arrangements that are inherited as the product of nature (or of traditions so distant and 
transcendent as to seem second nature) is to live freely, at least in relation to others.  The 
norm, to return to my old metaphor, is of a marriage that is neither arranged nor freely 
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contracted into, but of a union that is “born into” or simply somehow “meant to be.”  
There is the individual, the community, and nothing in between.  One feels at home with 
others - and so free to be oneself - only in the so-called “tribal” relations of family, 
friendship-as-extended-family, race, gender, the “global village” of humanity, and so 
forth.  These relationships transcend or delve beneath the need for mediating words; 
unspoken, they are experienced as properly unintended, spontaneous, and authentic.    
In this context, we should reconsider the argument of Tocqueville’s with which 
we began, that democratic people will accept servitude before inequality.  Perhaps to be 
free in relation to others, to be free of every inequality of power, we are prone to abdicate 
democratic power and think of ourselves as subject to impersonal, abstract, superhuman 
forces - not of the all-too-human, personifiable state or bureaucracy, but of the market, 
evolution, God, chance, fate, and so on.  We can never be equally powerful, so we settle 
for being equally powerless.  Only when determined by the common master of nature or 
Nature can we be free with others.  
Democratic Associations: The Family and Humanity    
Tocqueville makes clear that, along with the idea of the independent individual, 
the idea of humanity occurs naturally to the democratic imagination.  In aristocratic 
times, “the general notion of ‘one’s fellow man’ is obscure, and little thought is given to 
devoting oneself to one’s fellow man for the sake of humanity … .  By contrast, in 
democratic centuries, … the duties of each individual toward the species are far more 
clear.”112  This dual movement toward individualism and humanitarianism - toward the 
desire for independence from each other, and toward the idea of being bound to every 
other - is born of democratic equality and the recognition of one’s similarity to others that 
follows.  This recognition of resemblance, of being surrounded by those like oneself, 
neither superior nor inferior, facilitates conformity, compassion, and communication 
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within and across democratic societies - the elements of what we would call 
“globalization.”  It also facilitates the inversion of these phenomena: the ostentatious 
display of uniqueness, competitiveness, and the feeling of being strangers to one another.   
We have already touched upon the conformity, and the reaction against 
conformity, produced by freedom-in-equality.  In times of equality, one takes pride in not 
depending upon one’s neighbors.  At the same time, independence is a difficult test and 
one is prone to cheat off of one’s neighbors, secretly going with the flow of what seems 
to be the prevailing opinion.  Isolated, the individual has the desire but not the ability to 
maintain his individuality.  Consequently, insofar as one can make it out, the authority of 
humanity will be overwhelmingly weighty.  On the other hand, as with the story of the 
savage and the slave, the more one’s resemblance to one’s neighbors is recognized, the 
more widespread, vehement, and even rebellious will be the reaction against 
resemblance.  Feeling lost in the human crowd, the individual will feel compelled to 
express his own personality and make a conspicuous show of his freedom.  Like the 
savage, “pride will always impel individuals to escape the common level … .”113  
Conformity and a contrary uniqueness thus advance together.  With democracy, 
Tocqueville writes, for “the first time in history, the features of the human race become 
clearly visible.”114  At the same time, to avoid being “confounded in a common mass, a 
host of artificial and arbitrary classifications arise, and individuals use these to set 
themselves apart lest they be dragged against their will into the crowd.” 115  This is what 
Freud would later term the “narcissism of small differences.”  
Moreover, Tocqueville argues that diversity can only be shallow in times of 
equality and mobility.  With the collapse of the principle of hierarchical difference, and 
with the dissolution of the principle of landedness and the separation between distinct 
places, diversity cannot but diminish to idiosyncrasy.  In a passage that must seem bizarre 
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to modern sensibilities, Tocqueville writes that the era between the Roman empire and 
the empire of democracy was a sort of golden age of diversity and individuality.  The 
advent of equality, by contrast, gave rise to the “tendency toward assimilation”  “The 
Middle Ages were times of fragmentation.  Each people, each province, each city, each 
family had a strong tendency to assert its individuality.  Today, an opposite tendency is 
apparent: peoples seem to be moving toward unity.  Intellectual bonds join the most 
remote parts of the earth, and people cannot remain strangers to one another for a single 
day or ignorant of what is taking place in any corner of the globe.”116  “Uniformity 
reigns” in democracy, and “diversity, like liberty, is vanishing day by day.”117   
The recognition of human similarity facilitates more than conformity and the 
reaction against conformity, though.  Democratic men, Tocqueville argues, will also be 
compassionate - as compassionate in their humanitarianism as they are competitive in 
their individualism.  And again, resemblance is the source of both sides of the apparent 
opposition.  When all are equal and similar, Tocqueville explains, the possibility of 
climbing up (and falling down) the social and economic ladder is “open to all.”  “The 
immediate result of this is that all citizens are secretly at war with one another.”118  But 
even as the democratic individual has one foot in this socialized version of Hobbes’s state 
of nature, his other foot is planted firmly in Rousseau’s.  When all are equal and 
“everyone thinks and feels in almost the same way, then each person can judge everyone 
else’s sensations in an instant: all he has to do is cast a quick glance at himself. … No 
matter if strangers or enemies are involved: his imagination instantly puts him in their 
place. … In democratic centuries, men rarely sacrifice themselves for one another, but 
they do exhibit a general compassion for all members of the human species.”119  More a 
matter of sympathy born of sameness than of the harmony of differences, men are bound 
across all divides by a “natural pity.”120        
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Finally, the recognition of similarity facilitates unfettered communication within 
and across peoples, but also a sense of distance between people.  Tocqueville suggests 
that in democratic times the members of the human association cannot remain strangers - 
thought circulates freely as everyone is “in constant communication with one another.”121  
Mobile, people “are constantly changing places, and inhabitants of different countries 
mingle with, see, listen to, and borrow from one another.”122  But on Tocqueville’s 
account, this mingling represents less achieved unity than given uniformity.  People and 
nations associate less as distinct and differentiated parts of a whole than as additions to a 
general mass.  And as we have seen in the American West, constant mobility in a sense 
breaks the communicative bond.  For instance, Tocqueville writes that as aristocracy 
gives way to democracy “each profession is open to all comers, and large numbers of 
practitioners are constantly entering and leaving, so that they become strangers to one 
another, each indifferent and almost invisible to all the rest” - the “social bond is 
destroyed.”123  Similarly, as “each class draws closer …, its members become indifferent 
to one another and treat one another as strangers.”124  Like tenants in an apartment - right 
next-door but transient -  the inhabitants of democracy are increasingly able and 
increasingly disinclined to converse with disparate others.  Everyone speaks the same 
language, as it were, but no one talks.                
These, then, are the bonds that unite individuals in human association.  They are 
ties that divide as much as they bind, whether in reaction against homogenization, in 
competition, or in the feeling of being among strangers.  Given and universal, these ties 
seem natural, as real and spontaneous as caring about oneself.  They bind everyone 
equally and are worn lightly, without effort or compromise, never constraining or 
obstructing the freedom of the individual.  And they are a product of the abstract 
resemblance of individuals.  “In democratic societies,” Tocqueville writes, “where all 
 117 
men are insignificant and very much alike, each person looks at himself and instantly 
sees everyone else.”125  In this sense, the human association is a sort of association of one, 
beyond the need for mediating words.  Talking with other members is at once as shallow 
and as intimate as talking to oneself.   
The idea of association via the internet is exemplary of this bond of shallow 
intimacy - of a bond one clicks out of as easily as it is taken on, wherein emotions are 
exchanged largely through pictures and symbols (“emoticons,” for example) with like-
minded individuals around the world (one’s “friends”), in a manner that conveys the 
sense of being by oneself with others.  In this sense, the internet is constituted as the 
social state of nature par excellence, the perfect marriage of privacy and recognition, 
freedom and belonging.  It is the perfectly open society one creates above the world one 
actually inhabits.             
 
Tocqueville writes that, with the spread of democracy, all “bonds of race, class, 
and country are becoming looser; the great bond of humanity is growing tighter.”126  In 
America, and it would seem in the world, there will come a day when there is but one 
people, “all equal to one another, all members of the same family.”127  But universal 
humanity is not the only mode of association Tocqueville describes as inscribed in 
democracy.  The familial association is just as central as the human association.  Or 
better, a single norm of association - association based upon innate resemblance - 
dominates democratic society in its opposite extremes.  While human beings will see 
each other as “members of the same family,” Tocqueville sees a future when each 
individual, “withdrawn into himself, is virtually a stranger to the fate of all the others.  
For him, his children and personal friends comprise the entire human race.  As for the 
remainder of his fellow citizens, he lives alongside them but does not see them.  … He 
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exists only in himself and for himself, and if he still has a family, he no longer has a 
country.”128  There is the exclusive family and all-inclusive humanity, and nothing in 
between.   
The equality of conditions thus both expands and contracts the orbit of social 
relations - one is connected to everybody in the world and disconnected from one’s next-
door neighbor.  But as we see, even in this disconnection the individual does not retreat 
into total isolation; so-called “atomization” is never a viable possibility.  Instead, 
individualism “disposes each citizen to cut himself off from the mass of his fellow men 
and withdraw into the circle of family and friends, so that having created a little society 
for his own use, he gladly leaves the larger society to take care of itself.”129  We saw how 
the French attempted through revolution to create an imaginary society above the one 
they inhabited - an effort at mastery and escape in a single stroke.  Here, the American 
exemplar of democracy creates a little society outside of the one he inhabits where he 
feels, quite literally, at home - by himself with others.  The French envisioned politics as 
a vehicle for their literary ideals of pristine democracy, of an expansively open society 
that transcended the fetters of hierarchy and landedness.  The Americans envision private 
family life as a venue for their literary ideals of perfectly open society - of a “small 
republic,” as it were - that transcends the fetters of political life.  Bound by nature, the 
democratic family is a little society that can do without politics.           
Tocqueville addresses the influence of democracy on the family in single chapter, 
which can be read almost as a microcosm of the entirety of Democracy II.  For 
Tocqueville (and as we shall see in the next chapter, for Claude Lefort as well), 
democratic society takes shape around the disappearance of the figure of the father - the 
figure who speaks on behalf of authority, whether of God, the sovereign, or tradition.  In 
aristocracy, the father is the present embodiment of the distant ruler (who himself is the 
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present embodiment of a distant God).  As the “natural and necessary bond between the 
past and the present … he is the organ of tradition, the interpreter of custom, the arbiter 
of mores.”130  With a bit of an Oedipal resonance, we might say that democracy is born 
into the world with the beheading of the father-figure.   
This, of course, transforms the family as much as society.  “In the aristocratic 
family, as in aristocratic society generally, every place is marked” according to 
distinctions of rank.  “Democracy overturns or lowers most of these barriers.”131  
Consequently, Tocqueville writes, “the distance that once separated a father from his son 
has decreased and … paternal authority has been if not destroyed then at least impaired.”  
This tendency is taken to its extreme in America, where “the family - taking the word in 
its Roman and aristocratic sense - does not exist.”  The father “enjoys the unchallenged 
domestic dictatorship that the weakness of his sons requires” for the first few years 
following birth, but as the “young American approaches manhood … the bonds of filial 
obedience grow looser … . He first becomes master of his thoughts and soon thereafter of 
his conduct.”132  The order of the democratic family thus perfectly mirrors that of 
democratic society in general: with the dissolution of the right of command the distance 
between people decreases and the bonds that hold them together soften.       
On Tocqueville’s account, the democratic family adheres largely around the 
intimacy this new closeness brings.  As “mores and laws become more democratic, 
relations between father and sons become more intimate and tender.  Rule and authority 
are less frequently encountered.  … The master and magistrate have vanished; the father 
remains.”  Fraternity supplants paternity even in the relation between father and son.  
“Confidence and affection are often greater,” and while the father’s “order may be 
ignored,” his “advice is usually powerful.”133  There is such an ease and sweetness to this 
new bond of affection that the democratization of the family becomes irresistible.  
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Democratic family mores, Tocqueville famously concludes, “are so mild that even 
partisans of aristocracy find them attractive, and after savoring them for a time they are 
not tempted to revert to the chilly and respectful formalities of the aristocratic family.”134             
With this newfound intimacy, all that is formal in the relationship dissolves, 
leaving only a warm and familiar informality.  As “power slips away from the 
aristocracy, we see all that was austere, conventional, and legal vanishing from paternal 
power as well, and a kind of equality establishing itself around the domestic hearth.”  
There remain few “external signs of respect” around the father, and no “recognized 
formula for addressing him.”  “I have seen,” Tocqueville writes, even “fiery enemies of 
democracies allow their children to address them in the most familiar of terms.”135  To see 
this difference, one need only compare the domestic correspondence of democratic times 
to those of the aristocratic past.  In aristocracy, the “style is always correct, formal, rigid, 
and so cold that the heart’s natural warmth can barely be felt through the words.  Among 
democratic peoples, by contrast, every word that a son addresses to his father bears the 
stamp of something that is at once free, familiar, and tender … .”136  We might say that 
aristocratic language is like the formal and often uncomfortable suit one is expected to 
put on in public, while democratic language is what one relaxes in around the house.  
Democratic communication is direct and “from the heart,” liberated from the repressive 
confines of mediating social rules, forms, and conventions.  Aristocratic communication, 
conversely, appears more concerned with propriety of style than authenticity of 
expression.  Words are a façade whereby one presents oneself to public court rather than 
a means of opening up to others.  The son of aristocracy is recognized through in a sense 
forgetting himself, what in democratic times would be considered “repressing,” 
“concealing,” or “masking” himself.  The son of democracy is recognized through 
revealing himself, what in aristocratic times would be considered degrading himself.   
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Beyond the family, Tocqueville concludes that while democratic informality and 
intimacy seduces even stalwart aristocrats in the heartfelt emotion it allows to come 
through, the “manners of the aristocracy draped human nature in beautiful illusions, and 
though the portrait was often deceptive, there was a noble pleasure in looking at it.”137  
One wonders whether Tocqueville reflects his democratic milieu here, assuming that 
manners are drapery - that the inner, private, deep self is “the real me,” as it were, while 
the features one chooses or feels obliged to present in public are illusion.  One wonders 
whether in aristocratic times the noble character one portrayed in accordance with public 
norms would have been considered more telling of the “real.”  In times of hierarchy, 
manners would be considered natural.  To be sure, the persona of noble actor is 
determined and in a sense enforced from without, by a public code of social expectations 
and immutable traditions.  But is the inner self of democracy any less determined and 
enforced from without, by a natural code of genetic facts and immutable family 
upbringing?  Are the mysterious contours of the subconscious self any less inherited than 
were the rules of etiquette and honor that shaped the aristocratic actor?   
Regardless, as Tocqueville writes, the experience of the democratic mode of 
association is that “the natural bond seems to grow tighter as the social bond relaxes.”138  
Democracy, Tocqueville continues, “brings kin closer together while at the same time 
driving citizens further apart.”139  To generalize, we might say that democracy tightens 
kin-type relations - associations that seems to follow from the blood-bond of family 
resemblance - while weakening any relationship that seems held together merely by 
social conventions.  For Tocqueville, as we have seen, the former relationship manifests 
itself in the associations of global humanity and the intimate family.  The latter mode of 
association is everything in between - relations based on citizenship, class, race, religion, 
all those voluntary associations of civil and political society, and so forth.  
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 Here Tocqueville would seem on weak footing.  Clearly enough, the bonds of 
race and religion, among others, continue to hold tight.  I would maintain that we can 
explain this state of affairs by following Tocqueville’s reasoning, if not necessarily his 
writings.  Such bonds persist in democratic society insofar as they convey the experience 
of being members of the same family or “tribe.”  This, I think, is analogous to the 
phenomenon Tocqueville called “collective individualism.”140  Solidarity of whatever sort 
persist as meaningful so long as it is experienced as natural rather than conventional -  
born into rather than constructed, inherited rather than intended.  It is only in nature that 
the democratic individual feels as if alone with others, perfectly equal and free.  Feeling 
at home with others, he can let go and “act naturally.”  He can lose himself without ever 
forgetting himself.      
Democratic Informality: Association Without Mediating Conventions  
In the years leading up to the French Revolution, Tocqueville writes, people were 
“simultaneously immensely proud of humanity and exceptionally humble with respect to 
their own time and country.”  The “idea of the greatness of man in general, the 
omnipotence of his reason, the unlimited extent of his intellectual abilities, penetrated all 
minds and filled them; with this proud notion of humanity as a whole there was combined 
an unnatural contempt for the particular time in which they lived and the society of which 
they were part. … Everywhere people spoke of nothing but institutions’ weakness, their 
incoherence, the absurdities and vices of contemporaries, society’s corruption, its 
rottenness.” Written works were “full of diatribes against the present and predictions of a 
coming catastrophe.”141  Man in abstract and humanity in general were idealized as the 
figures of limitless potential and true grandeur.  All things pertaining to the particular 
situations of particular people were devalued as corrupt and absurd.  The pride people felt 
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in relation to the democratic abstraction was matched only by the contempt they felt for 
their own time and place.    
I want to suggest that this dialectic of idealization and devaluation is not 
contingent upon the facts preceding the French Revolution, but rather intrinsic to the 
democratic social state born of revolution.  Relative to the sublime ideas that seize the 
imagination with the collapse of hierarchy - of the expansive liberty of the savage, of a 
society ordered and animated only by fraternity and a humanitarian compassion, of the 
union of this natural liberty and natural love - the world we inhabit can only seem rotten 
and always tending toward catastrophe.  Relative to the open self, society, and world of 
democracy, the particular practices and institutions of the here and now can only seem a 
theater of the absurd - a play full of trite, repetitive, clichéd, nonsensical jargon that 
obstructs authentic expression and meaningful communion; an unsatisfying play where 
nothing happens while we perpetually wait for an opening onto the new. 
Take, for example, the simultaneous idealization and devaluation of democratic 
politics today.  On one hand, democracy is idealized as the grand political movement of 
humanity spontaneously coming together in a global “green revolution,” over and against 
our presently polluted condition.  Or democracy is idealized as synonymous with 
freedom, the “seeds” of which will spontaneously spring up the world over once 
obstructing power-formations are cleared away, whether by means of revolutionary or 
military action.  Or democracy holds the promise of the new politics we are all waiting 
for but which never seems to come, regardless of which plain-spoken, outsider, agent-of-
change president next appears on the scene to get things back on track.  Conversely, the 
democratic political system is precisely a theater of the absurd, wherein everyone is 
“playing politics” in a routine that seems bizarrely disconnected from the real world.  
And try as we might, we can never revolutionize, escape, or transcend the confines of this 
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system, the institutions and conventions of which stand in the way of the beautiful 
possibility of democracy.  It is in this sense, I suggest, that we can understand the great 
optimism and great cynicism that together constitute our political discourse.  The 
democratic movement seems given, inevitable, and entirely meaningful.  The democratic 
political systems, processes, and organizations that are supposed to be a vehicle for this 
idea seem entirely - indeed constitutively - beyond reform.  Democratization (democracy-
as-verb) is idealized, democracy (democracy-as-noun) is devalued.      
More generally, in a social state ordered by the idea of democratic openness - 
whether imagined to be of the pre-modern past or the post-modern future - that which is 
perceived to be of human contrivance is devalued as obstructing and confining artifice.  
Conventionality is undermined as a limiting, unnecessary, arbitrary barrier separating us 
from the real and the possible - a not-at-all beautiful illusion.  “Democracy,” Tocqueville 
thus writes, “destroys or obscures nearly all the old social conventions and prevents men 
from easily settling on new ones.”142  We might say that while the principle of democratic 
equality subverts hierarchical conventions, the concomitant principle of democratic 
openness subverts the conventional as such.  
 In this context, think of the divergent representations of the American 
Constitution.  On one hand, arriving to us from the distant past, as the quasi-sacred work 
of quasi-divine Founders, the Constitution is untouchable - the vehicle of timeless and 
placeless rights.  On the other hand, as the product of particular people in a particular 
time and place, the document is no more than an artifact of wealthy dead white men - the 
often unjust and even stupid political norms and forms that have been foisted upon us.  
The Constitution is idealized as the bedrock of our civil religion, or devalued as the 
source of our undemocratic political economy, with nothing in between.                  
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In the transition from aristocracy to democracy, the collapse of conventionality 
manifests itself in the dissolution of manners, etiquette, and codes of honor.  “In 
aristocratic societies,” Tocqueville writes, “outward relations among men are subject to 
mostly stable conventions,” wherein the “customs of the leading class … serve as a 
model for all others.”  Conventions stand upon stable and visible authority, and so 
“everyone thinks he knows precisely what signs are appropriate to indicate respect or 
good will, and etiquette is a science of which no one is supposed to be ignorant.”  Society 
is ordered and animated by “rules of politeness,” which constitute a “complex piece of 
legislation” governing every form of association, including the family.143 
Equality/openness dissolves these leading models and precise signs, and promises 
a mode of association simplified of all this rigid, complex, encumbering legislation.  
Should the inhabitants of democracy chance to meet, their approach is “natural, frank, 
and open.”144  People are no longer bound to meet, as it were, by reciprocal obligation, 
but when they do meet their interactions are easier and more relaxed.  Tocqueville 
explains that as “distinctions of rank vanish and men of diverse education and birth mix 
and come together in the same places, agreement about rules of proper behavior is almost 
impossible.”145  And “men who live in democracies are too mobile to allow some group 
of them to establish and enforce a code of etiquette.  Each individual therefore behaves 
more or less as he pleases … , rather than conforming to an ideal model held up in 
advance for everyone to imitate.”146  In turn, where aristocratic manners display the 
virtues of “regularity and grandeur,” democratic manners display “simplicity and 
freedom.”  Aristocratic manners “adorn and hide what is natural,” democratic manners 
are “more sincere,” a “thin and poorly woven veil, through which each person’s true 
feelings and individual ideas can easily be seen.”147  Authenticity of expression supplants 
formality of presentation in facilitating association.  Where the aristocrat is recognized in 
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his demonstrable knowledge of the intricate rules of etiquette, democratic peoples are 
“accustomed to consider the feelings and ideas rather than the manners of the people they 
meet,” and they “attach more importance to the substance of actions than to the form.”148  
In the end, Tocqueville writes, “it is fair to say that the effect of democracy is not 
precisely to give men certain manners but to prevent them from being mannered.”149     
Along similar lines, the effects of democracy prevent men from being honored, at 
least on Tocqueville’s understanding of “honor.”  “Men seem to employ two quite 
distinct methods in making public judgments of the actions of their fellow men: 
sometimes they rely on simple notions of the just and unjust that exist everywhere; at 
other times they use very particular notions associated with one country or period.”  The 
former, which take shape around “the permanent and general needs” of the “human race,” 
are what Tocqueville calls “moral laws.”  “Honor,” on the other hand, “is nothing other 
than a particular rule based on a particular state that a people or class uses to assign 
blame or praise.”  Tocqueville cites as an example the refusal to fight a duel as a moral 
act that many peoples would consider dishonorable.150       
Thus, “whenever men gather to form a particular society, a characteristic form of 
honor immediately springs up among them, that is, a distinctive set of opinions regarding 
what is to be praised or blamed.  And these particular rules always have their source in 
the special habits and special interests of the association.”151  The “feudal aristocracy was 
born in war and for war, and so nothing was honored above “martial courage.”152  The 
“American classification of vices is no less arbitrary.” In America, where “there is no 
door that work cannot open,” honor is directed against idleness while the “passion for 
wealth … is honored.”  “What our ancestors in the Middle Ages called servile greed, the 
American calls noble and estimable ambition, just as he ascribes the name ‘blind and 
barbaric fury’ to the conquering ardor and warlike spirit” of the Middle Ages.153  Courage 
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is not effaced but rather transformed, from “martial valor” to “audacity” and “boldness in 
industry.”154 
In aristocratic times, when peoples are divided and subdivided by a million little 
distinction, the “prescriptions of honor” are “numerous” and “bizarre.”155  As with 
manners and etiquette, the democratic abstraction smoothes over and simplifies these 
complexities of aristocratic honor.  As the “men who make up the nation revert to being 
similar and equal,” “honor will be limited to a small number of precepts, and the distance 
between those precepts and the moral laws adopted by the common run of humanity will 
diminish.”156  And as all nations merge into one people, the particularities of honor 
dissolves entirely into the generalities of morality.  Were there “to come a day when all 
races coalesced and all the peoples of the world had the same interests and needs and no 
characteristic features any longer set them apart, then people would cease to ascribe any 
conventional value to human actions altogether” and the “general needs of mankind, 
revealed by consciousness to every man, would be the common measure.”157  Were the 
empire of democracy ever to achieve universal equality and similarity, democratic honor 
would become synonymous with human morality.  
 
In all of these cases, informality replaces formality as the norm of propriety 
governing human relations.  The more simply and directly one conveys one’s ideas and 
feelings to others, the more open and genuine one is in one’s relationships, the more one 
is as if at home with others, the more meaningful is the experience of association.  
In a theme he returns to time and again, Tocqueville writes that, in their politics, 
in their religion, and their in thought in general, “nothing is more repugnant to the human 
mind in ages of equality than the idea of submitting to forms.”158  Tocqueville explains 
this in part as the popular sovereign’s or sovereign individual’s impatience with all 
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limitations and constraints.  Democratic peoples “harbor an instinctive disdain” for all the 
settled, rules, regulations, and procedures because such things “continually slow or halt 
the realization of their designs.”  They don’t see why they should abide such petty 
inconveniences and red tape, which get in the way of common sense and just getting 
things done.   
 
The “arrogant disdain” for formalities, Tocqueville writes, is one of the great 
dangers of democratic times.  This is particularly so when a contempt for forms carries 
over into political life, where their “principle merit” is to serve as barriers between the 
strong and weak, the governing and the governed, slowing the former while allowing the 
latter time to take his bearings.”  In democratic times, then, when a disrespect for forms is 
a “very natural - and very dangerous - instinct,” only the most “imperious necessity” 
justifies neglecting one’s political manners.159  It is primarily along these lines that 
Tocqueville famously argues for the value of lawyers and lawyerly ways to democracy: 
“Men who make a special study of the law take from their work certain habits of order, a 
taste for  forms, and a sort of instinctive love of regular sequences in ideas that naturally 
foster in them a strong opposition to the revolutionary spirit and the unthinking passions 
of democracy.”160    
Tocqueville identifies a second, more subtle, reason why forms arouse the 
contempt of democratic peoples.  Beside placing inhibitions on the free exercise of 
power, conventional norms and forms are experienced as obstructing the immediacy of 
understanding and experience.  The American “cast of mind,” for instance, is to “be free 
of the systematic spirit,” to “seek on one’s own and in oneself alone the reason for 
things,” and to “aim beyond form at substance.”161  To this end, Americans “will strip 
away as much of the outer husk as they can, remove anything that stands between them 
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and the object of their attention, and eliminate whatever is hiding the thing and 
preventing them from getting a good, close look.  This habit of mind soon leads them to 
despise all outward forms, which they regard as useless and inconvenient veils placed 
between them and truth.”162  Seeking “the real in all things,” deep down beneath the 
opaque surface of particular and passing conventionality, the democratic individual tends 
to base his “opinions on the very nature of man.”163  In this sense, Tocqueville concludes, 
“equality cannot fail to destroy what is purely conventional and arbitrary in forms of 
thought.”164  “Forms will usually be neglected and occasionally scorned” and an 
“uncultivated, almost savage vigor will dominate thought.”165      
Tocqueville suggests, in turn, that religions should be wary of burdening 
themselves with “external forms” and “external practices in democratic ages.”  
Democratic peoples are impatient of figurative images.  Symbols strike them as puerile 
artifices used only to veil or embellish the truth that it would be more natural to present 
openly.  Ceremonies leave them cold, and they are naturally inclined to look on the 
details of religious worship as a matter of secondary importance.”166  Whatsoever seems 
ceremonial will be deemed without significance - just for the sake of show - and even 
scorned as unnecessary artifice that inhibits authentic faith.   
Tocqueville writes of the France of his time: “Political institutions are like 
religions, where worship usually long outlives belief.”167  On the above account, it seems 
that the opposite would tend to be the case - that belief, whether religious or political, 
would long outlive worship in democratic times.  Indeed, insofar as externally imposed 
forms of worship are thought to be superficial fetters upon real and vital belief, it seems 
the politics and religion of democracy would be better served by seeking to engage ideas 
and emotions via the rejection of all secondary doctrines and dogmas.  The passions are 
stirred not by the empty rhetoric of religious rituals and political ceremonies, but by 
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vehement genuineness in adherence to deep, primitive, even original principle - by 
revolutionary return to source.  In turn, a brazenly untouched, undomesticated 
fundamentalism, as it were, will capture the democratic imagination as much as the 
expansive openness of globalization discussed above.  The former drops below the 
artifice of conventional forms, the latter expands beyond the constraining borders of 
conventional forms.  Both, we might say, are born of a contempt for the particular time in 
which one lives and the society of which one is a part.  
These quasi-familial and humanitarian relations take on great normative weight in 
democracy, then, precisely because they don’t seem mannered.  As modes of association 
that do not require agreement (or compromise), their organization seems before or 
beyond the need for mediating procedures and meaningless rules of etiquette.  In his cast 
of mind, Tocqueville writes, the democratic individual seeks to remove anything that 
stands between him and the object of his attention; in his relationships, we might add, he 
seeks to remove anything that stands between him and the object of his affection.  Such 
relations seem spontaneous and real, a natural way of being with others that transcends 
the artificiality and escapes the unfreedom of the here and now.  As when he is alone, 
democratic man feels at home in such intimate and informal relationships.   
The Separation of Democracy and State 
In the previous chapter, we saw how democracy’s revolutionary movement 
overflowed all territorial boundaries and spread like a religion.  This is because the 
modern democratic abstraction, mirroring monotheistic, and above all Christian, 
abstraction, transcended all particularities and distinctions.  In the ancient world, 
Tocqueville writes, “there were, so to speak, as many gods and human species as there 
were nations. … Several religions kept particular social or political institutions …, like 
slavery, which made them inadmissible in countries which did not accept these 
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institutions.”  But the Christian religion “placed itself absolutely outside particular 
institutions which can exist among men, social or political, all legal conventions, in order 
to consider the human species as a single whole, composed of similar individuals, all 
subject to the same moral law … .”168     
The social state of democracy is similarly based “on principles so general, so 
natural, so much founded on the nature of human society outside any particular society, 
that it can be understood and adopted by all people.”  Democratic society, Tocqueville 
seems to suggest, is simply society as such - society in its natural form, taking shape 
around natural laws and human reason alone.  It is for this reason that the empire of 
democracy “has been able to aim at conquering not only one people, but all humanity.”169  
Indeed, as we have seen, the democratic empire makes the very idea of humanity - of a 
human association - thinkable.  Like the Christian religion, the “political gospel” of the 
democratic revolution considers “man in the abstract,” with “prescriptions … that claim 
to regulate the relations of men between themselves, independently of the positions these 
men occupy in each society.  These are the natural relationships.  Those of father to son, 
son to father, brother to brother, men to men.”170  As with Christianity, democracy’s 
tenet’s speak directly and solely to the family and the species.          
Now, in an argument that is still often heard today, Tocqueville writes that the 
authority of religion, its moral force, lies precisely in its distance from temporal power.  
The separation of church and state morally empowers the former.  The continued vitality 
of religion in America, for instance, is due to the fact that members “of the clergy … 
steer clear of power voluntarily and take a sort of professional pride in having nothing to 
do with it.”  “When a religion” Tocqueville explains, “seeks to found its empire solely on 
the desire for immortality that torments the hearts of all men equally, it can aim for 
universality.  But when it joins forces with a government, it must adopt maxims 
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applicable only to certain peoples.”171  Religious codes lose their “expansive properties” 
when bound to “particular civil or political law,” which render them “applicable only to 
certain countries, certain nationalities, certain climates, certain civilizations, certain 
races.”172  Moreover, religion cannot seek “the support of worldly interests” without 
becoming as “ephemeral” and “fragile as any temporal power.”  Nor can religion “share 
the material might of those who govern without incurring some of the hatred they 
inspire.”  In these three ways, “diminishing a religion’s apparent strength … (makes) it 
more powerful.”173  
Beyond the separation of church and state, we might surmise that the same 
argument holds for the separation or religion and church, at least insofar as the institution 
of the church itself seems in any way spatially or temporally bounded, or to wield 
worldly power.  Establishing a house of religion can only diminish that which should be 
eternal, infinite, and immaculate - boxing the transcendent into the here and now, into 
present but passing conventional forms.  Along these lines, we might consider the often 
heard notion of ‘spiritual but not religious” an extension of Tocqueville’s reasoning 
behind the of the separation of church and state.         
Democracy, I want to suggest, founds its moral empire in precisely the same 
fashion.  To ensure the victory of its idea, democracy must cast off all particular, 
embodying, encumbering forms.  Like the Christian religion, democracy aspires to 
universality and so must forsake affiliation with all temporal, material power.  In this 
sense, democracy’s increasingly unquestioned authority lies in its pristine powerlessness.  
We might say that the continued vitality of democracy depends upon the separation of 
democracy and state, and ultimately of democracy and politics - at least insofar as by 
“politics” we mean a practice organized and animated by particular, conventional forms.  
To house democracy would be to domesticate democracy.  The spiritual impulse is 
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strengthened by its distance from its religious instantiation; the democratic impulse is 
strengthened by its distance from its political instantiation.  Spiritual but not religious has 
its logical concomitant in democratic but not political.           
Political Atheism and the Democratic Way of Life 
In an letter to Eugène Stoffels, Tocqueville writes: “You speak of what you call 
your political atheism, and you ask me if I share it.  On this we must understand each 
other.  Are you disgusted only with parties or also with the ideas they exploit?  In the first 
case, you know that such has always more or less been my way of thinking.  But when it 
comes to the second, I am no longer your man in the least.”  Wary of such a formulation, 
though, he goes on to write that “I am trying not to construct two worlds: the one moral, 
in which I am still enthusiastic for what is beautiful and good; the other political, in 
which I lie down flat on my face in order to smell more at my leisure the dung on which 
we walk. … I am seeking not to divide what is indivisible.”174 
I suggest that the democratic revolution has led precisely to such a two-worlds 
construction of the moral versus the political.  Whether as an archaic past long lost to us 
or as a dreamt of future that seems tantalizingly inevitable but always just over the 
horizon, the world of democratic openness harbors the types of freedom and association 
we experience as meaningful.  This is an always pristine world, before or beyond the 
particulars of our time and place, simplified of all that is not by nature good and right and 
beautiful.  The practice of politics - and to some extent even the concept of the political - 
has no place in this world.  Never wholly moral, the practice of politics - and practical 
action in general - once stood in a world that took shape around particular norms of honor 
and dishonor.  As the democratic phenomena subverted all codes of honor, though, 
politics was left without standards of judgment, save amoral efficiency.  When thinking 
about and evaluating politics, we end up demanding a politics of the impossible (crafted 
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with geometrical precision to be moral without exception), or a politics that looks like 
war by other means.     
If the world of democratic moral principles stands as a sort of untouchable and 
unrealizable New World, then, the world of democratic political practices is debased as 
compromised, corrupt, and ultimately absurd.  If the pristine first world is inherently 
unreachable, it is in this polluted second world that we feel always stuck without means 
of escape.  “Democracy” (or better, “democratization”) takes on a quasi-religious sense 
of promising revolutionary transcendence to a natural state of openness; “politics” is 
degraded to an economic sense of being all and only about personal power, petty self-
interest, material well-being, and so forth.  The democratic revolution, which began as an 
essentially political revolution, ends up subverting democratic politics.  Democratic faith 
ends in political atheism.    
Along these lines, Tocqueville description of the common view of politics in 
1840’s France is no less common today.  “We all consider the greatest evil and the 
greatest danger of the present situation to be the profound indifference into which the 
country is falling … .  There are many causes of this evil; but surely one of the principle 
ones is the belief that … political life is no more than a game in which each person seeks 
only to win; that politics has nothing serious in it but the personal ambitions of which it is 
the means; that there is a sort of gullibility and almost stupidity and shame in growing 
impassioned for a game that lacks reality and for political chiefs who are only actors not 
even interested in the success of the play, but only in that of their particular roles.”175  
One wonders whether Tocqueville wouldn’t immediately recognize this outlook today in, 
for instance, the media’s reflexive representation of every politician as acting solely to 
stage the “photo-op” or “sound-bite” - in the representation of every speech, action, and 
image as “PR” and “spin” meant to manipulate the demographically determined opinions 
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of the electorate.  What are we to think of a politics wherein politicians running for the 
honor of office refer to the time of elections as “the silly season.”  There is a sense in 
which cynicism tends toward its logical endpoint here, in the assumption not so much of 
politics as corrupt (which would be to presume that there was something meaningful to 
be corrupted), but in the assumption of politics as simply absurd (recognized by all as 
meaningless).  Liberal democratic politics - the politics of parties and representative, of 
constitutions and institutions - seems as fake and absurdly out of place today as would a 
formal code of etiquette, and for much the same reason.  No wonder today’s political 
satire has such an easy time of it, not even needing to exaggerate the features everyone 
already recognizes as ridiculous.  The Daily Show is just CNN with a studio audience.   
Tocqueville writes that in times past, “kings, sensing the almost divine character 
that cloaked their authority in the eyes of the multitude, drew from the very respect they 
inspired the will not to abuse their power.”176  One wonders what today’s politicians draw 
from the disrespect they inspire.   
 
The political atheism of democratic society, Tocqueville suggests, is no less than 
tragic.  Contrary to a prevailing opinion of democratic times, he argues that democracy 
needs a robust politics even more so than previous social states.  The health of democratic 
society is inextricably bound to the health of its politics.  We might say that the practice 
of politics - of arguing and acting in association with equal others - serves as a remedy to 
the pathologies of democratic culture.  Politics is the venue for a type of freedom 
removed from the idea of savage independence - for the exercise of power in between the 
aspirations to mastery and escape.  Politics is the venue for a type of association in 
between isolated individualism and the collective individualism of the familial and the 
human association.    
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For Tocqueville, man is a social animal, and so public life is largely an end in 
itself.  “Feelings and ideas are renewed, the heart expands, and the human spirit develops 
only through the reciprocal action of human beings on one another.”  Tocqueville 
therefore concludes that “the science of association is the fundamental science.  Progress 
in all the other sciences depends on progress in this one.”  This science is increasingly 
important as equality promotes individualism and materialism.  “If men are to remain 
civilized, … they must develop and perfect the art of associating to the same degree that 
equality of conditions increases among them.”177  Democratic society requires a 
countervailing “place where a large number of men can freely exchange their feelings 
and their thoughts on any subject whatsoever.”178  Moreover, public associations of 
whatever sort obstruct administrative centralization, the tyranny of the majority, and the 
despotism of the state.  As we have already touched upon, the key here is that 
associations stand as quasi-aristocratic actors, above the undifferentiated mass of 
insignificant individuals.  Great associations “artificially create something analogous” to 
great individuals.  Here, “ordinary citizens, by associating can constitute very opulent, 
very influential, and very powerful entities - in a word, they can play the role of 
aristocrats. … A political, industrial, commercial, or even scientific or literary association 
is an enlightened and powerful citizen that cannot be made to bow down at will or 
subjected to oppression in the shadows … .”  Like the aristocratic actor, the democratic 
association is always seen and heard, and so can stand up to “the exigencies of power.”179  
As necessary as such public associations are, though, they are not sufficient.  This 
is because only political associations convey the experience of political liberty.  Political 
associations are those wherein divergent people (not only people of like-mind) must learn 
to exercise power together (rather than merely obstruct power).  “It is through political 
associations that Americans of all walks of life, all casts of mind, and all ages … see and 
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speak to one another” and potentially “come to a common understanding.”180  In political 
associations, people with differences try to reach an understanding by means of arguing 
together, to the end of exercising their political rights, liberties, and powers through 
political action.  These are associations that bring people out of silent isolation, but not by 
means of unspoken familial resemblance.  They teach us not so much how to trust one 
another, but how to argue with one another despite our passion for equality and desire for 
independence.                                
“Unfortunately,” Tocqueville writes, “the same social state that makes 
associations so necessary in democratic nations makes them more difficult to achieve 
there than anywhere else.”181  In aristocratic times, people were bound and obliged to 
associate.  They were habituated to incorporation as a sort of second-nature.  In equality 
and independence, in the socialized state of nature, democratic individuals are disinclined 
to associate voluntarily, at least beyond their private circle of immediate friends and 
family.  In turn, Tocqueville argues, the inhabitants of democracy must at first be forced 
to associate, and so to be free.  Only over time will they become habituated to life in 
association and freedom.  Freedom and association are in the fullest sense practices to 
which one must be disciplined.   
Here again, the specifically political practice of liberty in associations is vital.  “In 
civil life, anyone may … persuade himself that he is capable of meeting all his own 
needs.  In politics, such a thing is unimaginable.”182  “When citizens are forced to concern 
themselves with public affairs, they are inevitably drawn beyond the sphere of their 
individual interests, and from time to time their attention is diverted from themselves.”  
Only by being in effect thrust into political independence does each see “that he is not as 
independent of his fellow men as he initially imagined.”183  The absence of compulsive 
political life is perhaps above all what divided the course of democracy in France from 
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democracy in England and America.  With the centralization of the French old regime, 
the different classes were deprived of the opportunity for political association and action, 
but they were also never compelled to associate and act together.  With the government 
and bureaucracy taking every initiative, “they no longer felt the need to come together 
and reach agreements … .”  By the eighteenth century, they “never met except by chance 
in private life.”184  In England, conversely, “freedom always forced them all to stay in 
touch with one another, in order to be able to reach an understanding when necessary.”185  
And America proves that over time association might become if not entirely voluntary 
than at least dispositional as people “acquire a general taste for association and 
familiarize themselves with its use.”186  Only “politics generalizes the taste for and habit 
of association.  It takes a crowd of men who would otherwise have lived alone and makes 
them want to unite, and it teaches them the art of doing so.”187  The practices that take 
shape around democratic self-government, Tocqueville concludes, are “constant 
reminders to each and every citizen that he lives in society.”188 
In this sense, Tocqueville values political liberty as integral to the overall health 
of the democratic social state.  While democratic culture subverts the political practice of 
democracy, democratic politics cures the ills of democratic culture.  “I maintain,” 
Tocqueville writes, “that to combat the evils that equality may engender there is only one 
effective remedy: political liberty.”189  We have seen how in the political sphere 
democratic association and action combats the tutelary despotism born of equality by 
conveying some of the bearing of nobility.  In society more generally, political liberty 
inoculates us against both democratic individualism and democratic materialism.  
“Liberty alone can effectively combat the natural vices of (democratic) societies … . 
Only freedom can bring citizens out of the isolation in which the very independence of 
their circumstances has led them to live, can daily force them to mingle, to join together 
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through the need to communicate with one another, persuade each other, and satisfy each 
other in the conduct of their common affairs.  Only freedom can tear people from … the 
petty daily concerns of their personal affairs … (and) substitute higher and stronger 
passions for the love of material well-being, … and create the atmosphere which allows 
one to see and judge human vices and virtues.”190  The need to come together in common 
affairs to generate and use political power forces people to hear and see one another, to 
cooperate with and depend upon one another, to argue with and attempt to persuade one 
another, and so to judge and honor one another.  While such a practice of liberty might 
engender “particular hatreds,” it always works against “general indifference.”191   
More generally, we might say that the practice of political liberty counters 
freedom’s dialectic of idealization and devaluation.  The extremes of mastery and escape 
come to seem unnecessary, impossible, and even undesirable.  With his stake in political 
liberty, the citizen stands as it were in between the savage and the slave - neither wild nor 
domesticated.  And in bringing different people together in argument, political liberty 
serves to remedy both the excessive notions of similarity and difference characteristic of 
democratic association.  Assumed similarity - whether in the abstraction of humanity or 
in familial resemblance - is supplanted by the airing of differences between particular 
people, and so for the possibility of coming together through persuasion.  At the same 
time, the assumption of impermeable difference - whether of caste, class, or culture - is 
potentially overturned.  There is, Tocqueville writes, an “anticaste influence” to 
“common discussion about common interests.”192    
 
In all of these ways, I think we can say that politics for Tocqueville is a venue for 
the mediation of democratic extremes.  As just discussed, political associations and 
institutions and arguments draw - or force - people together from out of their private lives 
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in such a way that they might both recognize and mediate their differences.  From a 
broader perspective, politics serves as an intermediary between principle and practice.  It 
is in the process of political association and action that we temper our ideals by putting 
them into everyday practice, and elevate our everyday lives out of the shadows of 
isolation, insignificance, and petty materialism.  In the practice of politics, Tocqueville 
suggests, the demands of morality and expediency may moderate one another, 
imagination is made to meet experience, and the sense of limitless possibility is tested 
against necessity.   
Today’s tendency toward representing politics as either religion or economics by 
other means erodes this unique and uniquely important place of politics in democratic 
society.  Every “I believe …” sermon about “core convictions” delivered in strident voice 
by today’s politician-preachers, and every cynically knowing assertion that to understand 
the way politics works one need only “follow the money” or realize that “it’s the 
economy, stupid” subverts democratic politics.  Pulled toward these opposite poles, it 
seems the middle-place of democratic politics cannot hold.  Political life, which 
Tocqueville theorizes as the venue for the potential mediation of the religious and the 
economic, collapses into one or the other.      
From a different angle, we might say that the democratic revolution signifies the 
transition from political bonds to natural bonds, and from political freedom to natural 
freedom.  Tocqueville writes, for instance: “The same aristocratic institutions that had 
made creatures of the same species so different nevertheless bound them together with a 
very tight political bond,” born not of “natural interest” and “natural right” and “genuine 
sympathy,” but of “duty and honor,” “mutual obligation” and “political right.”193  Natural 
versus conventional becomes the master normative dichotomy of our modern democratic 
way of life, where the former stands as good, true, and beautiful, and the latter is at best 
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useful and necessary.  In such a context, only a politics that seems natural - based on 
natural interest, natural right, genuine sympathy - can stand as meaningful. 
Tocqueville wrote of America that (as with the artificially simulated aristocracy 
of democratic associations) “the sovereignty of the Union is a work of art.  The 
sovereignty of the states is natural; it exists by itself, without effort.”194  “Everything is 
conventional and artificial” and a matter of “legal fictions” in the former.  The latter is 
“like … a family.”195  Today, that which is like a family has split into the familial village 
and the global village - the pre-conventional “tribe” and post-conventional humanity.  
These are the modes of association that seem to exist by themselves, without effort - 
before or beyond the need for conventional mediation, independent of human intentions.  
Certain religious and economic formations hold such normative significance in our 
democratic way of life precisely because they seem in accord with these spontaneous, 
given and inevitable ways of being with others.  The church and the market, as it were, 
are taken as the alternative modes of natural association.  The political forum, 
consequently, is thought to necessarily reduce to one or the other these formations (or 
else seem a matter a mere “legal fictions”).  Political organizations are represented as 
either “communities” or “special interest” groups, with nothing in between.  More so than 
dissociation, this sort of depoliticization of society - wherein the actual practice of 
politics seems always the mere epiphenomenon of something deeper, more real, more 
natural - is for Tocqueville the tragedy of democracy.    
 
Conclusion   
Following and building upon Tocqueville, I have attempted over the course of the 
previous two chapters to think through the place of politics in democratic society.  
Beginning with the equality of conditions, the generative fact and principle of the 
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democratic social state, we went on the consider the notions of elevation and degradation 
inscribed in equality, then onto the related ideas of freedom and its loss inscribed in 
equality, and finally to the norms of human association inscribed in this freedom-in-
equality.  I argued that the interpretive key to the democratic way of life is the idea of 
openness.  The flip-side of the equality of conditions is the collapse of the principle of 
hierarchy, with the concomitant dissolution of the principle of landedness or place.  It is 
in this sense that the democratic revolution in the nature and source of authority signifies 
an opening of society and the world.  Inextricably intertwined with the condition equality, 
mediocrity, and banalization is the passion for revolutionary, creative openness.  In space 
and in time we are and should be restless, never settled and never stopping, always on the 
move, taking to the open road.  In principle, everything is and should be possible except 
the closure of possibility.  Henceforth we can imagine rising above the level of humanity, 
even in a way transcending our materiality, and sinking below the level of humanity in 
our material neediness.  We imagine a sort of unlimited, savage freedom wherein we 
possess all the power, or wherein nobody possesses any power, even as we fear the 
slave’s domestication.  And we imagine a society wherein we continue to enjoy the 
uncompromised and untouched independence of nature, or wherein we enjoy the 
simultaneous freedom and belonging conveyed by the intimacy and informality of being 
at home with others.           
To put all of this in the context of one of Tocqueville’s most important arguments, 
political revolutions will be rare in times of democracy not so much because the passion 
for revolution dissipates into bourgeois timidity and conservatism, but because politics 
can no longer be envisioned as a venue for meaningful revolution - indeed, politics can 
only seem an obstruction to society’s proper order of revolutionary openness.  Put in the 
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context I have developed, the unspoken oneness of “soul-mates” is, in effect, Berlin’s 
positive freedom similarly deprived of political venue.           
I argued that while the idea of nature is radically transformed in the move to 
modernity - from hierarchical to open - nature remains a central standard of judgment.  
And I argued that in relation to this new norm of nature, the practice of politics cannot 
but seem unnatural.  Moreover, insofar as it is premised upon political relations, society 
itself seems unnatural.  In relation to the irreducible conflict and competition of Hobbes’s 
state of nature, political civilization seems a bit of a charade, a well-meant illusion that 
masks the way things really work.  In relation to the authenticity and compassion of 
Rousseau’s state of nature, political civilization seems degraded, an obstruction to the 
way things could and should be.  The notion of politics as a mode of congregation, of 
coming together from out of difference, is supplanted here by politics as a mode of 
community, of being together as one in resemblance, whether private or universal.  This 
politics is as noisy as it is silent - cacophonous in the family feud and clashing 
authenticities of what has come to be called “the culture wars,” silent insofar as it is 
devoid of argument.  Arguments are taken as useless words and just so much standing 
around talking, as a shady way of “persuading” others to do what one wants (force by 
means of verbiage), or as a sad reminder that we are still so petty and bickering as to 
always fall short of beautiful union.  
The fate of politics in democratic society, I suggested, can be summed in the 
proposition that democratic man does not consider himself a political animal.  We can 
take this in two senses.  First, democratic man imagines himself at once transcending the 
practice of politics, and so beastly as to be incapable of the practice of politics.  And 
second, political life seems like it should either be above the ordinary world of material 
needs, self-interest, disagreement, and so forth, or that it is so beastly as to best be 
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avoided.  A politics that does not reflect the experience of being in the market or of being 
at home, of struggling for mastery or of striving for escape, seems to have no place in our 
social state of nature.  The democratic way of life takes shape around not argument and 
persuasion, but around unrelenting competition and unconditional love.   
 
In the following chapter, I turn to Claude Lefort’s theory of democracy to further 
explore the idea of democratic openness - what Lefort calls the “dissolution of the 
markers of certainty” - and the norms of freedom embedded therein.  After talking with 
people about the meaning of freedom, C. Fred Alford writes: “Remarkable is how similar 
diverse people sounded, not how different.”  “Aren’t race, sex, and ethnicity the leading 
categories of existence, the experience that structures everything we hold dear?  Perhaps, 
but not as far as freedom is concerned.  In half a dozen different accents, American 
freedom sounds much the same.”196  In this chapter, I suggested why people might be 
disposed to believe that race, sex, and ethnicity are the leading categories of existence.  In 
the next chapter, I argue that the idea of democratic openness is the focal point for the 
unargued meeting of the minds between disparate individuals Alford describes.  
Tocqueville writes that it is “impossible to eliminate the existence of dogmatic beliefs,” 
meaning “the opinions that men accept of faith without discussion.”197  Openness, I argue, 
is uniquely suited to serve as the dogmatic belief of democratic times.  Taken as at once a 
fact of the world as we necessarily experience it after the democratic revolution (the 
original phenomenon of opening), and as the core value of a rightly ordered society, 
democratic openness itself seems natural and normatively determinate.  The consequence, 
I go on to argue, is less that conventional norms and forms are denatured and subject to 
questioning than that the “closed” world of settled conventions is debased as such, 
without question.  To paraphrase Tocqueville: in democratic society there will appear a 
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great, restless mobility of human actions and a singular fixity of the principle of 
openness.198     
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Democratic Openness as Orthodoxy: Claude Lefort on History, Nature, 
and Convention After the Democratic Revolution    
They are like travelers dispersed in a great forest in which all the paths lead to the 
same point`          
       - Tocqueville  
 PART I: DEMOCRACY AS NATURAL 
The Democratic Third Republic  
Conventional wisdom holds that from the end of Reconstruction to the start of the 
Great Depression a “laissez-faire orthodoxy” reigned in America.1  More a way of life 
than merely an economic system, capitalism was taken as the animating and ordering 
principle of society.  Market-competition and the liberty of contract constituted a 
symbolic order within which all spheres of life were represented and evaluated.  The 
contract stood as “an all-purpose metaphor for proper social relationships” and no less 
than “the embodiment of free will and voluntary action.”  Liberty of contract was 
elevated “from one element of freedom to its very essence,” while the “market, not 
democratic politics” was considered “the true realm of freedom.”2  William Graham 
Sumner went so far as to claim that questioning the market order was tantamount to 
attacking “the foundations of civilization” - socialism in particular was “anti-social and 
anti-civilizing.”3  Conversely, the free-market was thought to bring with it most 
everything that is of value: freedom, justice, wealth, peace, progress.  In sum: “Man 
became economic man, democracy was identified with capitalism, liberty with property 
and the use of it, equality with opportunity for gain, and progress with … the 
accumulation of capital.”4   
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With its currency among the courts (most notoriously in the 1905 Supreme Court 
case of Lochner v. New York), this worldview was insinuated into the very constitution of 
the American polity.  Today, “Lochner” symbolizes a national identity so distinct as to be 
considered its own “constitutional regime” - the “second republic” of “laissez-faire 
constitutionalism,” as Bruce Ackerman writes.5  And the collapse of this order with West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) is cast as a “paradigm shift … of the most fundamental 
kind.  In Robert Jackson’s words, it signified the disintegration of ‘(t)he older world of 
laissez-faire.’” 6  A sort of national identity-crisis, what had been unquestionable became 
unconscionable.  
This narrative helps us understand modern democracy, I suggest, although not in 
the ways usually supposed.  Free-market orthodoxy is usually put forth as the antithesis 
of the characteristic “openness” of modern democracy.  In this context, “laissez-faire” 
epitomizes the tendency to represent a particular conventional settlement as grounded in 
the universal order - as “social arrangements decreed by nature.”7  As Cass Sunstein puts 
it: “the Court took as natural and inviolate a system that was legally constructed.”8  
Moreover, as this free-market second nature - guided by an “invisible hand” - was 
synthesized with Protestantism, nature was reaffirmed as Nature.  “It must be born in 
mind that (this order) was a mixture of three intellectually powerful currents of Western 
thought: the Protestant ethic; classical laissez-faire economics; and the principle of 
natural selection.”9  Uniting religion with economics and science in a single 
normative/descriptive representation of the world, the “national creed” of laissez-faire 
stood under “a sort of cosmic seal of approval.”10   
Just as laissez-faire was itself defined and defended against the paternalistic and 
putatively natural order of slavery, “democracy” is often formulated over against the 
tendency to “naturalize” or “essentialize” our socially constructed world - to endow 
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historically situated conventions with the character of universality.  More than merely a 
form of government, “democracy” here represents an open way of life in which almost 
nothing is sacrosanct, taboo, repressed, or beyond contestation - everything is at least in 
principle questionable.  Every convention and identity is recognized as a social construct, 
and every construct is subject to being deconstructed.  Thus is Justice Holmes’ 
declaration that “The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s 
Social Statics” celebrated today as a great debunking democratic dissent, exposing the 
truth of laissez-faire as mere opinion, rooted in the here and now.   
Against this representation, I weigh the possibility that we tend today to think of 
democracy itself as natural; that modern democracy in America is in this sense more 
analogous than antithetical to the laissez-faire orthodoxy described above.  Specifically, I 
argue that democratic openness is today what free-market competition once was: the 
simultaneously descriptive and normative fact/value of our way of life.11  Democratic 
openness stands as the normative principle of the only social order we accept as good and 
legitimate: an open society wherein everything is potentially subject to questioning.  At 
the same time, openness describes the modern condition of uncertainty we find ourselves 
born into.  Consequently, the democratic social order seems inscribed in the order of the 
world - if not decreed by a now silent nature, than singularly in accordance with nature’s 
flow.  Perhaps providentially, openness is both that which we willingly (even 
passionately) affirm, and that which we simply cannot deny.    
If this analogy holds, democratic openness would serve today as an all-purpose 
metaphor for proper social relationships.  Democracy would be taken as not one element 
of freedom but as its essence, and as the good from which most others (freedom, justice, 
wealth, peace, progress) follow.  We would live in a time when man has become 
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democratic man, capitalism is identified with democracy, liberty and equality with 
democratic openness, and progress with democratization.   
 
What follows is an exploration of how democracy, through its association with 
the state of “openness,” might come to seem natural.  To this end, I take up the work of 
Claude Lefort. 12  Perhaps beyond any other contemporary theorist of democracy, Lefort 
offers a way to conceptualize the inherently abstract idea of openness.  He illuminates 
both the fundamental connection between modern democracy and the principle of 
openness, and how this political principle is constitutive more generally of a “form of 
society” and “style of existence.”  As we shall see, Lefort fruitfully interprets the 
characteristic openness of modern democratic society by reconstituting its genesis in the 
democratic revolution, the original phenomenon of opening, which he describes as “the 
dissolution of the markers of certainty.”  Through his work, I suggest, we are better able 
to see what Tocqueville at times misses: the advent of equality is inextricably intertwined 
with the collapse of hierarchy; the passion for equality is inseparable from the passion for 
revolution - that is, from freedom-as-openness.       
At the same time, Tocqueville helps us see what Lefort at times misses: even as 
the principle of openness introduces an element of uncertainty and restlessness into our 
existence, it is affirmed in such a way as to shut down argument and contestation 
regarding certain democratic beliefs, practices, and conventions.  Like the capitalist 
economics of laissez-faire before it, the democratic culture of openness is affirmed as 
second-nature.  On Lefort’s account, after the democratic revolution our notions of both 
freedom and nature take on an open or “historical” quality - living necessarily in the 
unpredictable and open-ended flow of time, no body can legitimately claim to have the 
last word on matters of truth and right.  Principled upon openness, democratic society, 
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which Lefort terms the “historical society par excellence,” seems both constitutively free 
and in a sense natural - inscribed not in immutable Nature but in the openness of history.  
No longer can anyone speak in the name of Nature, but to go against democracy would 
be to go against history.  Through a critical interpretation of Lefort’s work, then, we shall 
see how the principle of democratic openness itself might constitute a sort of orthodoxy, 
although one without authoritative interpreters.  In democratic society we are like 
Tocqueville’s travelers: unlead but nonetheless ending up at the same point.     
I go on to argue that the consequence of this orthodoxy of openness is not the 
blatant injustices and inequities of the laissez-faire orthodoxy, absurdly encoded as 
natural and justified as good, given, and inevitable.  Instead, I argue that whatsoever is 
perceived as belonging to the world of conventional norms and forms is not so much 
opened to questioning as undermined as such, without question (not unlike the political 
regulation of the free-market economy in the laissez-faire order).  Meaning and authority, 
I conclude, settle precisely with the idea of that which cannot be enclosed and 
incorporated in particular, conventional norms and forms - with the idea of formlessness, 
or informality.          
Before returning to Lefort in part II, I orient my interpretation of democratic 
society against the more common notion of “market society,” and then take up some 
recent works of democratic theory that help demonstrate the connections between 
“democracy” and “openness.”  
Market Society or Democratic Society  
Increasingly, conventional wisdom holds that we in America (and beyond) still 
live in a fundamentally “market society” - a neo-liberal, laissez-faire third republic.  In 
our age of globalization, the “reigning economic faith ... is merely a souped-up version … 
of the market-as-nature.”13  Moreover, this economic faith is supposedly taken as our 
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faith as such (in the odd synthesis of “neo-liberal” capitalism and “neo-conservative” 
Christianity).14  We hear that the corporation, like “the Church, the Monarchy, and the 
Communist Party in other times and places, … is today’s dominant institution.”  CEO’s 
are taken as the “heroes” and “high priests” of our time.15  Nowadays, this analysis runs, 
“the status of the market is … something close to a global theology. … Market society is 
no longer simply a metaphor. … It is a living reality.”  Consumption “has become 
existential, the veritable badge of identity.  As we consume so we are.”16  Even more 
strikingly: “Economics, as channeled by its popular avatars in the media and politics, is 
the cosmology and the theodicy of our contemporary culture.  More than religion itself … 
it is economics that offers the dominant creation narrative of our society, depicting the 
relation of each of us to the universe we inhabit (and) the relationship of human beings to 
God … . This understanding … now serves as the unquestioned foundation of nearly all 
political and social debate.”17  In turn, “one cannot think of a single area of American life 
that does not define itself proudly and brazenly by the bottom line.  Books are judged on 
sales; movies by the first weekend’s gross; ... .”18  Beyond oligarchy (which is only one 
principle of rule among others), we live, Sheldon Wolin argues, in a wholly exclusive and 
all-embracing “economic polity.”19  
Is this the case, though?  Can we think of any contemporary representation of a 
CEO as a hero (much less a high priest)?  Do we really judge books and movies by their 
sales (or, conversely, do we usually disdain the best-seller or blockbuster)?  Do we 
proudly identify ourselves in terms of consumerism (or, conversely, do we assume that 
while we ourselves are not so shallow and materialistic, most others are)?  Do we still 
represent our relationships with others via economic metaphors (for instance, marriage as 
a sort of business contract)?  Do we take economics as our religion?  I suggested 
previously that such ideas of meaning giving way to materialism capture the imagination 
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to such an extent today not as the world we actually experience, but rather as the world 
we most fear.    
 
I offer an alternative interpretation of contemporary American society.  Insofar as 
we can make such general claims about our “society,” “culture,” or “age,” I suggest that 
ours is rendered more fully intelligible as a “democratic society” - a democratic “social 
state,” to use Tocqueville’s phrase.  We tend to represent and evaluate things in terms of 
democratic openness.  What does this mean?  As an admittedly trivial but I think 
wonderfully illustrative example, think of the 1998 movie “Pleasantville,” a strikingly 
overt allegory of openness.  Over the course of the movie, the characters literally burst 
out of their closed, secure, domesticated, routine, black-and-white existence and into 
color as they come to question inhibiting social norms, express themselves authentically, 
and experience (even savor) the previously repressed uncertainties of life.  By the end, 
every character inevitably awakens to the truth, the good, and the beauty of a 
colorful/open existence (even, at last, the politician).  They learn to take the world as it 
really is deep down below what they are led to believe, and they are set free.  The heroes 
are the artist and the outsider, self-expression is the veritable badge of identity, and the 
creation narrative is one of revolutionary rupture with paternalistic authority.   
Now, any “interpretation of society” is justified only insofar as it resonates with 
the reader’s own experiences and observations.  One sign of our “democratic society,” 
though, might be that Lochner no longer makes sense even while Griswold v. 
Connecticut (1965) still does.  Another might lie, as we shall see, in the continuing appeal 
of and quest for the natural, understood as spontaneous, authentic, and undomesticated.20  
Yet another sign might lie in our very fascination with such general and abstract notions 
as “market society” and “democratic society,” as Tocqueville argued.  Most significantly, 
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with such an interpretation it becomes apparent that while we do indeed affirm the free-
market as normative, even natural, we do so only insofar as it can be associated with the 
freedom of democratic openness.  Capitalism is itself sold as democratic.  (Think of the 
immensely popular works of Thomas Friedman.  He cites a number of adds, including: 
“E*Trade.  Now the power is in your hands;” and “Sooner or later, all tyrannies crumble.  
Those that keep putting their customers on hold tend to crumble sooner.”)21  At the same 
time, we are able to account for the other half of the picture: “economics” - insofar as 
signifying either the hierarchical closures of corporatism (Big Oil, Big Tobacco, etc.), or 
all that falls under “bourgeois materialism” - is hardly the “unquestioned foundation” of 
our society, much less our cosmology and theodicy.  We cannot ignore the fact that 
“market society,” “consumerism,” and so forth are invoked precisely so as to question 
and condemn them rather than as legitimate or aspirational.  Along these lines we can 
understand the full picture of our love/hate relationship with capitalism (and 
globalization) in democratic society.   
Unpacking Democratic Openness: From the Rule of the People to the Death of God 
Democracy has been associated with openness of one kind or another at least 
since the time of Pericles, whether in his Funeral Oration description of democratic 
Athens as a “city open to all,” or in the Corinthian description of the Athenian sea-power 
as “lover’s of innovation” and “never at home.”  And of course there are senses of 
openness inherent in the very idea of democracy as the rule of the people: inclusive and 
open-government, transparent and accountable, operating out in public as opposed to 
behind closed doors.  Increasingly, though, there is a tendency to take “democracy” as 
synonymous with “openness,” and to formulate openness in a particularly expansive or 
“radical” sense.  Here, democratic freedom and equality are combined within, 
conceptualized in terms of, and reduced to openness - democratic openness as the “liberty 
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of the late moderns,” as it were.  Tellingly, the top result of an April 2007 Google search 
for “democracy” was “Democracy: the free and open-source internet TV platform … 
built on open-standards.” “There’s now an opportunity to create a television culture that 
is fluid, diverse, exciting, and beautiful,” as opposed to “the same narrow, top-down 
cultural stagnation that we see on traditional television.”22     
Following the characterizations of “lover’s of innovation” and “never at home,” 
radical openness is taken to mean a great many things (uncertainty, indeterminacy, 
contingency, open-endedness, fluidity, etc.); and to imply the possibility of a great many 
more (questioning, contestation, pluralism and diversity, integration and communication, 
radical action, spontaneity, unpredictability, the event of beginning, etc.).  As Patchen 
Markell outlines it, radical openness takes shape within a matrix of oppositions between 
“rule,” “stability, order, closure, and continuity” and “freedom,” “change, interruption, … 
and novelty.”23  These oppositions are often reduced to “democracy” versus 
“totalitarianism” and “fundamentalism.”  While this sense of openness is usually 
associated with one side of an academic discourse about democratic theory, and 
categorized as postmodern, post-structuralist, and/or agonistic, it is more prevalent than 
that.  Hardly the voice of postmodernism, take Thomas Friedman’s characterization of 
the post Cold War order - radically disrupted and rendered fluid by “the democratization 
of technology,” “the democratization of finance,” and “the democratization of 
information” - as one where “walls fell all over the world,” and which “grows … more 
open every day.”24     
 
In his valuable recent work, Alan Keenan further clarifies the affinities (and 
tensions) between radical openness and democracy as the rule of the people.   He 
identifies two senses of openness right at the surface of “the logic of collective 
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autonomy.”  First, there is “the openness of inclusion and generality:” “for it to be the 
people who rule, rather than some faction or special class of the people, the process of 
making decisions must be open to all members of the community affected by them.”  
Second, democratic self-rule requires the openness of “debate, argumentation, 
questioning, and revisability;” it must be “the people … of today who rule, not that of 
yesterday, or of tradition.”  They “must be able to revise their decisions, institutions, and 
practices as they wish or need.”25  Notice a tension: open decision-making necessarily 
limits the openness of questioning - potentially unfettered questioning is reduced to mere 
amendment. Every decision a closure, a limiting of the range of potentiality, deciding 
comes with a sort of democratic buyer’s remorse.       
At a deeper level, Keenan identifies a third kind of openness, beyond those of “the 
people’s” identity in space and over time: that of the grounds and standing of the identity 
of “the people.”  This is “the openness of incompletion and imperfection” of “the 
democratic ‘we.’”  To be able to either question or decide, “‘the people’ must take on an 
identity whose relative clarity and stability depend on particular foundations, traditions, 
and institutional forms that cannot be fully general or fully open to question.”26  Yet, 
since there are “no external, nonpolitical, non-self-generated standards for judging the 
‘correct’ vision of the people,” any institutionalization of “the people” is to some degree 
arbitrary, illegitimate, and undemocratic.27  The “vicious circles” and “nonsimultaneity” 
of “the people’s self-foundation” - that the first cause of the people cannot be the people 
themselves; that they must perform a Munchausian bootstrapping of themselves into 
existence - embeds openness and uncertainty in the very definition of democracy as the 
rule of the people.28      
Keenan thus exposes openness along all three democratic axes - horizontal 
(generality), forward and back in time (revisability), and vertical (foundations); as well as 
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at the core of both democratic action (to rule as both to decide and to question), and the 
democratic actor (the identity of “the people” who are to rule).  
 Even further, Keenan identifies “the form of openness that in some way lies 
behind all the other forms of democratic openness … . (This is) the constitutive, even 
ontological, openness and fluidity of democratic and political freedom.” Beyond 
“democratic politics in principle render(ing) everything provisional and open to 
question,” the “democratic spirit or imaginary is fundamentally one of questioning.”29  
This “most fundamental kind of democratic openness and uncertainty” lies behind “both 
the “‘positive’ openness of generality and revisability,” as well as the “‘negative’ 
openness of democratic … incompletion.”30  In other words, this “ontological” openness 
of freedom/uncertainty/questioning lies behind both the openness we affirm as the norm 
of democratic legitimacy, and the openness we simply cannot deny, which is a given of 
our late modern condition.31  Already we can begin to see how, via its association with 
“ontological” openness, the democratic social order might seem not only good and right 
but also given and inescapable, not unlike the old laissez-faire order of competition.           
 
In a striking formulation of the connection between “ontological openness” and 
“democracy,” George Kateb writes: “the hidden source of modern democracy may 
always have been the death of God;” the “death of God was … slyly at work in the 
founding of modern democracy.”32  For Kateb, modern democracy rests upon the “sense 
of inessentiality and indefiniteness” born of the death of Father and King - of the collapse 
of divine hierarchy, and so of the earthly warrant for command gained by participation in 
this hierarchy.  Without appeal to some higher sovereignty, to the determinate guidance 
and guarantees of metaphysical absolutes, we are left on our own to order the frontier into 
which we are cast.  For Kateb, democracy is a matter of both coping with and celebrating 
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this necessary self-reliance.  William Connolly concurs: democracy is “grounded in a 
matrix of uncertainty” - in the “modern pressures to problematize those final markers 
(God, natural law, the divine right of kings, the natural basis of traditional identities, a 
fictive contract) that might have governed” us in the past.33  Our democratic way of life is 
essentially without final solutions or final destinations.  
 Along these lines, Wendy Brown describes democracy as “politics without 
banisters” - without the support of “convictions” or fixed certainties.  “Conviction - as 
Truth or as principle - was never the right modality for belief within a democratic polity.  
A politics of Truth is inevitably totalitarian, and convictions in the sense of principle 
converges far too easily in liberal democracies with individualist strains of moral 
absolutism.”34  To check the appeal of such absolutism, Bonnie Honig argues that we 
must resist the seductive longing for peace - for the reassurance and security of “the 
dream of a place called home,” “free of power, conflict, and struggle.”35  We must foster, 
instead, a “democratic ethos,” - “an affirmative cultural/political response to the 
problematization of final markers that helps to define the late-modern condition.”36  And 
this “culture of democratization,” Connolly writes, has “at its very center” the “periodic 
denaturalization of settled identities and conventions” and the “disturbance” of the 
“particular patterns” of “previous settlements.”37  As Peter Euben puts it, democratization 
is about “naturalized conventions periodically confront(ing) their conventional status”38  
The problematization of final markers requires the problematization of conventional 
settlements - our proper posture amid uncertainty is one of restless questioning.     
 
 
The political and social upshot of this “ontologically” open way of life is that no 
person or group can rule or speak in the name of God, Truth, Nature, History, Reason, 
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Law or even the People.  The properly democratic lexicon on this account replaces the 
hierarchy of the sanctified Capital Letter with the circularity of the self-hyphenation (self-
reliance, self-rule, self-creation, self-foundation, self-determination, etc.).  This is one of 
the most common formulations of democracy today.  We hear, for instance, that “the 
NFL draft is great because it’s democratizing.  No one has the slightest idea what will 
happen, so all opinions are equally invalid. … And the fact The Experts [who try to 
predict which college players NFL teams will select] are constantly wrong is 
democratizing.”39  Beyond Keenan’s notion of “revisability,” modern democracy here 
signifies the innate limitation of any claim to authority in a chastening uncertainty.  No 
one can legitimately claim final answers because there are no final answers; certainty and 
conviction are never warranted.  And it is within this context that equality (we are all 
ultimately unsure and insecure) and freedom (there is no basis for command, no 
unquestionable rule) take on their specifically modern democratic character and fuse into 
the principle of democratic openness.   
  
But how open is this openness? On the above account, “democratic” describes a 
state of affairs in which social arrangements cannot be “massively affirmed” as deduced 
from nature.  Grounded in our condition of uncertainty, democracy justifies questioning 
settled conventions and identities.  Is there a sense, though, in which this uncertainty and 
questioning might come to be massively affirmed as natural?  Notice that the 
“ontological” openness discussed above seems no less normative than descriptive - the 
death of God as both fact and value, true and good.  We necessarily live under openness-
as-uncertainty, the freedom and equality expressed in openness-as-questioning is 
embedded in this condition, hence we are necessarily free and equal.  Given the “reality” 
of our experience of openness, the legitimacy of political and social openness seems 
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simply self-evident - obvious in a way laissez-faire probably never was.  Conversely, 
hierarchy and absolutism seem as much illusory as illegitimate.   
Are there fixed norms of identity inherent in democratic openness that are taken 
for granted and closed off from questioning?  For example, do the psychological and 
emotional capacities to cope with the anxiety and frustrations of uncertainty constitute a 
standard of democratic maturity, even courage, below which we sink in our childish 
dreaming of a place called home?  Given uncertainty, does the “questioning self” stand as 
normative and natural?  To cease questioning under conditions of ontological openness, it 
seems, would be akin to not believing under conditions of ontological closure (before 
God’s death), or to not competing under conditions of survival of the fittest.  In this 
sense, perhaps we are less permitted than ethically enjoined to question ourselves, others, 
and the world we inhabit.  In a world defined as without final answers, what choice do we 
have but to question things?  Contestation becomes freedom’s imperative.  The liberty of 
contract was once cast as an ethical measure in the capacity to contract (in the dichotomy 
of competition/paternalism).  Is the freedom to question cast as the capacity to question 
today (in the dichotomy of question/paternalism)?   
In this context, how are we likely to judge previously settled conventions that are 
“made to confront their conventional status?”  The evidence for our evaluation seems 
contained within the proposition: we would judge them harshly, precisely because they 
are previously settled, closed conventions.  Unconventional would be synonymous with 
good (think of the negative connation of “conventional wisdom” as opposed to the 
positive connotation of “common sense”).  In turn, there seems a certain superficiality to 
democratic contestation, a pre-ordained quality wherein every choice is one of more or 
less of the same basic good - more or less openness. 40  While we are uniquely permitted 
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to call the conventional world into question, it can only be according to the normative 
standard of openness.  Questioning stands as an end in itself. 
To advance this line of reasoning, I offer a critique of Claude Lefort’s theory of 
democracy.  Exploring his work in part II, we see more clearly than so far possible the 
origins and dimensions of “democratic openness.”  At the same time, I suggest in part III 
that through a close reading of Lefort’s work we come to notice a self-subverting quality 
of democratic openness, wherein its full factual/normative gravity becomes apparent.  In 
critique of Lefort’s work, I argue that the order of openness (or, as we shall see, the rule 
of history) is no less determinate than the order of Nature.    
PART II: THE REVOLUTIONARY PHENOMENON OF OPENING  
The Theologico-Political Form of Society   
“Democracy,” Lefort writes, is fully apprehended only as a “regime” or “politeia” 
- the term signifies a “constitution” and “form of government,” but also as a “style of 
existence” and “mode of life.”  These last two phrases should “evoke everything that is 
implied by an expression such as ‘the American way of life,’ namely, those mores and 
beliefs that testify to the existence of a set of implicit norms determining notions of just 
and unjust, good and evil, desirable and undesirable, noble and ignoble.”  As a “form of 
society,” democracy thus generates certain notions of “proper relations between human 
beings.”41  And this “shaping” of a people’s “manner of being in society” defines the 
regime’s “permanence in time, regardless of the various events that may affect it.”  The 
democratic form is united “as a recognizable whole despite its internal divisions” and 
differentiated “on a fundamental level from other forms of society” in that we can say 
there are characteristically democratic norms of justice, of the good and the right, of 
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human association, and of a life well lived.42  We might take this as Lefort’s revision and 
restatement of Tocqueville’s notion of democracy as a “social state.”   
Lefort distinguishes this way of approaching social phenomena from more 
mainstream methods of the social sciences.  He argues that we can neither understand nor 
evaluate our “form of society” analytically, by reducing it to its internal aspects (whether 
to its structural components like state and civil society; its “spheres” of economics, 
politics, law, science, religion, and so forth; or its various groups, classes, and interests).  
For example, there can be no adequate study of our beliefs and actions in terms of self-
interest and rational choice independent of an interpretation of the unifying social-
symbolic milieu within which we come to think of “the individual” in terms of a “self” 
who is normally and primarily “interested,” and who has both the right and rational 
capacity to choose.  To begin with the self-interested actor is to put the partial and 
derivative before the whole and generative, to explain by that which itself requires 
explanation.  Nor can we approach human coexistence as the epiphenomenal 
consequence of either economic necessity or economic choice.  Social relationships are 
not experienced solely as, and so cannot be understood solely as, material relationships.  
Rather than “following the money,” as it were, we must follow the trail of that which is 
publicly represented as meaningful - as orienting and motivating, a right or a cause, a 
source of pride and dignity, and so forth. 43  In turn, the centrality of notions such as 
economic necessity and choice in our society would raise questions like: what form of 
society is prone to represent itself, its fears and aspirations, in terms of economic 
necessities and choices?      
For Lefort, what is overlooked in any reduction of the overall schema of society 
to its empirical components is the religious dimensionality of society - the regime 
specific mode of articulating the universal and particular.  “Religion,” as Lefort employs 
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the term, “is a mode of portraying or dramatizing” those relations people establish with 
something beyond empirical time and space, and by which they in turn recognize a 
principle of proper relations with one another.”44  That the inhabitants of a social form 
identify that form as cohering over time and in space, as a recognizable and meaningful 
way of life, reveals the “religious sensibility” of the “beliefs, attitudes, and 
representations” that order the social, even if “the agents concerned do not relate them to 
any dogma,” even if “they do not imply any fidelity on their part to a church” and even if 
“they may, in certain cases, go hand in hand with militant atheism.”45  
Lefort goes on to argue that to interpret this quasi-religious articulation of the 
transcendent and the mundane we must look to the creation narrative, as it were, of the 
regime. The “space called society … cannot in itself be conceived as a system of 
relations, no matter how complex we might imagine that system to be.  On the contrary it 
is … the particular mode of its institution that makes it possible to conceptualize … the 
articulation of its dimensions, and the relations established within it between classes, 
groups and individuals, between practices, beliefs and representations.  If we fail to grasp 
this primordial reference to the mode of the institution of the social, to the generative 
principles or to an overall schema governing both the temporal and the spatial 
configuration of society, we lapse into a positivist fiction.”46 
We can think of this coming into being of a coherent social form in terms of the 
“enigma” of a “division which institutes a common space,” of “a break which establishes 
relations.”47  It is from the “primal division” between the here and now, on one hand, and 
the quasi-religious dramatization of something beyond the empirical that society takes 
meaningful shape.  When we look at modern society, for instance, its characteristic 
divisions between state and society or public and private occur if, where, and how they 
do because of the particular way in which we envision this original division.  The “fact 
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that (social) space is organized as one despite … its multiple divisions and that it is 
organized as the same in all its multiple dimensions implies a reference to a place from 
which it can be seen, read and named”48  As we shall see, for Lefort we name ourselves 
democratic via a generative break that is largely Oedipal.49  The particular mode of 
democratic society’s institution is the revolutionary beheading of the king.           
  
But why think of our social Gestalt, with its particular founding mediation of the 
transcendent and the empirical, as essentially democratic?  Why privilege the language of 
politics when thinking about the “religious dimension” and “mode of institution” of 
society?  Why, for example, “democratic” rather than “market” or “Christian” society?   
For Lefort, the key to the character of any society, to its characteristic norms of 
human relations, is the way in which power is represented as legitimate.  The key to any 
social form is how power within that form is taken as potentially bridging the “primal 
division” between particularity and universal.  Society, Lefort writes, is put into form by 
the specific way in which power “makes a gesture towards something outside” the 
material world, toward an “externality,” which, if “projected ... on to the real ... would no 
longer have any meaning for society.”50  We glimpse our social form in those instances 
when power is represented as authority rather than experienced as force or “naked 
power;” the symbolic divulges more than the empirical.51  The “existence of a power 
capable of obtaining generalized obedience and allegiance” through such a gesture 
toward transcendence implies a certain type of social … articulation, as well as a certain 
type of representation, to some extent explicit, to a larger extent implicit, concerning the 
legitimacy of the social order.”52  In this sense, Lefort concludes, it is “of the essence of 
power to present and make visible a model of social organization.” 53   
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When speaking of power in this symbolic register, we are dealing with what 
Lefort terms the “political form” of society, or simply “the political” (le politique).  
Lefort distinguishes this from “politics” (la politique), which is a matter of the “exercise” 
and “functioning” of power (as opposed to the prior matter of its representation).  A 
regimes politics is revealed in the partisan struggles of competing interests or classes, and 
is analyzable in the terms of the social sciences.  The political, on the other hand, is 
“revealed, not in what we call political activity, but in the double movement whereby the 
mode of the institution of society appears and is obscured.  It appears in the sense that the 
process whereby society is ordered and unified across its divisions becomes visible.  It is 
obscured in the sense that the locus of politics (the locus in which parties compete and in 
which a general agency of power takes shape and is reproduced) becomes defined as 
particular, while the principle which generates the overall configuration is concealed”54  
Once enmeshed in the empirical and material practices of power, we lose sight of the 
principle by which such practices came into being.     
We might say that “politics” refers us to an “economic” notion of power, and so 
to the divisions and conflicts internal to a social form, while “the political” conveys the 
“religious” dimension of power whereby power attains a principled status.  The former 
refers to power as effective, the latter to power as meaningful and legitimate.55  One 
cannot, as Lefort puts it, “separate the elaboration of a political form - by virtue of which 
the nature and representation of power and social division (divisions between classes and 
groups) can stabilize, and by virtue of which the various dimensions of the human 
experience of the world can simultaneously become organized - from the elaboration of a 
religious form - by virtue of which the realm of the visible can acquire death, and by 
virtue of which the living can name themselves with reference to the dead …”56  The 
 172 
connection here is such that Lefort terms society’s form fundamentally “theologico-
political.”57        
By way of example, we can say that for Lefort (as for Tocqueville) revolutions 
are caused not exactly by misery or suffering, but by the collapse of the “constitutional”  
dimension of power, of the political form of society within which material misery and 
suffering might be symbolically encoded and endured.58  More religious than economic, 
as it were, revolution “are not born of an internal conflict between the oppressed and their 
oppressors; they occur at the moment when the transcendence of power vanishes, and 
when its symbolic efficacy is destroyed.”59  Revolutions occur when the “distinction 
between power as a symbolic agency and power as a real organ disappears,” and so when 
power proves “incapable of giving form and meaning to social division … .”60 
The Democratic Revolution as the Disembodiment of Power 
What, then, characterizes our democratic theologico-political form of society?  
What characterizes its symbolic political milieu wherein power is represented as 
authority?  What is the democratic mode of mediating the particular and the universal?  
For Lefort, as we have seen, democratic society is like any society in that it can 
only be interpreted as taking shape within a theologico-political matrix.  At the same 
time, Lefort argues that we must recognize the fundamental transformation of this matrix 
that occurs with the democratic revolution.  In an oft-quoted passage, Lefort writes: 
“democracy is instituted and sustained by the dissolution of the markers of certainty.  It 
inaugurates a history in which people experience a fundamental indeterminacy as to the 
basis of power, law and knowledge, and as to the basis of relations between self and 
other, at every level of social life (at every level where division, and especially the 
division between those who held power and those who were subject to them, could once 
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be articulated as a result of a belief in the nature of things or in a supernatural 
principle).”61      
Lefort, we said earlier, concurs with Tocqueville that democracy should be 
understood capaciously, as an encompassing social state or form of society.  Here we 
have Lefort’s key departure from Tocqueville’s theorization of democracy: the 
dissolution of the markers of certainty supplants the equality of conditions as the 
generative fact and generative principle of the democratic regime.  The central question 
for Lefort is therefore: what “way of life” is instituted and sustained by this dissolution?  
What social form, with what principle of proper human relations, is generated by the 
experience of a “fundamental indeterminacy” precisely as to the basis of relations 
between human beings? 
 
The first thing we can say is that we are tempted to misinterpret the revolutionary 
transformation of our theologico-political social form as its collapse into fragmentation - 
into a formless “economic” materialism and “scientific” empiricism.  As we shall see, the 
incorporating form of modern democracy is elusive precisely because its inhabitants do 
not see, and so deny, it.  Modern democracy, represented as assuming its openness with 
the death of God (the collapse of religious dimensionality), is taken as the society without 
form -  a congregating multitude of individuals (usually represented as a market).  This is 
not Lefort’s interpretation, though.  With the democratic revolution, the theologico-
political form of society does not collapse, but instead takes on an unprecedented 
openness or formlessness of form.  We might put it this way: for Lefort, the “hidden 
source of modern democracy” is not the death of God but the death of Christ - the 
worldly figure of the sovereign father.  The disappearance of the corporeal figure or form, 
not the collapse of the dimension, of transcendence opens space and time to the 
 174 
democratic phenomenon.62  Lefort thus represent the democratic revolution as the 
dissolution of the material markers of authority, and so certainty.    
On the one hand, then, the “essentials remain unchanged: the theologico-political 
is revealed in the deployment of a system of representations … whose oppositional 
principle” “between the particular, which is … organized spatially and temporally, and 
the universal, which is still related to the operation of transcendence” remains constant.63  
Yet, we should not let this obscure the radical nature of the dissolution of the markers of 
certainty.64  For Lefort, as for Tocqueville, the democratic revolution is the singularly 
pivotal event of human history.  It inaugurates modernity by rendering the articulation of 
the particular and the universal, the mortal and the divine, problematic.  As with 
Tocqueville, for whom there are really only two basic regime-types (aristocracy and 
democracy), for Lefort, all pre-revolutionary social forms (from ancient Greece to the 
ancien regime) are fundamentally alike, as are all post-revolutionary forms (whether, as 
we shall see, democratic or totalitarian).    
This pivotal quality becomes apparent when we look at the theologico-political 
form the revolution overturned.  “Under the monarchy,” Lefort writes, “power was 
embodied in the person of the prince. … The prince was mediator between mortals and 
gods or … the transcendental agencies represented by a sovereign Justice and a sovereign 
Reason.”65  The physical presence of the Christ-figure king made “visible both the union 
of natural and supernatural, and the division between them.”66  The king “condensed 
within his body, which was at once mortal and immortal, the principle that generated the 
order of the kingdom.  His power pointed towards an unconditional, other-worldly pole, 
while at the same time he was, in his own person, the guarantor and representative of the 
unity of the kingdom.  The kingdom itself was represented as a body, as a substantial 
unity.”67  Moreover, the properly hierarchical order of the realm was instantiated in the 
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head-body image.  Society was a “great imaginary body” for which the king, as head, 
“provided the ... guarantee of its integrity.”68  In this context, “the universal speaks for 
itself.”69    
Literally, then, the “democratic revolution, for so long subterranean, burst out 
when the body of the king was destroyed, when the body politic was decapitated and 
when, at the same time, the corporeality of the social was dissolved.”70  The revolution 
signifies the “dissolution of the monarchical focus of legitimacy and the destruction of 
the architecture of bodies.”71  Democratic society, in turn, is “instituted as a society 
without a body;” it remains a recognizable whole, but without any determinate, visible 
representation of itself as a whole. 72  Democracy is still a form of society, but a uniquely 
abstract one.  Just as Tocqueville argues that democracy takes shape with the dissolution 
of the feudal principle of landedness (of authority incorporated in the land), Lefort argues 
that democracy is defined by the absence of physical, objective definition.  After the 
revolution, the transcendent can no longer be made manifest, power can no longer be 
transubstantiated into sovereignty, and so society can no longer be put into form, via the 
Christian mode of embodiment.  Henceforth, we search without precedent for a new way 
of articulating the religious dimension of social existence - of mediating the universal and 
the particular.  Understood as such, the democratic revolution is “a political event” with 
no less than “a metaphysical significance: the collapse of an unconditional authority 
which, in one or another social context, someone could claim to embody.”73   
Emptiness, Openness, and the Rule of the People   
This extraordinary phenomenon of disincorporation is, for Lefort, the instituting 
mode and moment of democracy.  The democratic regime is given form precisely, if 
paradoxically, by the “indetermination that was born from the loss of the substance of the 
body politic.”74  And herein lies the most basic sense of “democratic openness,” the 
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generative opening of the democratic theologico-political.  The democratic political form 
is constitutively open in that “the locus of power,” once occupied by the figure of the 
king, “becomes an empty place.”  With the revolution, power cannot be transubstantiated 
into authority by means of symbolic incorporation; authority can no longer be present in 
the flesh, as it were.  Sovereign power becomes, Lefort writes, “such that no individual 
and no group can be consubstantial with it;” the seat of power “cannot be occupied.”75  
The “people, the nation and the state take on the status of universal entities,” but none of 
these “represent substantial entities.  There representation is itself, in its dependence upon 
a political discourse, … always bound up with … debate.”76  Consequently, no body can 
legitimately command or render judgment.  The principle of hierarchy collapses with the 
“destruction of the architecture of bodies.”  The claim to legitimate authority is thus 
conjoined to the legitimate questioning of authority.  Today, power cannot simply 
proclaim its own legitimacy; instead it “must ... win its legitimacy without becoming 
divorced from competition between parties.”77  In a “modern society, … power may deny 
right, but it is incapable of depriving itself of its reference to it” without falling into a 
contemptible particularity.78  Of “all the regimes of which we know,” Lefort concludes, 
modern democracy “is the only one to have represented power in such a way as to show 
that power is an empty place and to have thereby maintained a gap between the symbolic 
and the real.  It does so by virtue of a discourse which reveals that … those who exercise 
power do not possess it; that they do not, indeed, embody it.”79  It is in this gap - this 
empty, open space - that the democratic way of life takes shape.   
This is not to say that “the people” aren’t sovereign in democracy, but rather that 
“the people” cannot enact their sovereignty.  Unlike the self-sufficient king, “the people” 
cannot speak and act on its own behalf.  The abstraction of “the people” can never be 
unproblematically identified, and so they can never be present in such a way as to occupy 
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the seat of power.  In turn, there is always a gap between popular sovereignty and its 
representation - between symbolic and real; principle and practice.  Even as “the people 
will be said to be sovereign,” then, their “identity will constantly be open to question, ... 
(and) will remain latent.”80  This latency of sovereignty - this constitutive absence of the 
father-figure - is the beating heart of modern democracy for Lefort.  It is, as we shall see, 
the meaning of freedom in democracy.    
Following Lefort further, we can say that this relationship between sovereignty 
and absence is more than coincidental: the people will be said to be sovereign only on 
condition of  their identity remaining latent.  The sovereignty of the people is absolute 
precisely because it is absent.  The people’s authority being made real would actually 
signify a diminution from potential universality to actual particularity.  Lefort writes that 
by its very material manifestation in the here and now power would be “exposed to the 
threat of falling into particularity,” and so of arousing something “more dangerous than 
hatred, namely, contempt.”81  Any descent from universality and power “runs the risk of 
... falling into collective representations at the level of the real, the contingent ... .”82  At 
the moment power is wielded, by the very condition of its being taken up and exercised 
by “mere mortals,” as Lefort puts it, it is itself rendered merely mortal.83  With the 
democratic revolution, the use of power is necessarily accompanied by a reduction of 
authority - effectiveness implies a certain level of illegitimacy. 
Notice that democratic openness - the emptiness of the place of power - is actually 
maintained by the idea of the sovereign rule of the people. “The people” themselves 
cannot rule, and the thought of a sovereign “people” ensures that no one else can rule 
either.  The sovereignty of the people, absolute but abstract, ensures that the seat of 
power can never be substantially occupied.  Democracy, Lefort writes, “combines these 
two apparently contradictory principles: on the one hand, power emanates from the 
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people; on the other, it is the power of nobody.  And democracy thrives on this 
contradiction;” whenever resolved, “democracy is either close to destruction or already 
destroyed.”84  The rule of the people is thus quite literally the rule of no body, whether 
personal or institutional.  When power belongs to the people, “no one can take the place 
of the supreme judge: ‘no one’ means no individual, not even an individual invested with 
a supreme authority, and no group, not even the majority.” 85  While “no artifice can 
prevent a majority from emerging in the here and now or from giving an answer which 
can stand in for the truth ... the fact (is) that every single individual has the right to 
denounce that answer as hollow or wrong … .” 86  Intrinsically unrealizable and 
unrepresentable, “the people” fall silent the moment some person, group, or institution 
presumes to speak in their name. 87  In its impossibly all-inclusive generality the popular 
sovereign cannot will.  A sort of impotent Leviathan, with a power that is at once 
unconditional and immaterial, popular sovereignty cancels itself out - limitlessly 
legitimate but effectively powerless.  As Lefort puts it, in democracy “the negative is 
effective” - a sort of white-noise, the silence of the voice of the people eventually drowns 
out any claim to authority.88 
For Lefort, then, the rule of the people seems ultimately less a matter of collective 
decision-making and self-government (which, in any case, presumes a non-existent 
collective self), than of exposing the particularity and so contestability of any decision 
made in the people’s name - democracy not as self-rule but as the rule of no body; the 
rule of the people as the operation of negativity.  To “return power to the people” is not to 
empower the people but to debase those who exercise power.  The principle of 
democracy becomes a wholly critical standard.  When the people reign, no one rules; 
therein lies the openness of democracy.   
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We might pause here to notice that the democratic rule of the people on Lefort’s 
account actually serves many of the functions as the liberal rule of law.  The latency of 
the people replaces the immutability of rights as a check upon the legitimate exercise of 
power.  A constitutively absent sovereign replaces higher law as the repository of an 
authority beyond our grasp.  The generality of “the people” replaces the impartiality of 
the law as a safeguard against tyranny.  We shall consider the implications of this shift 
below.   
The Regime of Revolution 
For Lefort, as we have seen, the “position and representation of power, and the 
figuration of its locus” are “constitutive of the social space.”89  The political shapes the 
social.  After the democratic revolution, the emptiness of our political form generates the 
openness of our social form.  It is in this sense that our political/social form is 
characteristically democratic.  Lefort describes this democratic political/social form in a 
key passage: “democracy invites us to replace the notion of a regime governed by laws, 
of a legitimate power, by the notion of a regime founded upon the legitimacy of a debate 
as to what is legitimate and what is illegitimate - a debate which is necessarily without 
any guarantor and without any end.”90  This open-ended debate, wherein no one can have 
the last word, is “the essence of democracy.”91  Where the social order could once be 
articulated as a result of a belief in the settled nature of things, after the revolution a 
restless “process of questioning is implicit in social practices.”  In democracy, “no one 
has the answer to the questions that arise” and whatsoever “has been established never 
bears the seal of full legitimacy.”92  The current wielders of power, “the people” 
themselves, even the concept of democracy itself, are all essentially contestable.               
      Recall Lefort’s claim that one must return to a regime’s instituting mode and 
moment to uncover its generative principle.  Democracy is unique in human history 
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because it is instituted via not incorporation but disincorporation - via the dissolution of 
the markers of certainty.  The founding representation of power is that of its beheading.  
Revolutionary opening - the contestation and potential overturning of established norms 
and forms - is itself the “mode of institution” of the “overall configuration of society.”  
Perhaps paradoxically, democracy is constituted via revolution.  And born of revolution, 
revolution is inscribed in democracy’s genetic code, as it were.  The negative remains 
effective, to the point where we experience what Keenan termed an “ontological 
openness.”           
In part III, I argue that Lefort’s theory of democracy just outlined illuminates the 
constitutive nature of our restlessness - of our permanent passion for the phenomenon of 
revolutionary opening - that Tocqueville at times overlooks.  At the same time, I argue 
that the “fundamental indeterminacy” of our democratic existence is perhaps more 
determinate than Lefort recognizes.  Indeed, the democratic regime comes to seem as 
immutable and ordained as the regime it overturned.  Democratic society seems to us 
tailor-made, as it were, for the mysterious and unpredictable movement of history (rather 
than for the divine hierarchy of Nature).  I argue that the revolutionary moment - the 
historical event - rather than the form of the king stands as the mediating point of 
(re)articulation between the universal and the particular.  The architecture of openness 
replaces that of the body.  In turn, for instance, restlessness takes on normative weight as 
an ethical imperative and standard of judgment: if one is not in motion, one is neither free 
nor “fully alive;” the concept of energy replaces that of harmony in our idea of health; we 
come to define ourselves by the sum of our experiences, by our history rather than by our 
place; change is seen as both inevitable and good; questioning supplants faith.  Born of 
the loss of any embodying figure or form, we might say that democratic society is put 
into form precisely as a formless form of society.  Formlessness itself becomes the 
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unquestionably proper open-form of society, and informality the proper open-form of 
social relations.  Democracy is regimented by its original vital principle of revolution.    
PART III : DEMOCRACY AS THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAR EXCELLENCE   
The Democratic Adventure: Equality and Restlessness  
Lefort writes that we “could not hope for a better description of the unique 
character” of the democratic regime than the one provided by Tocqueville.  In Lefort’s 
eyes, Tocqueville’s most profound theorizations of democratic society point to its 
dynamic vigor and vitality, to the “’superabundant force’ and ... ‘energy,’” at its heart.93  
Its “prime virtue,” Lefort paraphrases Tocqueville, “is its characteristic agitation,” its 
kinetic quality, “and not its potential ability … to improve the government’s ability to 
conduct public affairs.”94  In short, the prime virtue of the democratic way of life is its 
“’all-pervading and restless activity.’”95  Democracy is valuable as a form of government, 
to be sure, but above all it should be embraced as “an unprecedented historical adventure 
whose causes and effects cannot be localized within the sphere that is conventionally 
defined as that of government.”96 
But even Tocqueville, Lefort argues, misinterprets the basic nature, and so short-
changes the extent, of this restless energy and activity.  Tocqueville’s misdiagnosis 
follows from his theorization of the equality of conditions rather than the dissolution of 
the markers of certainty as generative of our democratic social state.  “However 
important this phenomenon may be,” Lefort writes of equalization, “it ... leaves an 
essential mutation in the shadows …”97  Tocqueville “usually tries to uncover an 
inversion of meaning” in the rise of equality: “the new assertion of singularity fades in 
the face of the rule of anonymity; the assertion of difference (of belief, opinion or morals) 
fades in the face of the rule of uniformity … and so on.”  Consequently, his explorations 
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are “restricted to … the underside of the phenomena he believes to be characteristic of 
the new society ... . (He) does not pursue his explorations by examining the underside of 
the underside.”  While Tocqueville detects the “ambiguities of the democratic revolution 
in every domain,” he is “reluctant” to fully “confront the unknown element in 
democracy.”98   
Indeed, Lefort argues that when taking up this “unknown element” we cannot 
even “limit our explorations to the underside of the underside.  One the contrary, we must 
recognize that, as long as the democratic adventure continues … the meaning of what is 
coming into being remains in suspense.”99  This is the meaning of democracy’s 
“fundamental indeterminacy,” and this suspense is another aspect of its openness.  By his 
very attempt to decipher the ultimate meaning of the revolution, to predict the future of 
our “democratic adventure” (whether, via equality, toward freedom or despotism), 
Tocqueville necessarily misreads the revolution.  He is blind to the ultimate blindness of 
our democratic condition - to its essentially open-ended and protean character.   
For Lefort, then, the democratic revolution cannot be understood as giving rise to 
Tocqueville’s notion of a determinative equality.  Instead, as we have seen, democracy 
takes shape from the  “indetermination that was born from the loss of the substance of the 
body politic.”100  Our empty political form leads primarily to an open social form, and 
only secondarily to equality.  The revolution gives “birth to the unknown,” which renders 
even the equality of conditions provisional.101  A sort of fecund uncertainty generates our 
intrinsically restless way of life.  Democratic society, Lefort concludes, is “instituted 
through a new awareness of what cannot be known or mastered.”102  Consequently, “what 
is instituted is never established, the known remains undermined by the unknown, the 
present proves to be undefinable … .”103  For Lefort, the meaning of the revolution is 
precisely that its course and meaning remain perpetually unknowable and uncontrollable.          
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Lefort sums this state of affairs by theorizing democracy as “the historical society 
par excellence, a society which, in its very form, welcomes and preserves 
indeterminacy.”104  It is “historical” in that it is a social form “destined to undergo a 
process of continuous institutional upheaval, destined to give birth to new social forms 
and explicitly to experience the real as history.”105  Democracy is “a truly historical 
adventure in the sense that it can never end, in that the boundaries of the possible and the 
thinkable constantly recede.”106 
I suggest that Tocqueville at time concurs with this description of democracy as 
the society in which the boundaries of the possible constantly recede, but he characterizes 
it as the aspiration rather than the condition of democracy.  In what follows, I argue that 
Lefort characterizes it as both our aspiration and our condition - our good and our truth.  
“Historical” subsumes both the immutable fact of our modern democratic situation 
(indeterminacy and uncertainty), and the central value of democratic society (freedom 
and the right to question).  In turn, our “historical” social form comes to seem inscribed 
in the “historical” adventure during which we necessarily live.  Put differently, “history” 
is to the democratic order what “nature” was to the laissez-faire order: the venue of 
fact/value elision.  Our democratic adventure stands as both that which we willingly 
affirm and that which we cannot deny.     
Historical Freedom   
Tocqueville argues that the social state of democracy harbors within it the 
potential for both a new type of freedom and a new type of despotism, whether of the 
tutelary state or of public opinion.  For Lefort, democracy is not such a mixed bag.  As 
we have seen, Lefort argues that Tocqueville misses the radical transformation of society 
inaugurated by the disembodiment of power and the dissolution of the markers of 
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certainty.  Consequently, Tocqueville underestimates how irreducibly restless and in flux 
the democratic social state truly is.   
The implication of Lefort’s argument seems to be that the final form of 
democracy simply cannot be despotism simply because democracy has no final form, 
only an endless series of provisional reformulations.  What has been opened can never be 
closed again: history never stops moving; the democratic revolution never relents; our 
historical society never settles down.  Indeed, instituted through an awareness of what 
cannot be known or mastered, as Lefort puts it, democratic society is no less than 
destined to undergo a process of continuous institutional upheaval.  Insofar as we 
understand freedom as the denaturing of any particular representation of power - as “the 
operation of negativity” - freedom itself appears as an innate characteristic of our 
democratic condition.  The kings head cannot be reattached to his body, and so we cannot 
but be free.  We can never be certain again, and so questioning remains at least in 
principle perpetually possible.  So long as we live in history, we ourselves cannot be 
known or mastered.  We are, at bottom, restless and undomesticable.  Freedom is woven 
into the vicissitudes of our historical adventure.  We are necessarily free.     
Recall Lefort’s claim that the “prime virtue” of democratic society is its 
“characteristic agitation.”  On Lefort’s account, this agitation is equally characteristic of 
the condition into which we are born.  In this sense, democracy’s prime virtue is 
inscribed in its very condition of existence, given and inevitable.  We asked earlier 
whether competition was taken as the unavoidable truth of our way of life or as the 
central value of our way of life, - or providentially, both - in our laissez-faire republic.  
We asked whether the so-called “death of God” was true or good or Kateb, Connolly, and 
others.  Here we might ask whether the openness induced by the dissolution of the 
markers of certainty stands as a description of the unpredictable world we find ourselves 
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stuck in, or as the normative principle of this social arrangements and relationships we 
affirm as good and right.  Does “democratic” characterize the reality of our existence (as 
revealed to us by the revolutionary rupture) or the proper free-form of society?  Does 
“historical” signify the is of indeterminacy and uncertainty or the ought of restlessness 
and questioning?  For Lefort, it seems the openness of our democratic society is simply 
ingrained in the open-endedness of our historical condition.    
 
This linkage of fact and value in freedom is apparent in Lefort’s notions of  both 
“political freedom” (as against the domesticating tutelary state), and the “freedom of the 
individual” (as against domesticating public opinion).107  Lefort writes, “the operation of 
negativity and the institution of political freedom are one and the same.  And the fact is 
that political freedom survives so long as it is ... deemed impossible to occupy the locus 
of power.”108  The “survival” of political freedom here is contingent only upon the 
perpetual emptiness of the place of power.  Political freedom lasts as long as nothing 
established can bear the seal of full legitimacy.  In turn, Lefort argues, we should temper 
our fears of the growth of the tutelary state within the political form of democracy.  
“What I have termed the operation of negativity,” Lefort writes, “is no less constitutive of 
the democratic space than the erection of the state into a tutelary power.  The system 
thrives on this contradiction and, so long as the system is perpetuated, neither of its terms 
can lose its efficacy.”109  “It is often said that the power of the state is increasing as a 
result of .. new demands” for state protection in the form of the extension of individual 
and group rights and welfare guarantees, “but the extent to which it is being challenged 
tends to be forgotten.”110  Far from occupying the seat of power, the democratic state 
holds only the modicum of authority proper to the material realm of everyday politics.  
Thus the state can never possess the tutelary authority of the father-figure; it is always 
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subject to being contested.  Indeed, the politics of democracy is no less than a “theatre of 
... contestation.”111   
With a similar logic, Lefort argues that the denaturing, negating flow of history 
“counteracts the petrification of social life” Tocqueville fears will follow from 
conformity to majority opinion.112  While “the legitimacy of the pole of opinion can be 
asserted to be unlimited,” we should again temper our fear because “opinion remains 
shapeless; it cannot be localized in a body and it cannot be reduced to a set of statements 
as it is constantly being created and re-created ... .”113  And the moment opinion is 
localized and given shape, it loses some of its limitless legitimacy.  Public opinion must 
always be voiced by somebody (usually multiple and conflicting somebodies), and is 
thereby brought down to size as merely particular opinion.  The power of majority 
opinion is limited by the fact that it is recognized as the opinion of some particular 
majority.  The power of public opinion is undermined the moment it is polled - the 
moment it is given form in the here and now.  Against petrification, then, democracy 
inaugurate “the experience of an ungraspable, uncontrollable” social life that is 
“constantly ... open to question.”114        
Ultimately, Lefort concludes, we “have to reject the alternative formulated by 
Tocqueville ... (wherein) the individual either appears in the fullness of his self-
affirmation, or disappears completely as a result of his weakness and isolation, and is 
swallowed up by opinion or by social power. ... (The individual’s) strength does not 
reside in his full positivity as a subject, and ... any attempt, no matter how refined, to 
enslave him will fail because there is within him something that escapes objectification.”  
Here again we see freedom as escape, over against mastery.  The individual escapes 
objectification when he “discovers that he is undefined, and has no contours,” that he is 
“constituted beneath the pole of a new indeterminacy ... which turns truth into a question 
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to which there is no answer ... .”115  For Lefort, the individuals own formless form assures 
his freedom.  Democratic man is and cannot but be free precisely because he is an 
historical being, constitutively uncertain and opaque.  Living in history, after the 
dissolution of the markers of certainty, we cannot know or master, but then nor can we be 
known or mastered.  We cannot be shaped by power because we are inherently 
ungraspable.  Free because fugitive, we less question power than are a question to it.  
With the disappearance of the father-figure, we cannot be domesticated because we 
cannot be named.   
Contrary to Lefort’s assertion, we actually do find this notion of freedom in 
Tocqueville’s writings: “The men who live in the democratic ages upon which we are 
entering have naturally a taste for independence; they are naturally impatient of 
regulation, and they are wearied by the permanence even of the condition they 
themselves prefer.  They … easily elude (power’s) grasp by their own mobility and 
insignificance.”116   
 
The picture that emerges from Lefort’s work thus seems to be one in which 
freedom is inherent in the uncertainty of our historical condition.  As the restless 
“operation of negativity,” freedom is inscribed in life after the democratic revolution.  
With the denaturing of authority, freedom is as inescapable as change itself, as basic as 
natality and mortality.    
Perhaps we can say that Lefort doesn’t so much confront the perpetual underside 
of democracy as inverts Tocqueville’s terms (although without Tocqueville’s critique), 
theorizing a social state wherein freedom rather than equality is implicitly taken as 
natural, given and inevitable - a permanent feature of our unpredictable existence.  Or if 
not exactly a quality of “nature,” Lefort’s freedom is inseparable from our post-
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revolutionary social symbolic order, which governs our access to and experience of the 
real.  Henceforth, as Lefort himself writes, we experience the real as history.  If not quite 
“a truth inscribed in the real,” democratic freedom is constitutive of our “new relation to 
the real.”117  And in its bundle of associations with freedom and revolution and history, 
Lefort affirms the democratic order as both true and good.  Tocqueville argues that 
authority can be displaced but never eradicated, it always settles somewhere.  After the 
revolution, when no authority can be “massively affirmed,” the operation of negativity - 
freedom-as-revolutionary-opening - is itself massively affirmed. 
Democratic Man as a Rights-Declaring Animal 
We enact this operation of negativity, Lefort explains, by declaring our rights.  At 
times, rights have been formulated as an obstruction to democratic politics - whether as 
super-political “higher law” that closes off from debate certain untouchable absolutes, or 
as fostering possessive individualism and private self-interestedness.  Whether by taking 
on the characteristics of a religion or by steering us into economics, rights obstruct and 
undermine democracy.  Against both of these notions, Lefort democratizes the idea of 
rights.  For Lefort, rights are the “generative principles of democracy.”118  “The singular 
thing about the freedoms proclaimed at the end of the eighteenth century [specifically in 
the 1791 French Declaration of the Rights of Man] is that they are in effect indissociable 
from the birth of the democratic debate.  Indeed, they generate it.  We therefore have to 
accept that whenever these freedoms are undermined, the entire democratic edifice is 
threatened with collapse ...”119  Like the liberty of contract in the laissez-fair order, the 
right to debate - to associate and speak - is the central pillar of democratic civilization.   
Why is this the case?  With the democratic revolution, Lefort argues, rights are 
deprived of the fixed point of the monarchy and “a new point is fixed: man. ... But what 
kind of anchor point is this?”  With a logic we have seen before, he states: “The rights of 
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man reduce right to a basis which, despite its name, is without shape ... and, for this 
reason, eludes all power which would claim to take hold of it - whether religious or 
mythical, monarchical or popular.  Consequently, these rights go beyond any particular 
formulation which has been given of them, and this means that their formulation contains 
the demand for their reformulation ... From the moment when the rights of man are 
posited as the ultimate reference, established right is open to question.” 120  An awareness 
of rights therefore “implies the institutionalization of conflict.” 121  When the principle of 
right is recognized, no establishment - not even of rights themselves - can be taken as 
fixed and final; everything is open to question.  In this sense, the rights of man “cannot be 
dissociated from the idea of the indeterminable.”122  
There are a number of key points here.  First, notice that the abstraction “man” 
parallels that of “the people” discussed earlier.  We saw how the sovereign rule of “the 
people” is itself materially undermined by the indeterminacy and absence of “the people” 
- the condition of full legitimacy itself checks the effective use of the people’s power.  
Here, the rights of man are similarly posited as an unconditional rule or “ultimate 
reference.”  But because this rule is seated in the indeterminable idea of man or 
humanity, it eludes the grasp of the holders of power.  The rights of “man” are the rights 
of no body (and as such never fall into a contemptible particularity).  In turn, human 
rights less impose certain limits on the exercise of legitimate power than render uncertain 
power’s claim to speak in the name of right. 
Second, notice that the general principle of human right goes “beyond any 
particular formulation.”  Just as the sovereignty of the people can never be fully 
represented, the rights of man can never be fully realized in the here and now.  It would 
be “misleading,” Lefort writes, “to declare simply: here, in our societies, (that) rights 
exist. … (One) must refrain from granting them a reality.”123  “Such principles do not 
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exist in the same way as positive institutions, whose actual elements can be listed … .”  
We must thus recognize that “the awareness of right and its institutionalization are 
ambiguously related.”124  Put differently, we must recognize the tension between the 
notion of enumerated rights, which are multiple, settled, and determinate, and the singular 
and open-ended “right to have rights,” as Lefort puts it, which gives “rise to an adventure 
whose outcome is unpredictable.”125  The “symbolic dimension of right is manifested … 
in the irreducibility of the awareness of right to all legal objectification, which would 
signify its petrification in a corpus of laws.”126  For Lefort, the principle of right cannot 
be put into legal words or conventional forms; to give it form in the sphere of politics 
would be to devitalize it in the register of “the political.”  Indeed, rights “cannot be 
immanent within the social order without the very idea of right being debased.”127  The 
norm of restlessness is inscribe in the idea of rights: more verb than noun, rights “are not 
simply the object of a declaration, it is their essence to be declared.”128    
And third, Lefort goes further to write that any particular formulation of right 
contains the “demand for (its) reformulation.”  With our awareness of the right to have 
rights, we recognize “the universality of the principle which reduces right to the 
questioning of right,” and also that “where right is in question, society - that is, the 
established order - is in question.”129  It is not only that we might recognize the positive 
law establishment of rights as at times falling short of the principles on which they are 
based.  Instead, insofar as we are to declare our rights, we must question and reform the 
established order - disembodiment enjoins disestablishment.  In this sense, democracy 
signifies not only the subversion of hierarchical conventions but of the conventional as 
such.  We enact democracy by dissolving the markers of certainty - dis-placing authority 
becomes an end in itself in the democratic social state.  Henceforth, social order rests 
upon the right of question rather than the right of command (or the right to contract); 
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abdicating the right to question in democracy would be like abdicating the right to 
command in aristocracy.  In a world defined as without final answers, the good of 
questioning of every decision seems simply self-evident.  It is not that democracy is 
inherently anarchic or unruly, then, but that questioning itself stands as the ordering rule - 
the unquestioned creed - of our democratic way of life.  More than effective, the negative 
is determinate: practice is necessarily subverted by principle; the universality of the 
principle of right is necessarily a critical standard.  We arrive here at something of a 
definition of democracy for Lefort.  Democracy is revolution: “the theatre of 
contestation” in which we, “on the basis of rights,” “transgress … boundaries” in a 
“history that remains open.”130   
Lefort claims that, to understand our social form, we must return to its generative 
mode of institution.  Democracy was instituted by the revolutionary moment; subversion 
is its original vital principle and essential gesture.  The ideas of human rights and popular 
sovereignty ensure the reoccurrence of this founding moment in the perennial beheading 
of the father-figure, as it were - in the perpetual return to a state of openness.  Democracy 
is enacted not by its (impossible) realization but by subversion, even self-subversion.   
 
For Lefort, the democratic articulation of the universal and the particular is 
apparent in the moment one declares one’s rights.  This event supplants the body of the 
king in giving form to society, in establishing a norm of proper human association.  “Far 
from having the function of masking a dissolution of social bonds which makes everyone 
a monad,” Lefort argues, rights “both testify to the existence of a new network of human 
relations and bring it into existence.”131  The recognition of rights does “not imply that 
the individual withdraws into the sphere of his own activities ... (but instead) gives full 
recognition to the ... freedom of movement ... (and) therefore facilitates the multiplication 
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of human relations,” which were previously “frozen in the relation of authority, or … 
confined in privileged spaces.”132  Rights create for the first time in human history a 
venue for the interaction of free and equal human beings, wherein man exercises his right 
“to step out of himself and to make contact with others.”133       
Above all, then, it is the right to speak in association supplants that religious 
congregation, the aristocratic obligations of place, the economic contract, and so forth in 
shaping the social order.  The “generalization of the right to speak … is inseparable from 
the diffusion of the meaning of right throughout society.”134  Further, the “democratic 
apprehension of right implies the affirmation of speech.”135  With the creation of this 
novel public space of rights-relations, “a situation is constituted in which expression is 
encouraged” rather than merely permitted.136  Self-expression supplants salvational creed 
and codes of etiquette and self-interest in representations of the meaningful.  Expression 
supplants command and competition as the proper mode of human relations - from status 
to contract to speech; from paternalism to competition to recognition.  And this 
“relational freedom” of rights ensures the openness of democratic society.  “As everyone 
acquires the right to address others and to listen to them, a symbolic space is established; 
it has no definite frontiers, and no authority can claim to control it ... Speech as such and 
thought as such prove to exist independently of any given individual, and belong to no 
one.”137  
We have seen thus far how, for Lefort, democracy is not one element of freedom 
but its essence, and the good from which most others follow.  He goes on to conclude 
that, with the revolutionary declaration of rights, man recognizes himself as democratic 
man.  Man is “the being whose essence it is to declare his rights.”138  This is because, 
with the absence of the father-figure, we both can and must name ourselves - we signify 
that which we believe meaningful about ourselves - by declaring our rights.  The 
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“extraordinary event” of the revolution represents “a declaration which was in fact a self-
declaration, that is, a declaration by which human beings … revealed themselves to be 
both the subject and the object of the utterance in which they named the human elements 
in one another …”139  In the debate surrounding the meaning of right, humanity has 
“embarked upon a voyage of self-discovery.”  Human beings “create themselves by 
discovering and instituting rights in the absence of any principle” that might settle the 
debate.140  Naming himself, in a sense even creating himself, democratic man proves 
essentially free and undomesticable.  In this context, the democratic expression of right 
itself “becomes unconditional; it is a human attribute, and it reveals the vocation of 
humanity.”141  Democracy is revealed as our calling.   
Historical Nature  
  Democracy has taken on something of a religious status today.  We hear that 
democracy is the endpoint of the providential progress of history, or conversely, that we 
have “lost faith” in democracy.  Lefort, I argue, represents the democratic phenomenon as 
given and inevitable, but precisely because history has no endpoint.  So long as we live in 
history, the operation of negativity endures and prevails.  After the democratic revolution, 
the denaturing of authority itself seems natural - decreed by history.  Put differently, 
when we experience the real as history, when our experience of nature is itself governed 
by the rule of history, the open-order of democracy seems imprinted in the open-order of 
nature.  Democracy is assured not as the end of history, but by the endlessness of history.          
Lefort theorizes the democratic revolution as in a sense democratizing our 
representation of nature itself.  For Lefort, the flip-side of the denaturing of the social 
world is the desocializing of the natural world – removing the human fingerprints from 
nature.  Through the revolution, we move from nature affirmed as higher Nature (as a 
hierarchical and eternal order within which the human world is embedded) to nature 
 194 
experienced as accessible to us only through the veil of history.  We cannot but perceive 
nature as Bergsonian, as it were - as unpredictable and open-ended, fluid and in-flux, full 
of birth and death, mysterious and creative rather than cyclical or teleological or 
mechanical.  As with freedom, nature is rendered “historical.”  Or more precisely, history 
becomes the master term under which nature is subsumed and by which it is 
conditioned.142  We live life necessarily in history - in the course of history as in 
accordance with nature.  While the revolutionary bursting forth of history liberates us 
from the inhibiting absolutes of closed Nature, we henceforth live with the chastening 
uncertainties of open history.  We can no more argue with history than we could argue 
with Nature.  “The rule is different, but there is a rule.”143       
A leading description of this democratized, historical nature is put forth by 
William Connolly.  Drawing on the Nobel Prize winning chaos theory of Illya Prigogine, 
author of The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos and the New Laws of Nature, Connolly 
writes of the insertion of “an irreversible historical trajectory into several (though not all) 
systems in nature,” which thereby challenges “the regulative ideal of a closed system of 
explanation that traditionally informed the natural sciences, at least outside of biology.”144  
Connolly contends that “nature itself is populated more by ‘dissipative structures’ than by 
the timeless systems of Newtonian mechanics.  A dissipative structure, exemplified by 
cells, whirlpools, biological evolution, aging, and the evolution of the universe, has self-
productive capacities; it is marked by irreversible changes that give it a temporal or 
historical dimension; and it is susceptible to changes in the course of its development that 
are unpredictable.”145    
The dissolution of the markers of certainty is no less a natural than a social 
phenomenon; nature itself works according to the operation of negativity.  Our 
democratic third republic still stands as inscribed evolutionary nature, with evolution a 
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matter of “dissipative structures” rather than natural selection.  The natural order, just like 
the democratic social order, is marked by unpredictable, irreversible changes, and even 
“self-productive” capacities.  Revolution is the original vital principle of nature, just as 
with democracy.  And insofar as nature challenges “the regulative ideal” of “closed” 
systems, it affirms our democratic aspirations.146            
Connolly calls upon us to give up our tendency toward an “ontological 
narcissism” in which we “demand dispensations from within the world to replace the loss 
of a personal, willful, and powerful God located above it.”  We “domesticate” the 
“protean idea of contingency” by conceptualizing the world as either “plastic” and to be 
“mastered” or as “providential” and “designed” for our “fulfillment.”  We insist that the 
“world … must be for us in one way or another.”  If our end is neither mastery nor 
harmony, though, but rather undomesticated freedom, one wonders whether Connolly’s 
description of nature’s openness is any less narcissistic - whether the world we are born 
into is any less providentially designed for the fulfillment of our “deepest purposes” 
when those purposes are democratic.147   
Interestingly, this nature has even been reaffirmed as Nature by some.  Take, for 
example, the “Open Theism” movement.  As a challenge to the regulative ideal of God as 
sovereign, all-knowing, and unchanging, this “free-will theology” democratizes God as 
“temporal.”  “God, at least since Creation, experiences duration. God is everlasting 
through time rather than timelessly eternal.”  On this view, “God decided to create beings 
with indeterministic freedom, which implies that God chose to create a universe in which 
the future is not entirely knowable, even for God.”  Living under a chastening 
uncertainty, God “takes risks” and “makes mistakes” just like us.148    
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Lefort argues along similar lines that the democratic revolution set free nature, 
just as it liberated society and the individual.  Prior to the revolution nature was made to 
serve human purposes.  It was assigned order in response to the needs and fears, the 
expectations and aspirations, of man.  The unruliness of the world we actually experience 
was repressed by the fictive, superimposed identity of an orderly and meaningful 
“cosmos” or supernatural design.  We might say that the world was reduced to black-and-
white so as to better accommodate us.  But with the severing of the king’s head from his 
body - the severing of Nature from nature – there burst forth the recognition of the actual 
fluidity and spontaneity of corporeal space and time - of the unfathomable depth of nature 
in the ungraspable flow of history.  Of course, Lefort notes, even today we often 
dehistoricize the world in order “to assure ourselves of a truth which is already given and 
which will not betray us, in order to conjure away, in sum, the indeterminacy which 
constantly re-emerges in the history that we live.” 149  Nonetheless, with the revolution we 
at least in principle leave behind the comforting but confining illusion of certainty and 
security (the idea of nature rendered as our home), and live life in open and untamed 
historical nature. 
The revolution thus disentangles the social world and the natural world, liberating 
each from the other by revealing both to be open; both are ultimately undomesticable, 
unknowable and unmasterable.  Henceforth we have two distinct worlds following a 
single indeterminate orbit, two separate worlds represented as “historical”/“democratic.” 
If not exactly “decreed by nature,” then, the modern democratic social form 
stands in Lefort’s theory as uniquely suited to accommodate and function in accordance 
with our historical nature.  Democracy alone abides by the rule of history.  Democratic 
openness is the response, both necessary and proper, to our democratic condition of 
uncertainty (just as competition was the necessary and proper response to the market 
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condition of “the survival of the fittest”).  If not standing under a “cosmic seal of 
approval,” democracy seems self-evident - simply obvious, without viable alternatives, in 
little need of argument.  Indeed, as we shall see, denying the decisive political and social 
relevance of our historical condition is for Lefort a matter of willful ignorance or wishful 
thinking.  Not accommodating oneself to the dissolution of the markers of uncertainty in 
one’s social arrangements and relationships is at best a sort of childishness, and possible 
much worse.      
Despite his critique of Tocqueville’s theory of democracy and the revolution, 
then, we can take Lefort’s theory as implicitly confirming one of Tocqueville’s central 
insights.  Tocqueville writes that democracy, for better and for worse, is experienced by 
its inhabitants as coming naturally, as in line with the plain truth and justice of equality, 
and so as a spontaneous and authentic manner of being in society.  Democracy is the 
social state of nature into which we feel ourselves born without labor, in which we 
believe ourselves to live informally and without artifice.  Democracy is the regime 
wherein the need for regimentation, for education or habituation into its form, is denied; 
taken as normal, the democratic way of life does not require normalization.  Lefort, I 
argue, offers just such a picture of democracy.  As the social form that does not stand 
under the pressures of a prohibited and repressed uncertainty, democracy does indeed 
appear in Lefort’s work as spontaneous and self-evident - that which springs up when 
obstructions and usurpations have been cleared away.  To live in historical society, with 
its historical freedom, is to live in the social state of historical nature.    
The Totalitarian Illusion: A Society Without History    
Tocqueville argues that democracy might be just a middle-stage between 
aristocracy and socialism.  His work can be read as an ongoing effort to alloy democracy 
with certain vestigial elements of aristocracy to prevent democracy’s slide into socialism.  
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Lefort too represents democracy as a middle point, between the Christian embodiment 
and the totalitarian logic of oneness.  While Tocqueville fears the permanent loss of 
freedom to the extreme equality of socialism, I argue that on Lefort’s account freedom 
cannot in the long run be lost to totalitarianism.  In history, there is always a return of the 
repressed.  Totalitarianism is an illusion; democracy is inevitable.   
For Lefort, totalitarianism is a product of the dissolution of the markers of 
certainty just like democracy.  Like democracy, totalitarianism is made possible by the 
collapse of Christian embodiment as the mode of representing the theologico-political 
matrix of society.  But while totalitarianism “is engendered in ‘historical society’” its 
“phantasy is to abolish the historical in History; … to identify the instituting moment 
with the instituted; to deny the unpredictable, the unknowable … .”150  Born of the 
revolution, totalitarianism “designates itself as a society without history.”151     
To understand this quest to abolish history we must recognize the down side of 
freedom – the experience of openness less as freedom than as insecurity.  We might 
experience our historical condition of uncertainty as a sort of Edvard Munchian “vertigo 
in the face of the void created by an indeterminate society.”152 Within the horizons of 
democracy, the individual is “dispossessed of his assurance as to his identity” - he is 
“doomed to be tormented by a secret uncertainty.”153  Moreover, “men are haunted by the 
idea of the break-up of the social,” which “democracy threatens … to bring … about.”  
When “both the principle and the heart of civilization are contingent,” we recoil at the 
“barbarism” and “darkness” experienced as potentially overtaking us.154  Democracy is 
therefore “constantly threatened by the resistance it provokes.”  W are tempted to 
“surrender to the attractions of a renewed certainty” -  a return to black-and-white.155  The 
appeal of totalitarianism lies in “a nostalgia for the image of society which is at one with 
itself and which has mastered its history.”156   
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This temptation is strongest when society is experienced as having sunk into pure 
“economics” - when “the reference to an empty place gives way to the unbearable image 
of a real vacuum.”157  At this point, conflict seems both prevalent and meaningless.  The 
“mode of the establishment of power and the nature of its exercise or, more generally, 
political competition, proves incapable of giving form and meaning to social division;” 
“the symbolic efficacy of the democratic system is destroyed” and “power appears to 
have sunk to the level of reality … (as) no more than an instrument for the promotion of 
… interests.”  The “authority of those who make public decisions … vanishes, leaving 
only the spectacle of individuals or clans whose one concern is to satisfy their appetite for 
power.”158   
Society here is “put to the test of the collapse of legitimacy … by all the signs of 
the fragmentation of the social space, of heterogeneity.  In these extreme situations, 
representations which can supply an index of social unity and identity become invested 
with a fantastic power, and the totalitarian adventure is under way.”159  Reacting against 
the experience of pure, meaningless materialism, we might give ourselves over to a 
renewed “religious” certainty and unity and meaningfulness.  But crucially, this religious 
longing is itself radically transformed by the revolution.  Totalitarianism, like democracy, 
is a re-articulation of the particular and the universal, but it is carried forth in denial of the 
transcendence of the religious universal.  Totalitarianism is “the quest for a mystical 
union” in disavowal of “the religious … in so far as it indicates an other place.”160  
Totalitarianism is the attempt to fully realize the primal unity of society while wholly 
rejecting the primal division.161  In the totalitarian matrix of thought, it “is denied that 
division is constitutive of society.”  Here “the body is … revitalized.  But .. what is 
revitalized is quite different from what was once torn apart.” 162  The body is no longer the 
point of mediation between mortal and immortal, mundane and divine, but rather the 
 200 
point of their collapse into singularity.  With totalitarianism, an “impossible swallowing 
up of the body in the head begins to take place, as does an impossible swallowing up of 
the head in the body.”163  In its anti-democratic logic of oneness, totalitarianism strives to 
eradicate pluralism at every level - between state and society, individual and society, 
public and private, particular and universal.164    
At the same time, Lefort writes that totalitarianism inverts the meaning of 
democracy in the name of democracy itself.  Totalitarianism is a reaction against history 
carried out in terms of the realization of democracy.  Totalitarianism “overturns the 
democratic transformation … while at the same time taking over some of its features and 
extending them at the level of phantasy.”165  It is “a response to the questions raised by 
democracy, … an attempt to resolve its paradoxes, … (and) to banish the indetermination 
that haunts the democratic experience.  But this attempt … itself draws on a democratic 
source … .”166  Rather than living with “a constant displacement of the ‘solution’” to 
these paradoxes, totalitarianism strives for “the image of the people actualized.”167  The 
inherently latent quality of the sovereign people is effaced in “the fantasy of the People-
as-One, … (with) a substantial identity, … free from division.”168  Power “ceases to 
designate an empty place: it is materialized in an organ (or, in extreme cases, an 
individual) which is supposed to be capable of concentrating in itself all the forces of 
society.”169    
  Against the vertigo of uncertainty, a sense of potency is supported by “the image 
of a fixed history,” a history both known and mastered.  There is a “prodigious refusal of 
any innovation that might transgress the limit of an already known future, a reality that in 
principle is already mastered.”  In this “phantasmagoria of the Plan” the “unknown, the 
unpredictable, the indeterminable” are rendered as “avatars of the enemy,” whether 
barbaric or parasitic.170  In the attempted reconstitution of the markers of certainty, 
 201 
totalitarianism represents a “retreat towards a point of certainty where the necessity to 
speak is cancelled out.”171  The negation of the democratic adventure’s characteristic 
restlessness and activity and agitation, totalitarianism operates in silence, with a 
“certainty that can do without words.”172  
 
Lefort leaves us with the picture of democracy as potentially too demanding, and 
so as perpetually threatened by the temptation to surrender to a renewed sense of 
certainty and peace, identity and purpose.  We might recoil before democracy’s “ordeal 
of … indetermination” in our longing for home.173  Far from inevitable, democracy seems 
perpetually under siege.  I want to suggest, to the contrary, three ways in which Lefort’s 
analysis of totalitarianism actually demonstrates the hegemonic and unquestionable status 
of democracy. 
First, totalitarianism is an illusion.  “More than any other system,” Lefort argues, 
totalitarianism “is contradicted by experience.”174  We “would be victims of the phantasy 
which inhabits this system … if we imagined that it actually realized itself, that it could 
ever succeed in realizing itself, even in the heyday of Stalinism.  We would be forgetting 
that social division is only masked … . We would be forgetting … that the symbolic 
reference points of law, of knowledge and of reality may well have been denied, but not 
abolished … .”  Totalitarian ideology therefore always “runs the risk of being seen” and 
“exposed;” it is always subject to “the threat of a violent return of all the signs of division 
and otherness.”175  “The reappearance of a divide … between the discourse of power and 
people’s experience of their situation indicates the impossibility of … materializing 
power in the persons of those vested with it, of representing society as a body without 
supplying it with an external guarantor of its organization and limits, and of abolishing 
social division.”176  Totalizing power thus “proves to be unexpectedly fragile when, by 
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taking on the visible shape of an organ of men, it reveals itself to be divorced from, and 
therefore external to … the people. … (It) is always threatened with having to reveal that 
it is particular and not universal.”177  Totalitarianism cannot, over time, sustain the 
“fantastic attempt to compress space and time into the limits of the social body,” and so it 
eventually collapses in the “return of democratic aspirations.”178    
For Lefort, the anti-democratic counter-revolution simply cannot succeed given 
our experience of the real as history.  The validity of the “democratic” representation of 
our situation as unpredictable and indeterminate is constantly reaffirmed by our 
experience of the events of the world.  Even when democracy is momentarily “lost,” even 
when we occasionally strain and struggle against the uncertainty of our democratic 
condition, the return of our historical social form is inevitable.  We simply cannot, in the 
long run, deny democratic openness.  Like a repressed Freudian desire, democracy 
always returns, indeed bursts forth.  Whether experienced as liberating or as an ordeal, 
the revolutionary flow of history eventually undermines every ordering absolute imposed 
upon the world.  History is on the side of democracy.   
There is already in Tocqueville the sense that with the advent of openness we 
have reached a sort of end of history - a condition taken as universal, immortal, and 
characterized by the absence of great revolutions (if not of disturbances and violence).  
Democracy is the final regime, and the democratic revolution the final great event.  At 
the same time, Tocqueville fears democracy might collapse into its extreme expression as 
socialism.  The passion for equality might destroy freedom.  For Lefort, there seems no 
such threat to freedom.  The longing for certainty cannot destroy freedom, understood as 
the operation of negativity, the denaturing of authority, and the return to a state of 
openness.  Freedom is true; certainty is a lie.  Outside of the realm of illusion - or better, 
delusion - there is no long-term alternative to the democratic theologico-political matrix.          
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Second, against totalitarianism, democracy stands as singularly civilizational.  
Recall William Graham Sumner view that an attack upon capitalism was an attack upon 
“the foundations of civilization.”  For Lefort, democracy enjoys a similar standing.  The 
fundamental opposition running throughout his work is “between a totalitarian model of 
society (whatever its many variants may be, Stalinist or neo-Stalinist, Maoist or neo-
Maoist) and a model which implies the recognition of rights.”179  There is a borderline, 
black-and-white, all-or-nothing logic of this formulation.  The opposition is between 
democracy, with its characteristic vitality and restlessness and activity, and 
totalitarianism, which amounts to silence/stillness/death.  Tocqueville’s formulation of 
democracy, aristocracy, and socialism dictates a sort of Aristotelean mode of striking the 
mean between the excesses and defects of democratic equality.  Formulated in terms of 
openness, there is no sense of balancing or moderating democracy for Lefort, only the 
logic of threat and self-preservation.  And even if the outcome is in a sense pre-
determined, the apparent stakes could not be higher in the existential struggle between 
democratic freedom and totalitarian anti-freedom - the great enemy or other of 
democracy.  With such a dichotomous worldview, the internal indeterminacy and 
uncertainty of our democratic way of life stands sharply juxtaposed to the unconditional 
good of our democratic way of life.  What would it mean to question democratic values 
and beliefs in this context?  What are the alternatives?  Moreover (and again we can make 
the comparison to Tocqueville’s analysis of the modern usefulness of aristocratic norms 
and forms), the logic of Lefort’s dichotomy dictates that all that is socially and politically 
good simply must fall within the infinitely complex form of democracy.  There is no 
good that is not at the same time democratic, nothing democratic that is not at the same 
time good.  Democracy, principled upon freedom-as-openness, seems unquestionably 
true and unquestionably good.   
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And third, even while we cannot deny the uncertainty inherent in our democratic 
situation (any more than we could competition in a market situation), the capacity to cope 
with uncertainty (as with the capacity to cope with competition) constitutes an ethical 
measure of self and society, below which we sink in our totalitarian longings.  Lefort 
depicts totalitarianism as a sort of childishness, a wishful surrender to the illusion of a 
security and certainty.  Against this picture, the ability to live life in history - unblinking 
in the face of uncertainty, tolerating a world of questions with no answers - constitutes a 
norm of democratic maturity.  Rather than obstinately standing arms-crossed and eyes-
shut against the true complexity and unpredictability of life after the revolution, we are 
challenged to bear up under the anxiety, vertigo, and frustration of our existential 
insecurity – our self-reliant but not self-sufficient existence.  Without father-figure or 
fatherland, democracy demands of us the psychological and emotional strength and 
flexibility to take responsibility for, rather than repress, the ordeal of freedom.  We are 
measured and judged today by our capacity to affirm the freedom we in any case cannot 
deny.             
 
Conclusion: A Democratic Religious Articulation, between Capitalism and 
Christianity  
I suggested above that ours is rendered more fully intelligible as a “democratic 
society” rather than as a “market society.”  Lefort affirms this interpretation: to reduce 
the social world to economic concepts and categories is to succumb to an “illusory 
realism.”  Our social form is not staged as a market; meaning is not assigned in terms of 
economic value.  The corporation is not at all like the Church before it; CEO’s are not at 
all our high priests.  Such an interpretation confuses power in the symbolic register of 
“the political” with the empirical exercise of power.  On Lefort’s account, we are prone 
to succumb precisely to this confusion in democratic society.  The collapse into 
 205 
materialism is the original fear of democratic society (thus the totalitarian temptation).  
At the same time, the democratic revolution marks the collapse of the Christian mode of 
mediating the universal and the particular.  We do not live in a capitalist society, but nor 
do we live in a Christian society.  Our lives are not without meaning, but nor is the 
meaning of our lives settled and assured.     
In our “historical society,” the normative dimension of universality persists but 
takes on a purely critical function: the rule of the people as the rule of no body; freedom 
as the denaturing operation of negativity; the declaration of rights as the expression of 
revolution.  The democratic way of life is given form and animated by its original vital 
principle of revolution.  It is in the unsettling act of question - in the revolutionary 
movement away from home - that we put the democratic principle into practice.    
In this symbolic milieu, freedom takes shape over against domestication: in 
Lefort’s terms, we are free because no present power has the authority to name us.  
Equality takes shape not as dull uniformity but as formlessness, as the absence of 
hierarchical regimentation, and so as co-extensive with freedom.  Openness describes the 
conjoined equality and freedom of life without a father-figure - a radicalization of the 
anti-paternalism of laissez-faire competition and social contract liberalism.  And life is 
lived from moment to moment, in the unpredictable, suspenseful, exciting free-flow of 
history.  A life well lived is a life fully lived.  Surely we recognize ourselves - often with 
regret - as consumers, pleasure-seekers, self-interested choosers, and the like.  But insofar 
as we are to speak of “existential badges of identity,” I suggest that we would more fully 
recognize ourselves in historical rather than economic terms.  We identify ourselves by 
our experience of events - birth and death, epochal innovations, the coming of what’s 
next, being present at the creation or the collapse, on the day everything changed.180  We 
are not what we consume, but rather the sum of our experiences.  Life’s drama is 
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meaningful to us insofar is it is dramatic.  Thus, for instance, trans-formative rupture 
effaces continuity in the identity of the American polity, which is defined by the 
conversion narrative of being born again out of the laissez-faire second republic.  In its 
very absurdity, the following illuminates what captures the imagination along these lines 
in democratic society: “The iPod arrived in October 2001, … to a world in transformation 
from its comforting analog roots to a disruptive digital future;” today we must 
contemplate “the ways that the iPod changed the world” into “Planet iPod.”181       
Extending this speculative sketch of what it would mean to live in a democratic 
society: far from inaugurating a “bourgeois” celebration of the here and now, the 
democratic revolution degrades the status of the present, material, embodied world.  The 
death of the Christ-figure signifies not the dissolution of meaning, but its displacement to 
whatsoever is taken to be wholly immaterial and transcendent - the purely spiritual.182  
Pierre Manent captures this perfectly in his interpretation of Lefort: “To understand the 
specificity of the present situation, one ought to reconstitute its genesis, so that we 
understand that our democracy seeks to institute a political and thus human order that is 
free of all ‘incorporation,’ as Claude Lefort says, a political and human order that is 
purely ‘spiritual,’ This idea conflicts with appearances: doesn’t our society give a large 
place to the body and hardly any place to the soul?  In reality, our society is the one in 
Western history that most systematically reduces the role of the body.”183   
The dissolution of Christian embodiment leads, then, not to something like 
Heidegger’s flat and empty existence, characterized by the cold ascendancy of the will, 
and a debased self and society subject to economic calculation and scientific prediction.  
Democratic existence is not reduced to calculation but opened to uncertainty; rendered 
not predictable but questionable.  With our opening onto history, we experience the world 
as neither occult nor transparent, but as opaque.184  The previously mystical religious 
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dimensionality of society is not lost to mechanical materialism, but nor does it remain 
enclosed in the organic symbol of the body.  Instead it is rendered mysterious, displaced 
to the register of the phenomenal - of restless revolutionary/creative becoming.  The 
religious dimension of democratic society is the depth of history.  “History” - between 
“economic shallowness” and “religious foundationalism” - is characterized by neither an 
adrift weightlessness wherein all that is solid melts into air, nor by a secure groundedness 
or sense of place, but by their amalgam in an oceanic sense of depth and fluidity - the 
openness of the fecund ocean rather than the barren desert, the wilderness rather than the 
wasteland.  
 
The consequence of our post-revolutionary historical situation, I have argued, is 
the reflexive devaluation of conventional norms and forms.  In times past, human 
convention was represented as an establishment - if an imperfect, partial, diminished one 
- of a higher nature or Nature.  Where legitimate, the world of human artifice instituted 
the natural world, positive law instituted natural law, the terrestrial kingdom instituted the 
divine kingdom, and so forth.  Temporal authority was both derived from and limited by 
one or another notion of transcendent authority.  With the revolutionary rupture the 
hierarchical chain is broken: temporal authority is debased by the void of transcendent 
authority.  Meaning and authority settle exclusively with those vast abstractions that seem 
to escape embodiment in particular conventional or institutional form: humanity, rights, 
the biological/economic market, history, self-expression and human relations and 
unmediated modes of experience that cannot be captured in ordinary language.  If 
totalitarianism is the attempt to do without words, democracy is the search for something 
that cannot be put into words.   
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The authority of the divine, we might say, can no longer be made manifest in the 
world, but then that which cannot be made manifest gains a sort of divine authority.  
Take, for instance, the history of religious practices in America, with its ongoing cycle of 
more secular and liberal “mainline” religions - as they “compromise their ‘errand in the 
wilderness’” - being replaced by “less worldly,” more radical and demanding “outsider” 
or “upstart sects.”185  The purity of the spirituality that seizes the democratic imagination 
is experienced as devitalized (rather than realized, if only partially) by being housed in 
institutional form.  The rejection of “mainstream institutions” itself becomes mainstream 
as democracy’s original rupture is perennially reenacted.  In this sense, I have suggested 
that democratic society takes shape in the self-radicalizing striving for a world before or 
beyond convention.         
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to show, through a critique of Lefort’s 
normative/descriptive bundle of associations (revolution/history/freedom, etc.) how 
democratic openness is “massively affirmed” as both true and good.  We necessarily, 
inescapably live in our post-revolutionary state of openness.  At the same time, we 
embrace this openness as constitutive of freedom.  Democracy comes to seem 
providentially inscribed not in the eternal order of nature but in the immortal movement 
of history.   
In the next chapter, I turn to Sheldon Wolin’s theory of “fugitive democracy.”  
Far from inevitable, Wolin characterizes the political practice democracy as all-but-lost to 
us, overwhelmed by political/economic power formations that border on totalitarian.  
Democracy can be said to exist today only sporadically, in those transgressive events 
wherein the demos momentarily rouses itself to resist its oppression and domestication.  
Even as Wolin regrets this momentary quality, though, he also derives an idealized notion 
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of democracy from it.  Democracy is limited to the moment, but within the moment 
democracy is realized in pure form, as an almost unlimited revolutionary eruption.  I 
argue that this association of robust democracy with the phenomenon of revolution, the 
roots of which we have analyzed in this chapter, is itself a leading cause of the near-
demise of the political practice of democracy.  The idealization of the revolutionary 
moment goes hand in hand with the devaluation of the everyday political practice of 
democracy.  Or to put it in Lefort’s terms, the sphere of democratic “politics” is a priori 
devalued within “the political” form of modern democracy.  In our state of openness, 
democracy comes to seem at once inevitable, impossible, and impotent.       
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Revolution, Constitution, and the Democratic Moment: Sheldon Wolin 
on the Limits and Limitlessness of Democracy 
Democratic peoples often hate the repositories of central power, but they always 
love the power itself         
      - Tocqueville  
PART I: THE ECONOMIC POLITY 
The Separation of Democracy and Politics 
Tocqueville famously warned of “the danger that religion courts when it joins 
forces with power.”1  “As long as a religion rests solely on sentiments that console man in 
his misery, it can win the affection of the human race.  But when it embraces the bitter 
passions of this world,” or when its “joins forces with political powers of any kind,” 
religion itself descends into particularity and bitterness.2  The unequal exchange is one of 
transcendent moral authority for temporal political power.  In this sense, Tocqueville 
offers the paradox that “diminishing religion’s apparent strength could actually make it 
more powerful.”3  The separation of church and state is above all to the benefit of church 
(one wonders how well state comes out in the bargain).   
American religion enjoys the enduring advantages of this separation.  Realizing 
that religion “cannot share the material might of those who govern without incurring 
some of the hatred they inspire,” that it cannot command “respect … in the midst of 
partisan conflict,” Americans “created a place apart for religion.”4  The influence of 
religion is “limited to a particular sphere, but there it is pervasive and dominates 
effortlessly.”5  The clergy in America are free to “blast ambition and bad faith in men of 
all political stripes” by “zealously” marking their distance from petty partisanship.6        
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In what follows, I argue that we have come to think of democracy’s place in the 
world in precisely analogous terms.  We have created a place apart for democracy, from 
the standpoint of which we can blast ambition and bad faith in men of all political stripes.  
Democracy’s hegemonic, unlimited, unquestioned moral authority is contingent upon it 
washing its hands of material power, as it were.  Democracy consoles us in our misery 
and wins the affections of the human race by remaining above the fray of bitter passions 
and partisan conflict and the hatred of those who govern.  Democracy’s diminishing 
strength has actually made it more powerful.           
 
To think through this separation of democracy and politics I turn to its most 
explicit and forthright formulation in the democratic theory of Sheldon Wolin.  We have 
seen how the master term of modernity is equality for Tocqueville, and uncertainty for 
Lefort.  For Wolin, it is economy.  Modern times are characterized not by the leveling of 
authority, nor by the questioning of authority, but by the compulsive organization of 
existence for the increasingly efficient generation and projection of power.  At its core 
Hobbesian, modern life truly is ordered and animated by “a perpetuall and restless desire 
of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death.”7   In this context, authentic 
democracy is all but impossible.  As we shall see, given the inefficient and disorganized 
character of the people’s power, democracy simply cannot compete with what Wolin 
terms the “Superpower” of economy.  In the “contemporary world democracy is not 
hegemonic but beleaguered and permanently in opposition to structures it cannot 
command;” it is “perennially outspent and overmatched.”8  We are consequently 
“entering a moment in our history when it will become extremely difficult to find the 
terms for limiting power or for holding it politically accountable, much less for sharing 
it.”9              
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For Wolin, democracy’s prognosis is bleak, its prospects few and fleeting.  Of 
course he recognizes the “near-universal acclaim accorded democracy,” and its current 
status as a “transhistorical and universal value.”  Far from demonstrating the “vitality” of 
democracy, though, this rhetoric effects the cover-up of democracy’s near-demise.  
Empty talk of democracy conceals “the degree to which democracy is attenuated so that it 
may serve other ends.”10  The language of democracy has been systematically co-opted 
and is managed by the economic/political powers-that-be so as to pacify the people.  Like 
a Freudian dream, the promise of democracy functions as a harmless vent for our 
forbidden democratic passions.  Formal facade without substance, moral mask and sales-
pitch image, “democracy” is today’s opiate of the masses, a virtual simulation, the 
distracting spectacle of shadows on the wall.  Perversely, then, the “fact that democracy 
continues to be invoked in American political rhetoric and the popular media may be a 
tribute, not to its vibrancy, but to its utility in supporting a myth that legitimates the very 
formations of power which have enfeebled it.”11  The myth of democracy is used to 
domesticate the demos.          
    Wolin describes three notions of democracy that take shape in these economic 
times, which we analyze in the following three parts.  The first is liberal democracy.  
Meant to service the needs of power, this political system functions according to logic of 
efficiency and expansion.  It is a politics rendered as economical as possible by the near-
total exclusion of the people from any sort of meaningful participation in their 
administration.  As we shall see, in the American context it is the  “constitutionalized 
democracy” of the proponents of the Constitution, above all Hamilton.  Throughout the 
1980’s, Wolin offered what he called “archaic” democracy as the primary oppositional 
mode of democracy.  This is a conservative, centrifugal, unorganized, and robustly 
participatory practice of democracy, which exists today only as a remnant of the past (not 
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unlike aristocracy for Tocqueville).  In the preservation of the plurality of local cultural 
and traditional accretions, this Anti-Federalist mode of politics functions largely as sand 
in the gears of systematizing power.  It is quite literally a place apart from liberal politics 
and the power of state.  By the early 1990’s, and culminating in his 2004 expanded 
edition of Politics and Vision, Wolin reformulated democracy as a “fugitive,” at once on 
the run from and radically disruptive to the economical workings of power.   
In its archaism, democracy holds out against the relentless creative destruction of 
economy; as a fugitive, democracy transgresses the laws and orders of economy.  Archaic 
democracy is reaction; fugitive democracy is revolution.  Archaic democracy is rooted in 
the common-place and prosaic; fugitive democracy is the epic poetry of struggle.  
Archaic democracy is willfully ordinary and uneventful; the revolutionary moment of 
fugitive democracy, when popular power finally bursts forth, is a truly extraordinary 
event.  Archaic democracy is a matter of the people’s escape from economy, fugitive 
democracy represents the people’s (inevitably short-lived) striving for mastery.        
I argue that fugitive democracy is Wolin’s attempt to theorize the conjunction of 
material political power and democracy’s moral authority without the degradation of the 
latter - without democracy’s incurring the hatred of those who govern or descending into 
particularity and partisan conflict.  The key is that the people’s solidarity, their coalescing 
as a collective actor - a demos - capable of exercising political power is intrinsically 
impermanent and without need of mediating conventions.  The people’s power is limited 
because it is fleeting.  But for that pristine moment between its coming into being and its 
passing, it is audacious, righteous, authentic, primal, vital - the exercise of material power 
without sinking into materialism or settling down into economic routines.  We might say 
that material power and moral authority come together, but on condition that it is only for 
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an instant.  Here, democracy has not so much a place apart as a moment apart from the 
fallen present.    
In the previous chapters we have seen how the democratic way of life is 
principled upon openness.  In this chapter I argue that Wolin’s democracy-as-fugitive, as 
pure revolutionary moment, is the putting into practice of this principle.  It is democracy 
as event rather than as institution.  Indeed, as the act of “rational disorganization,” as 
Wolin puts it (in Lefort’s “operation of negativity”), fugitive democracy takes shape as 
the subversion of institutional and conventional forms and norms, which cannot but 
operate according to the imperatives of economy.  It is the savage response to the 
domesticating drive of economy.              
Along these lines, Wolin’s theory of democracy harbors the same dialectic of 
idealization and devaluation we have seen before.  The “democracy” of the everyday, 
material world - participation in the liberal system of voting and elections, even Wolin’s 
earlier formulation of grass-roots action and association - comes to seem co-opted and 
inauthentic and routine, more organized process than spontaneous movement.  The 
democracy that transgresses the closures of the material world, the democracy that is 
itself re-opened and re-born with each new rupture, never settles down or compromises or 
grows corrupt.  The dialectic becomes one of political cynicism and a sort of democratic 
heroism.             
Modern Power and Postmodern Power 
Wolin writes that, far from Tocqueville’s democratic social state, we live today in 
an “economic polity.”12  We live not in the wake of the democratic revolution, but in the 
shadow of the industrial revolution.  “The economic rules all domains of existence,” and 
we (as pre-modern man before nature) are “hammered into resignation, into fearful 
acceptance of the economy as the basic reality of (our) existence, so huge, so sensitive, so 
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ramifying in its consequences that no group, party, or political actor dare alter its 
fundamental structure.”13  The irony, of course, is that so successful have been the 
techniques of economy in liberating us from fearful resignation to nature’s basic reality 
that we have come to experience the economy as a sort of second nature.  Economy thus 
stands today as an “autonomous entity independent of history, religious values, moral 
constraints, and political regulations … (and) determinative of all other social and 
political relationships.”14  Society is “absorbed” into economy, which operates as the 
“first principle of a comprehensive scheme of social hermeneutics” and “an interpretive 
category of virtually universal application.  It is used to understand personal life and 
public life, to make judgments about them, and to define the nature of their problems.  It 
supplies categories of analysis and decision by which public policies are formulated, and 
it is applied to cultural domains such as education, the arts, and scientific research.”15  We 
thus end up with the following: equality as competitive opportunity, freedom as rational 
choice in consumption, justice as distributive, civic virtue as shopping, action as 
behavior, judgment as price valuation, prosperity as profit, progress as technological 
innovation, law as a matter of supply and demand, nature as a market, education as a 
means to the end of competing in the global economy, governance as administration, 
politics reduced to “it’s the economy, stupid.”  
And in our economic polity the common currency - the “denominator common to 
all domains” - is power.16  Economy is the means by which we generate progressively 
greater amounts of power over the natural and the human world.  The acquisition and 
exercise of power has become definitional for us today, like the habituation into and 
practice of virtue for Aristotle.17  We understand and evaluate ourselves as by nature 
power seeking animals.        
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Wolin explains the rise of the economic polity in two distinct phases - modern and 
postmodern - with the second half of the twentieth century as the turning point.  He 
characterizes the modern phase in largely Weberian terms, as the rendering of the world 
as a stable and orderly mechanism for the production of power.  Modernization is simply 
the process of rationalizing, systematizing, routinizing, homogenizing, etc., of the life to 
ensure that the machine does not break down.  The engine of this rendering process is the 
unholy trinity of the centralized and bureaucratic state, the capitalistic business 
corporation, and Baconian science.  Each worked to impose the norm of law-abidingness 
on self, society, and reality.     
Insofar as politics is concerned, modernization is the centripetal process of 
accumulating power in the “commanding heights,” concentrating it in the monolithic 
institutional conglomeration of what Wolin terms the “megastate.”  The instruments of 
governance of the megastate - “military and police power…, courts, legislature, political 
parties, and those interest groups that adapt their activities to conform to the ‘rules of the 
game’” - collectively form the “state system.”  And this system (a term that “revealingly 
combines a technical bioengineering meaning with a technocratic/bureaucratic one”) 
strives “to become a totality in which the center is being transformed into a mechanism of 
management and control.”18       
The vehicle of this drive for totality is the capitalist business corporation, along 
with a bureaucratic political system conducted according to the performative imperatives 
of the corporation.  “Corporate power is driven by a dynamic (takeovers, mergers, 
buyouts) that aggressively promotes concentration of economic power - and of political 
power.  Corporate politics prefers the ‘political economy of scale’ represented in a 
centralized state because it enables corporate resources allocated to political purposes to 
be used to maximum effect.  Dealing with/controlling a single large state is more cost-
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effective than dealing with/controlling fifty smaller ones.”19  This perfect synthesis of 
politics and economy in the economic polity operates “most effectively under conditions 
of calculability … in which outcomes can be predicted.  When conditions are stable a 
government bureaucracy can govern by uniform regulations and can apply the same 
decision rules; similarly, stable conditions allow business corporations to plan operations 
more confidently…”  The ideal is “a uniform, mass society…, a mass market of 
consumers with roughly the same tastes.”20  
The modern idea of science lends the quality of objectivity and even 
transcendence to this system of power generation.  Science is “an ideal that has its own 
theological resonance: power as immaculately conceived because born of the purest, most 
disinterested, and objective form of knowledge ever invented by mankind.”  At its 
conception, “science was depicted mythically, not as a social institution but as the 
miraculous gift of … geniuses…”  As a “a social myth science came to represent 
expertise grounded upon ‘truth,’ the highest form of knowledge in an age that has mostly 
forgotten the meaning of “God’s omniscience’ but remembers its attributes: knowledge 
that in no way required validation by ordinary beings.”  Thus the “scientific process” is 
the “perfect incarnation” of a “conception of power that was to be generated 
independently of any social contract or democratic agreement.”21 
 Ultimately, the common feature of capitalism, science and state “is that by nature 
each functioned best under conditions of autonomy: the capitalist was most efficient 
when least regulated, the bureaucrat most expert when least trammeled by public opinion 
or self-serving legislators, and the scientist most productive when allowed the maximum 
freedom of research.”22  Modern power ceaselessly expands precisely because it is not 
arbitrary or capricious.  It is a tyranny not of the personal whims of an individual or 
group, but of stability, of an “impersonal order governed by rational laws.”  It is a “vision 
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of power with no inherent limits” because it is “absorbed into reason” and so is 
“objective,” “etherealized,” and “pure.”23  The power-mechanism runs smoothest when 
left to operate according to its own internal dynamic, unfettered by the slow-motion of 
popular power.    
 
The second phase of the rise of the economic polity is postmodernization.  
Modernization is a matter of giving law-abiding, mechanistic form to the world so as to 
facilitate the production of power.  While power’s raw material - the natural and the 
human world - is made to suffer perpetual change and dislocation, the operation of 
modern power requires a settled location.  It is autonomous and impersonal but still 
incorporated.  Encapsulated in the “Hobbesian vision” of the “behemoth” and the 
“leviathan,” its “embodiment was the administrative or bureaucratic state; its instrument 
was the government regulation.”24  And in it physical formations it can still be seen and 
resisted through cultural and political counter-formations.  
Postmodern power, by contrast, is fluid and unfettered by the heavy machinery of 
political forms.  Leaving behind its stable shell of the megastate, postmodern power is 
what Wolin terms the “formless form” of power.25  Postmodernization “signifies the 
concerted attempt to replace cumbersome bureaucracies with ‘lighter’ structures (with the 
capacity to) adapt quickly to changing conditions, whether those be in the marketplace, in 
party politics, or in military operations… Government bureaucracies are encouraged to 
become ‘leaner,’ to delegate more authority to sub-units, to ‘privatize’ their services and 
functions, and to govern as much as possible by executive orders rather than by the time-
honored but time-consuming and unpredictable legislative process.”  Where “modern 
power was heavy, settled in location, and hence tending to identify with national power 
and its fixed boundaries, postmodern power is agile, restless, contemptuous of national 
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boundaries.”26  It is fully “abstract” and “nonphysical,” - disembodied in a way that 
accords “with a ‘virtual’ way of being in the world.”27  Like Tocqueville’s mild 
despotism, postmodern power’s reach is radically extended by virtue of its 
disincorporation. 
We might think of modern power as the mechanized infantry and heavy armored 
division of the Second World War - immense, but even in blitzkrieg mode slow by 
today’s technologically empowered aspiration to light, quick-strike, covert operations 
conducted largely without “boots on the ground.”  With postmodernity, power is about 
speed and stealth and precision rather than size and brute force - from the “B-52 
Stratofortress Bomber” to the “B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber;” from a “Star-Wars” to a “The 
Matrix” image of power.28  
Superpower and Inverted Totalitarianism 
The culmination of postmodern power is what Wolin terms “Superpower.”  This 
is “the postmodern contribution to the Aristotelian taxonomy of possible constitutional 
forms,” defined by its own “distinctive virtue.”29  This virtue is its “dynamic … ceaseless 
reaching out … extending the limits of the possible.”  With the “distinctive capability for 
generating power virtually at will,”  Superpower is “an expansive system of powers that 
accepts no limits other than those it chooses to impose on itself;” it “strains at limits as it 
projects power around the world.”30  The excellence of the regime, we might say, is its 
immoderation - its hubristic ambition.31  Where modern power imposes its routines and 
laws upon the world, postmodern Superpower is utterly lawless.  It is, in a word, the 
regime of limitlessness.    
We see Superpower’s overcoming of all constraints, forms, and limits in its 
universal projection of power, and also in the micro-reach of its power through the 
perversion of the notion of privatization.  Drawing on the market’s and scientific process’ 
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indifference to human and natural borders, Superpower has “gone global,” as they say.  
At the same time power is “down-sized” to become more efficient.  It is privatized, but 
only so as to be hidden and made more fully pervasive: “privatization is not the 
elimination of power but the elimination of … public discussion and argument over how 
power is to be used, for what ends, and who is responsible.”32  Power is “simultaneously 
concentrated and disaggregated,” “decentered without being decentralized…, transferring 
formal accountability from traditional political processes, such as legislative oversight 
and elections, to the allegedly impersonal forces of the market.” 33  Superpower is able to 
“retain its centered power” in the sate, but also “to extend its reach by delegating and 
slimming down, thereby increasing effectiveness while acquiring greater flexibility.”34  In 
postmodernity, power seems both everywhere and nowhere at once.    
In its nascent mode of modern power, Superpower strove to render the world a 
stable, standardized, predictable system.  “Social phenomena are renamed ‘inputs’ or 
treated as ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’…What cannot be accommodated or co-opted doesn’t 
‘count’ and can be ignored.”  All the multifaceted differences of lived experience are 
either absorbed or eliminated “in the yearning for totality of which systems-talk is the 
ideological expression.  System thinking extinguishes difference … by a combination of 
translation and abandonment…”35  The “rationalizing mentality” in turn imposes 
“uniform rules” according to the demands of its “efficiency calculus.”36  In its mature 
mode of postmodern power, Superpower renders the world less predictable system than 
frictionless vacuum.  The “emptying” of the world “becomes one of power’s 
preconditions.”37  The process is one of abstracting from all-things-particular - from 
particular place to general space; from historical context to contextless time.  
“Abstractness”  Wolin writes, is above all “a quality characteristic of languages of 
power,” defining as descriptively and normatively inessential all aspects of reality that 
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obstruct the free-flow of power.38  It is within this smoothed-out and streamlined, empty 
and abstract world that we find it difficult to find the terms for limiting power.  
 
The human consequences of this striving for limitlessness are profound: 
“dislocation and deculturation;” “the destruction of established practices, institutions, 
ways of life, and values.”39  We are left in effect homeless and amnesiac, stripped of 
place and memory, and exposed before power.  Autonomous and “self-revivifying,” with 
its “unprecedented magnitudes” and its “peculiarly abstract quality,” Superpower is “at 
bottom, anti-human.”40 
Wolin calls our attention here to what he considers a transformation of our way of 
life no less profound and sweeping than the one Tocqueville perceived.  Where 
democracy tore down aristocratic hierarchy, Superpower negates democratic freedom, 
public power, and pluralism.  To grasp democracy’s plight, why democracy today is 
rendered either archaic or fugitive, we must comprehend the monolithic yet pervasive 
power of this new regime of Superpower.  We must recognize its no less than 
“ontological ambitions” - the profound transformation of the real it seeks to induce.  And 
we must recognize the resulting existential implications of this transformation, which are 
“as thoroughgoing as any experience of religious conversion.”41     
This hegemony of economy, Wolin concludes, constitutes no less than a new type 
of totalitarianism, one Wolin describes as “inverted.”  Its techniques of control are cast in 
terms of discipline, disorientation, and seduction rather than in the more overtly 
oppressive, coercive terms of force and domination.  “The new form is represented not as 
‘the state’ … but as ‘the system;’” in turn control becomes a matter of assimilation and 
integration - a matter of leaving nothing outside 42  Blurring the “domination of the state” 
by contracting its functions to the “private” sector, it is totalitarianism as administrative 
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micromanagement, made possible by the fully synthesized and symbiotic 
political/economic system43  
 Fueled “by the ever-expanding power made available by the integration of 
science and technology into the economy of capitalism,” this new totalitarian regime is,” 
Wolin writes, “Nazism turned upside down”  “While it is a system that aspires to totality, 
it is driven by an ideology of the cost-effective rather than of a ‘master race’ …, by the 
material rather than the ‘ideal.’  It may, and will, exploit its workers without duplicating 
the Nazi system of inefficient slave labor.”44  This economic totalitarianism substitutes  
“profit and exploitation for war and ‘dynamic’ for ‘aggressive.’”45  It is a matter not of 
the “perpetual mobilization” of “crude fascism,” but of “perpetual demobilization” by 
means of “continuous mobility.”  We must understand it not in terms of the imposition of 
“rigid uniformities” but rather as “fashionism, conformity to incessant, inescapable 
change: in technologies, marketable skills, processes of production, and organized 
structures and strategies.”  The consequence is “a sense of weakness, a collective futility 
that culminates in the erosion of the democratic faith, … political apathy and the 
privatization of the self.”46   
PART II: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
The Expansion of Democracy 
Liberal democracy, Wolin writes, “is almost universally held to be the best form 
of government for the contemporary world.  Its basic elements are formal provisions for 
equal civil liberties of all citizens; freely contested and periodic elections; mass political 
parties competing for the support of voters; elected officials who are accountable and 
removable by the electorate; a politics largely financed by powerful economic interests; 
and a constitution that specifies the authority and the powers of the main governmental 
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organs and stipulates the rules controlling politics and policy-making.  To this list should 
be added the ‘free market.’”47  In symbiotic relationship with the market’s dynamic of 
competition and its mass demographic organization of rationally self-interested 
individuals, liberal democracy “is widely considered … indispensable … to a market 
economy” (which is almost universally held to be the best form of economy for the 
contemporary world).48  
We would thus be mistaken, Wolin argues, to take the universal appeal of 
democracy in liberal form as proof of the validity of the democratic hypothesis against all 
alternatives.  What is “actually being measured by the claim of democratic legitimacy is 
not the vitality of democracy … but the degree to which democracy is attenuated so as to 
serve other ends.”49  The unquestioned universality of liberal democracy follows from its 
own abstractness and formalism - its talk of human rights and the individual; its 
routinizing procedural mechanisms - and so from its service to economy.  The end-of-
history hegemony of liberal democracy is largely a result of its assimilation into, and 
service to, the global hegemony of market capitalism.  The unlimited legitimacy of liberal 
democracy is a function of the unlimited efficiency of capitalism.  Liberal democracy has 
ridden capitalism’s coat-tails to the top.   
When power was personified by kings and priests the liberal attempt to render 
power impersonal in the rule of law made sense as an oppositional movement.  But when 
power is disembodied, when absolutism is less a matter of arbitrary power than of 
abstract and systematic power, the liberal form of democracy only reinforces the 
economy of power, against authentically democratic notions of shared power and 
engaged citizenship.  Today, Wolin suggests, when we should fear the tyranny of the 
majority less and the totality of the system along with the apathy of the citizenry more, 
liberal democracy becomes part of the problem.  
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Some of the staunchest advocates of liberal democracy subscribe wholeheartedly 
to Wolin’s analysis.  Stephen Homes, for instance writes: “It now seems obvious that 
liberalism can occasionally eclipse authoritarianism as a technique for accumulating 
political power. … Liberalism is not allergic to political power. … (It) is one of the most 
effective philosophies of state building ever contrived.”50    
Constitutionalized Democracy  
Wolin argues that to understand how democracy is made useful to economy we 
must first recognize the “paradox at the center of the American Constitution and perhaps 
of modern constitutionalism generally;” constitutionalism emphasizes the restraint and 
division of power, but at the same time “makes possible the generation of power on a 
regular and assured basis.”51  Constitutional “constraints can be enabling,” as Holmes 
puts it.52  Power is harnessed, both contained by and contained in the constitutional 
mechanism.  Constitutionalism limits, authorizes, and organizes the generation of power.  
The question becomes: What types of power is restrained and what type made possible 
and authorized?  
The constitutionalized form of democratic power is expansive in time and space, 
made to govern both perpetually and nationally.  It is a democracy fitted to the modern 
nation state (with its scattered, diverse, and otherwise-occupied populace) through the 
organizing devices of representation, elections, parties, interest groups, and so forth.  For 
Wolin, however, this constitutionalization of democracy - rendering democracy abstract 
and systematic and normal - turns democracy against itself.  The “demos” is prohibited 
from ruling as a condition of a system structured so that “the people” reign. 
Constitutionalism is a matter of “enclosing the dynamics of politics within a determinate 
structure and designated political space…, conceptualizing various institutions…, 
normalizing their operation…, and projecting them over time.  The purpose … (is) the 
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establishment of stability through the containment of the demos… (Democracy is) 
domesticated, rendered stable, orderly, and just.”53  Democracy is “enabled” or 
“organized” by being disciplined.   
Institutionalization thus “marks the attenuation of democracy: leaders begin to 
appear; hierarchies develop…; order, procedure, and precedent displace a more 
spontaneous politics: in retrospect the latter appears as disorganized, inefficient.”54  
Fitting the free-flow of democracy to the ossified routines of conventional politics “has 
the effect of reducing democracy to a system while taming its politics by process…  
When democracy is settled into a stable form, such as a written constitution, it is also 
settled down and rendered predictable.  Then it becomes the stuff of manipulation: of 
periodic elections that are managed and controlled, of public opinion that is shaped, 
cajoled, misled, and then polled…”55  Such a tamed and inhibited political system is 
designed for “administration rather than democracy.”56 Thus, Wolin concludes, a 
“political constitution is not the fulfillment of democracy but its transfiguration into a 
‘regime’ and hence a stultified and partial reification;” democracy is “a phenomenon that 
can be housed, but may not be realized, within a form.”57 
We should think of this domestication of democracy by form not so much as 
adapting democracy to the modern “problem of scale” but rather to the requirements of 
economy: “requirements of organization … or its equivalents ‘bureaucracy,’ 
‘administration,’ or ‘management’ … specifying a set of integrated conditions for the 
production of power.  Among these are a hierarchical system of authority; centralization 
of decision-making; division of labor and specialization, especially in the form of 
professional politicians; and increasing reliance on expert knowledge”58  Democracy is 
“smoothed” to permit the “effective organization of the power to govern.”59  Such a 
democracy is “thin” and “procedural,” bound by rules and regulations, and reduced to 
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“the formalistic and abstract politics centering upon the national government.”  This is a 
politics of “image” rather than “substance” and “immediate… experience.”60  And this 
“emptiness allows (democracy) to be used for almost any political purpose, including 
purposes that are diametrically opposed” to those of authentic democracy.61  Liberal 
democracy is not democracy made practical but democracy compromised.     
Wolin concludes that to distinguish between authentic democracy and the liberal 
democratic form of government, we should distinguish between “politics” and “the 
political.”  Similar to Lefort, Wolin writes that politics “refers to the legitimized and 
public contestation, primarily by organized and unequal social powers, over access to the 
resources available to the public authorities of the collectivity.”62  Politics is economics 
by other means.  The political, on the other hand, (and this is quite different than Lefort’s 
use of the term), is “an expression of the idea that a free society composed of diversities 
can nonetheless enjoy moments of commonality when, through public deliberation, 
collective power is used to promote or protect the well-being of the collectivity.”63  The 
political is cast in the language of congregation.  “To be political,” then, “is not identical 
with being a part of government or being associated with a political party.  These are 
structured roles, and typically they are highly bureaucratized.  For these reasons, they are 
opposed to the authentically political.”64     
 Wolin does not shy away from the radical implications of this separation of 
democracy and state.  On a conceptual level, no form of government can be considered 
democratic.  “Democracy needs to be reconceived as something other than a form of 
government… Democracy in the late modern world cannot be a complete political 
system.”65  Further, even “from antiquity … political theorists … have made a category 
mistake by treating democracy as a possible constitutional form for an entire society.”66  
Government and state “prefer order and stability to experiment and spontaneity” and so 
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“the idea of a democratic state is a contradiction in terms.”67  Democracy is no longer 
democratic when it becomes affiliated with the types of power that a governing state 
requires, just as religion is no longer properly sacred and spiritual when it becomes 
involved in the material power of the temporal world, whether of state or church. 
Liberal Theory: Rights, Law, Order  
The domestication of democracy by constitutional form is, for Wolin, the evident 
aspiration of liberal theories of democracy.  Prioritizing liberal legality over democratic 
vitality, liberal theory works to depoliticize democracy by rendering it abstract and 
systematic.        
Wolin argues that John Rawls, particularly in Political Liberalism, offers the 
paradigmatic attempt to circumscribe democracy.  Specifically, by “assigning a 
mechanism, ‘constructivism,’ precedence over politics,” he attempts to impose an 
apolitical/prepolitical settlement of the political, thereby confining democracy to an 
objective normative form.68  For the sake of legitimacy and stability, Rawls theorizes 
“agreement” as prior to contestation; a sort of abstract consensus becomes the 
foundational prerequisite of democracy.  With Rawls, “the meaning and scope of politics 
is to be ‘settled’ beforehand, that is before conflict and controversy among social groups 
and the alignment of classes is recognized.  (Politics is settled) into constitutional 
arrangements of representative government, periodic elections, a bill of rights, and 
judicial review … lest it unsettle broader social concerns.”  And this settlement is itself 
abstracted from the historical and cultural context of political existence and “made to 
appear to take place in a pure ‘political’ realm outside politics…”69  Democracy here is 
drained of all but its most abstract normative elements.   
Thus “democracy is not a distinctive presence in Liberalism … Its supreme 
political value is not dispersed power but individual liberty; its pivotal institution … is 
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the supreme court; and it locates the true expression of political identity not in the vitality 
of local institutions but in the constitution … .  Democracy is invoked only to be 
subaltern,” denying certain political “possibilities, realities, and … memories.”70  
Conceptualizing a democracy without the demos as a political actor, Rawls’ “politics of 
reason” is a “neutralizing” rather than a “neutral” principle, resulting in the notion of 
democracy as a ”hermetically sealed condition of deliberation that allows rationality to 
rule …”71  Against such an ideal of conflict-suppression-through-abstraction, Wolin 
argues that in an “age of vast concentrations of corporate and governmental power, the 
desperate problem of democracy is not to develop better ways of cooperation but to 
develop a fairer system of contestation …”72 
Along these lines, Rawls perpetuates the anti-political orientation of political 
theory that long predates liberal contract theory.  From Plato onward, this depoliticization 
has taken the form of “‘the constitutionalizing of surplus democracy’” - of 
“depersonalization, legalism,” and “objective normativity.” 73  As with Rawls’ notion of 
justice/stability, “theorists of constitutionalism qualified the question of who should rule 
and how they should rule by inventing the question of what should rule … The essence of 
the contrast, which became, as well, the essence of constitutionalism, was between 
depersonalized principles and partisan politics” - between passion and reason, the people 
and the law.  The “objective status of (such) principles (are) contrasted with the flux, 
uncertainty, and subjectivism attributed to politics.”  Thus theory speaks the language of 
constitutionalism, easily accommodating the “mechanisms that … force the politics of 
democracy to be law abiding or, more precisely, to express itself structurally.”74  
Democracy becomes no more than a list of administrative procedures, rules, and 
regulations constructed to re-present a law-abiding people, packaged as the 
constitutionally mediated idea of “the voice of the people.” 
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This depoliticization of democracy, Wolin argues, takes shape today primarily in 
the reduction of democratic equality to the abstraction of equal rights - in the “liberal 
formula” of “Equal Rights + Freedom = Democracy.”75  Authentic equality is lost in the 
“idealizing blur” of the “ready-to-wear categories of equal rights for everyone.”76  Rawls 
is again exemplary.  “The fundamental primacy accorded individual rights justifies 
unequal persons and powers, but because every citizen can claim them formally, the 
norm of equal rights gains priority over the fact of inequality.  Thus liberal inequality is 
democratized and democratic equality is liberalized.”  Just how equal rights justify 
inequality “is illustrated when Rawls, apparently without sensing its antidemocratic 
character, insists on equal opportunity for all to positions of political and social power, 
that is, to positions in hierarchical organizations where they can exert unequal power and 
influence while receiving disproportionate compensation and protection …”77  
 Moreover, Wolin writes, engaged citizenship in diminished to “a matter of being 
able to claim rights” which derive from some “higher” realm outside of and above 
politics and in relation to which politics is understood as a threat.78  We have come to 
assume that “the extension of rights (is) an advance toward the realization of democracy.  
In actuality, the ideal of rights is “usurping the place of civic activity … (within a) liberal 
civic culture (that) never supplied any content … (or) guidance to the exercise of 
rights.”79  
As traditionally conceived, then, liberal constitutional theory is naturally 
amenable to the dictates of economy: to the primacy of law and so to the domestication of 
democracy by form; to the reductive elimination of difference through abstraction; to the 
paving-over of historical experience and cultural existence in the quest for objective 
reason and systematic order; to the reduction of equality to equal rights.  Wolin 
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characterizes his own project as the attempt “to theorize democracy without resorting to 
anti-democratic or undemocratic impositions.”80 
The Imperial Citizen  
With its domestication by liberal constitutionalism, Wolin writes, our democracy 
has become “a democracy without the demos as actor.”81  At a basic level, this is because 
we have “virtually ceased to think of ourselves as political people.”82  The citizenry no 
longer recognizes itself in political terms; it is not conscious of itself collectively, as a 
public, but instead sees the political role of the individual limited to that of  “a voter, job-
holder, taxpayer, and rule observer.”  We have come to accept “a collective identity in 
which the collectivity - ’We the People,’ in the brave words of the Constitution - becomes 
the passive object of power rather than the active political subject.” 83  Liberal political 
association is made to mirror capitalist economic association.  The result is “the 
anomalous presence of the powerless many in a democracy;” a “ventriloquous 
democracy,” conceived in terms “that allowed the American political animal to evolve 
into the domesticated creature of media politics,” easily manipulated by “communication 
conglomerates, media pundits, television, public opinion surveys, and political 
consultants.”84  Over the past fifty years we have witnessed  “the demise of the political 
citizen and the emergence of the American voter,” characterized by a “passive and 
deferential” civic disposition, and the self-conception of “playing a ‘role’ in a ‘system - a 
supportive role requiring only (an occasional) vote, so that those who rule (can) thereby 
claim ‘authority’ for their actions and exactions.’”85     
The product of this process of domestication is what Wolin terms the “imperial 
citizen,” characterized above all by the willingness to trade the democratic exercise of 
power, with its inherently small scale and limited potential, for “participation” in and 
identification with much more spectacular and effective power-systems.  The imperial 
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citizenry embraces shock and awe, even their own.  They accept being “shrunk” to voters 
and “dwarfed” by the “spatial dimensions” and “power concentrations” of empire.86  The 
citizenry demands “strong leadership” - with the powers and responsibilities of the 
presidency expanding, and those of the citizenry shrinking.  They abandon themselves to 
being “periodically courted, warned, and confused but otherwise kept at a distance from 
actual decision-making.”  They happily trade a democratic mode of being for an 
economic mode of being, accepting “purchasing power and ‘consumer sovereignty’” in 
return for “the surrender of their political power, and … the practice of the arts of the 
citizen.”87  At the same time, even as they welcome being “relieved of participatory 
obligations,” they are to be “fervently patriotic.”  The ideal imperial citizen is “apolitical 
but not alienated,” participating “not in power but in the rituals and festivals of power.” 88  
His sole function is to periodically grant legitimacy, or at least to accept that legitimacy 
has been granted.        
Today, Wolin writes, we are in desperate need of a “genuine alternative.”  We 
need to develop “a politics that cannot be co-opted, which is precisely what has happened 
to the original democratic dream of basing democracy upon voting, elections, and popular 
political parties… Democracy needs a non-cooptable politics, that is, a politics that 
renders useless the forms of power developed by the modern state and business 
corporations.”89   
 
 What, then, is to be done?  Confronted by the post-modern Leviathan of 
Superpower, what is to be done?  Superpower’s totalitarian economy of power is anti-
democratic, even antihuman, yet we the imperial citizenry embrace the world it has 
wrought as second nature.  Liberal democracy - democracy at once expanded and 
domesticated by constitutional form - is no solution.  It is just the economy of power 
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imposed upon politics, the rhetoric of democracy co-opted and made to serve its own 
subversion.  It is the abstract and systematized politics - the streamlined simulation of 
democracy - proper to the economic polity.    
In this context, Wolin argues that authentic democracy is rendered either 
“archaic” or “fugitive.”  It preservers either as vestigial remnant or as revolutionary 
moment.  As we shall see, Wolin himself comes to reject the former as any sort of 
effective solution to the problems of the day.  Such a limited, powerless practice of 
democracy might stand as a means of escape from domestication, but it cannot in any 
meaningful way oppose 21st century totalitarianism.  In turn, Wolin switches his emphasis 
to the idea of democracy as an event wherein the demos transgresses the laws and orders 
of economy.  This is a form-breaking democracy, undomesticated and wild, that if only 
for a moment generates the power to stand up to Superpower.  And in living fast it dies 
young, not lasting long enough to be corrupted and co-opted.       
I argue in what follows that fugitive democracy comes to take on the 
characteristics of its adversary.  In his efforts to theorize a power-wielding democracy, 
Wolin offers an imperial demos that is as eager as Superpower to transgress limits and 
laws.  He offers a revolutionary democracy that celebrates rupture from conventional 
norms and forms as much as postmodern power encourages rupture from cultural norms 
and forms.  He offers a notion of collective action motivated if not by economic 
efficiency, than by economic necessity - we come together as a demos largely to oppose 
our material oppression.  In either case, the mode of human association is depicted as 
spontaneous and unspoken, outside the need for mediating words and argument.  And 
conceptualizing the unity and energy of the demos as produced by external crisis, and as 
essentially in opposition to the enemy of Superpower, Wolin offers a sort of executive 
action or emergency power mode of democratic action and association.  
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Ultimately, with these characteristics fugitive democracy comes to seem less the 
best we can hope for in times of economy than the best type of democracy as such.  Back 
to ancient Athens, Wolin suggests, authentic democracy can only be fugitive democracy.  
Recalling Lefort, Wolin’s democracy is simply synonymous with revolution, whether 
great or small.     
PART III: ARCHAIC DEMOCRACY 
Domesticity versus Domestication  
We have seen how post/modern power strives to in effect simplify reality, 
eliminating through abstraction and systematization all those particularities that muck up 
the perpetual motion machine of power-generation.  Against this theoretical depopulation 
of existence, democratic archaism stands for the preservation of local cultures and 
histories - the conservation of the democratic many.   
To say democracy is archaic is a statement of fact for Wolin: authentic democracy 
has been “excluded, forgotten, passed by.”90  At the same time, Wolin conceptualizes this 
very obsolescence as a normative resource because it offers an oppositional pluralism to 
monolithic Superpower.  The archaic is significant precisely because it could not be 
assimilated and so was left behind (as we shall see, even the non-democratic archaic is 
therefore worth preserving).  Archaism introduces a countervailing cultural complexity to 
the reductive, uni-forming inclination of modern power.  It counters the economy of 
power with a sort of primitivism, and the globalizing reach of economy with what Wolin 
calls “democratic feudalism” and “democratic fundamentalism.”  It frustrates 
conglomeration through dissonance, like the difference of language that stymied power at 
Babel.  It constitutes, Wolin writes, “the domestication of power by an unplotted 
conspiracy of difference.”91  While Tocqueville’s archaic aristocracy was to “teach 
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democracy the importance of providing counter principles at the center of its system,” the 
“anomalous” and “anachronistic” element of democracy serve as a “counterprinciple to a 
new, postmodern regime.”92   
The key here is that archaic democracy’s radicalism thus lies in its conservatism.  
Archaism is continuity in the service of disorganization, remembrance as resistance.  
Wolin writes: “The central challenge at this moment is not about reconciliation but about 
dissonance, not about democracy’s supplying legitimacy to totality but about nurturing a 
discordant democracy - … discordant because, in being rooted in the ordinary, it affirms 
the value of limits.”93  In its very domesticity archaic democracy resists domestication.  
As archaism’s manifesto, Wolin offers: “the crucial challenge to radical democracy is to 
be as zealous in preventing things of great value to democracy from passing into oblivion 
as in bringing into the world new political forms of action, participation, and being 
together in the world.  Radicals need to cultivate a remembrance of things past, for in the 
capitalist civilization … of ‘creative destruction,’ memory is a subversive weapon… 
What is at stake simultaneously is the past and the future.  Radicals cannot leave the past 
to conservatives… (The) highest aim (is) renewal and radical change.”94  
Memory and Place  
Against power’s streamlining of existence, Wolin identifies Montesquieu as the 
leading defender of the particularities of the cultural places in which we live our lives.  
His “ideal might be (stated) as power moderated by the complexities of political culture 
or, more briefly, as acculturated power.”95 Wolin juxtaposes Montesquieu’s culturally 
oriented thought with Cartesian reason, which is “stripped of myth, superstition, and 
religious fable, … custom and tradition” and reduced to “scientific and mathematical 
modes of analysis.”96  Cartesian reason, striving for “total harmony,” constructs a 
“monological” reality “abstracted from social context” - one that “obeys” the “necessary 
 244 
truths” of universal law.  Based upon the “uncontested power of reason” law “appears 
‘irresistible’ and ‘self-evident’ because the self has nothing to resist with.  Selves, so to 
speak, have been severed from their ‘evidence,’ which has been left behind in the context 
from which they have been abstracted.”97  Stripped of situation, the self stands naked and 
powerless before the necessity of reason and law.   
Positing a “social whole” that has not been “assembled by theoretical reason but 
deposited by historical actions and inactions,” Montesquieu offers no such idealization of 
totality.98  Society here is not “the artifact of (a) single founder” or a “‘system’ of 
rationally arranged and interconnected institutions.” but a rooted “‘labyrinth’ 
(characterized by) tortuous …, undesigned, unpremeditated qualities… that time and 
custom have smoothed into a working arrangement.”  Its laws are a matter of accretion 
rather than of imposition and should be understood not “as “commands but as reciprocal 
relationships expressive of the natures of those to whom the laws apply.”  In this sense, 
Montesquieu theorizes the “multiplicity” and “complexity” inherent in the ad hoc 
“accommodations” of practices to places -  to “climate, geography, religion, morals, 
manners, and political understandings.”99  Against the empty space of Cartesianism, 
Montesquieu’s world is cluttered and textured by all those variations of local places.    
In addition to the conservation of a sense of place, Wolin speaks for the 
preservation memory.  The central antagonist here is not Descartes but Hobbes, and more 
generally the “art of forgetting” that enables the social contract.100  For Hobbes, the 
central demand of the move from nature to civil society -  formulated as “compleasance” 
in his fifth law of nature - is that “every man strive to accommodate himself to the 
rest.”101  Accommodation requires the mutual absolution of past wrongs and resentments.  
Peace is a matter of forgetting, not allowing oneself to be buried by the past.  The 
prospect of socialization hinges on leaving behind historical baggage, wiping the slate 
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clean and starting over again. “In the act of reconstituting the self into a civic self, 
forgetting becomes a rite of passage and as such a condition of membership.”102  Hobbes’ 
covenant is thus “a device to incorporate social amnesia into the foundation of society.”  
The result is a society of “blank individuals who fake their nature by denying historically 
acquired and multiple identities”103  Any perceived threat of faction or conflict or 
unruliness is to trigger the reversion to the peace-producing moment of contract when 
everyone put aside their differences for the sake of becoming one.     
  And the abstraction from identity and difference by which society is conceived 
enables the absolute sovereignty by which society is enforced.  “A lack of traditions and 
customary institutions allows the will to extend itself almost without limit,” and so it is 
“made to order for despotism or for centralized bureaucracy.”  Confronted only by a 
“vista of unimpeded action,” power can be truly unlimited.104   
Wolin goes on to argue that the creative destruction of the economy of power is 
“on the way to accomplishing the social amnesia that the seventeenth-century 
contractualists had only glimpsed.”105  The acceleration of time and frequency of flux so 
characteristic of the post/modern celebration of innovation (whether scientific or 
economic) has left us amnesiac and homeless, disoriented and defenseless before the 
relentless workings of power.  In turn, the conservation of memories and places stands 
not for “an atavistic urge to return to a simpler age,” but for “the creation of conditions 
which encourage complexities that live by different laws and defy Cartesian solutions” 
and Hobbesian accommodations.106           
 
For Wolin, the founding debate of the current American regime was precisely 
between a politics of the ordinary and the local, and an abstract and distant politics seated 
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in a single national government.  The choice was between “a constitution of government 
on one hand and a political culture on the other.”107  
The Revolution of 1776, Wolin writes, was “a protest of the periphery against the 
center …, of local liberties and institutions against … remote and hence abstract imperial 
authority.”108  It was a “a revolution against centralized power, rule from a distance, and 
uniform principles” and so had a distinct “reactionary element” to it.109  The ratification 
of the Constitution signified the suppression of this pluralism - e pluribus unum.  
Pluralism was represented as “primal chaos.”  Unity was represented as elevated, on “a 
different political plane, abstract rather than immediate, intellective rather than 
sentimental, administrative or executive in its outlook rather than participatory or 
suffrage-oriented … .”110    
The counter-revolution of 1787 thus marked the beginning of a return to empire 
and “the uniformity that a certain kind of power prefers.”  It was a rebellion not against 
the “arbitrary power” of an “unjust and illegal” British Crown, but against the 
“inefficiency” and “weakness … associated with difference… exception, anomaly … 
(and) local peculiarities”111  The “politics of particularism” represented by the thirteen 
states was depicted as irrational, “inherited and regressive,” something that must be 
replaced by “rational foundations” and “rational administration.”112 And the discourse 
developed by The Federalist centered on the basic terms of political economy: “‘system,’ 
‘efficiency,’ ‘energy,’ ‘power,’ and ‘administration.’”113  Combining “Old Testament 
conceptions of monotheistic power” with “eighteenth-century conceptions of a rational 
science of politics,” Publius justified the constitutional counter-revolution against the 
Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation as “an exodus from a 
condition of political polytheism.”  It was an exodus from the “disunity, even 
dismemberment, weakness, and division … of a nonsystem without a center.”114  The 
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avowed goal was to found a commercial republic, with a concomitant political economy, 
conducive to the concentration/generation of power.     
Yet, in one crucial respect this rhetoric of constitution was misleading.  Given the 
existence of the diverse political cultures of the thirteen states, along with “state 
governments, various institutions of local government, jury systems, and a vast array of 
spontaneous ad hoc life forms,” the Federalist science and economy of power cannot be 
understood as the solution “to a political vacuum.”  Instead, it must be seen as “the 
superimposition of a new … national form of politics.”115  Constitutional ratification was 
as much an act of destruction as it was of creation, not bringing order out of anarchy but 
re-ordering (depopulating) what was already in existence.  The problem of a political 
vacuum had to be rhetorically sold before it could be solved.   
Ultimately, American constitutionalism effaced the very idea of difference.  The 
key document is Federalist 10.  Wanting to protect the diversity associated with 
inequality of faculties and acquisitions, yet “expressing the fear of being overwhelmed by 
difference,” Madison made the pivotal move of representing difference as faction.116  The 
American people were to forget or forsake their deep regional and religious differences in 
their economic factionalism, which despite its cacophonous quality is actually based upon 
the homogeneity of identities and interests.  Madison domesticates difference, rendering 
it in terms of negotiable interests that can be accommodated (compromised) so long as 
they are “compelled to appeal to a center of authority to mediate” disputes.117         
In significant ways, Wolin argues, we can consider ourselves the creatures rather 
than creators of the constitutional order.  We have been regimented to our constitutional 
form and our commercial republic.  In this context, Wolin writes, any counter-revolution 
to the constitutional counter-revolution - any return to the principles of the Declaration of 
Independence and the Articles of Confederation - will be dismissed as reactionary.  With 
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the present hegemony of economy - when, for instance, the centralization and extension 
of power is taken as definitional of progress - the archaism of the Anti-Federalists 
appears extreme and fanatical.  For Wolin, anti-federalism is the beating heart of 
radicalism today.  In a passage that would seem to characterize his own position 
perfectly, Wolin writes: “the contemporary inheritors of the antifederalist tradition have 
seen themselves as radicals fighting against the centralization of power and the 
overproduction of it.”118  Their conservative vision is “driven to radicalism because there 
is no way for (their) conception of life forms to be maintained without opposing a system 
of power in which change has become routinized.”119                
Democratic Feudalism and Democratic Fundamentalism 
 Tocqueville famously argued that in many respects democracy in France was 
never more robust than during feudalism, prior to the centralization and bureaucratization 
of power inaugurated under the old regime monarchy and accelerated by the French 
Revolution.  While not a period of equality, power was never more dispersed and limited, 
and so freedom was never more extensive, than during the rule of the feudal aristocracy.  
It was an era of pure particularism, and of the ingrained “landedness” of traditional and 
customary social orders.  Wolin theorizes feudalism along similarly democratic lines.  
Feudalism signifies a society in which “inheritance, with its implicit historicity, is the 
master notion.”120  It is a disposition of preservation rather than innovation - of “tending 
to” and “cultivating” one’s own cultural place, understood as “a complex of shared 
beliefs, values, habits, practices, and experiences that define the particularity of a place 
and envelop its politics.”  It thus “centers politics around … habits of competence or skill 
that are routinely required… in the intimate political experience … of everyday 
existence.”121  Because it was “a conception that depicted and explained political society 
as a concatenation of differences … it could be said to pit political culture against 
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political rationality, the centrifugal tendencies of the one against the centripetal impulses 
of the other.”122  
 Like authentic democracy, then, feudalism stands against abstraction and 
systematization and for the entirely uneconomical and efficient dispersal of power to the 
small-scale of first-hand localism.  Like authentic democracy, feudalism is cluttered with 
what Tocqueville calls “intermediate bodies” that serve as speed-bumps in the generation 
of power.123  Feudalism and authentic democracy both subordinate the needs of the 
economy of power to the non-malleable, non-negotiable “identity” of “historical and 
biographical beings” and to the “biography of a place.”  As ways of being, they are less 
concerned with “straining toward the future” and “acting effectively” than with “the 
preservation of pastness … (as) an important element in the narrative structure of 
identity.”124  Democratic feudalism, we might say, represents the premodern antithesis to 
postmodern powers tendency toward totalitarianism.   
The homogenization of “feudal” differences as a means of greasing the wheels 
power is, for Wolin, the singular trait of American political development.   As opposed to 
the famous Tocqueville/Louis Hartz thesis that America had no feudal tradition to 
overcome, Wolin argues that such a tradition is precisely what has been paved over, 
beginning with the ratification of the Constitution and accelerating with most every so-
called turning point in American history.  The high-point of this tradition of affirming 
difference and particularity was the “feudal revolt” of the American Revolution.125  The 
slow erosion (punctuated by a few periods of rapid retreat) of this democratic and 
antistatist line - extending from the Anti-Federalists “to the Virginia -Kentucky 
resolutions (1798-99), to the Hartford Convention, the nullification controversy, and the 
Civil War” - is the actual political history of America.  While the Civil War destroyed 
“the last serious defense of feudal politics,” the New Deal marked the beginning of the 
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consequent “triumph of the state.”126  We are left today with a “reversal in the status of 
democracy, from being modern to being archaic.”  Like feudalism before it, 
“participatory politics centered around small towns, villages, cities, and state 
governments” has come to seem anachronistic, obsolete, and even bizarre.127            
  
As odd as the association of democracy and feudalism might seem, Wolin goes 
further to formulate what he terms “democratic fundamentalism.”  In today’s ubiquitous 
dichotomy of fundamentalism and globalization - “Jihad vs. McWorld,” as Benjamin 
Barber famously phrases it - Wolin suggest that authentic democracy has more in 
common with the former, or at least that the common economy of both democracy and 
fundamentalism is globalization.            
At times, Wolin suggests that democracy is forced to fundamentalist extremes by 
current conditions, forced to fight a rear-guard action against totalizing economy.  
Fundamentalist democracy is the notion of democracy “dictated by the inherently anti-
democratic structures and norms characteristic of the … the contemporary corporation 
and the Superpower state.”128  At other times, Wolin suggest that there is a more intrinsic 
connection between democracy and fundamentalism.  “Religious fundamentalism, 
‘moralism,’ and racial, religious, and ethnic prejudices belong to the same historical 
culture as traditions of local self-government, decentralized politics, participatory 
democracy, and sentiments of egalitarianism … (Both) are suspicious of distant 
authorities, centralized power, and new moral fashions. (The) prejudices (of 
fundamentalism) appear as anachronisms.  But then, so does democracy itself.”129  
In either case, fundamentalism is allied to authentic democracy insofar as it is the 
expression of irreconcilable, non-negotiable difference that simply cannot be 
homogenized, abstracted from, or reduced to economic factionalism.  In this sense, both 
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hold out against the centralizing, depopulating thrust of post/modernity.  Archaism, 
Wolin writes, has found its defenders in many brands of anti-modern centrifugalism: “the 
Klan, militiamen and women, neo-Nazis, Protestant fundamentalists, would-be censors of 
public and school libraries, champions of an ‘original Constitution.’”130  While not always 
appealing, such non-accomodationism serves (like Tocqueville’s aristocracy) to introduce 
countervailing dissonance into the process of uni-forming.  Their political value lies not 
in their truth or justice, but in their role as “provocateurs whose passionate commitments 
can arose self-consciousness in the public… The resulting controversies are crucial to the 
cause of anti-totality and its vitality.”131         
Fundamentalism is thus allied to democracy insofar as it is the “religion” not of 
the “oppressed or deprived … but of the (those) threatened … by a relentlessly 
modernizing society that exposes their most cherished beliefs as archaic.”  Protestant 
fundamentalism was shaped as a direct response to “efforts at modifying religious 
teachings to harmonize them with the findings of modern science;” it hungered “for 
nothing so much as a return to … original principles.” 132  In its archaism, democracy too 
is shaped as a direct response to efforts at harmonizing democracy to science and 
economy; it hungers for nothing so much as the preservation of our original slow-motion, 
small-scale democratic mode of being.          
The Powerlessness of Archaic Democracy  
Of late, Wolin himself has argued that theorizing democracy in terms of archaism 
- of feudal decentralization/fundamental difference - is inadequate to the challenges of the 
day.  Archaism amounts to quietism, to escape rather than struggle.  He writes: “While it 
is of the utmost importance that democrats support and encourage political activity at the 
grassroots level, it is equally necessary that the political limitations of such activity be 
recognized.  It is politically incomplete.  This is because the localism that is the strength 
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of grassroots organizations is also their limitation.  There are major problems in our 
society that are general in nature and necessitate modes of vision and action that are 
comprehensive rather than parochial.”133  General problems requires, beyond holding fast 
to particularism, democratic modes of action that can operate at a general level.  A 
politics rooted in the ordinary cannot respond to the extraordinary power generated today.  
The very limitations archaism introduces into the economy of power rebound to limit the 
democratic generation of power.  The uncompromising difference at the heart of 
archaism is so pronounced that democratic association along with economic 
systematization are dis-organized.  A sort of identity politics of geography, archaic 
democracy tends toward the logic of secession from any mode of association not based 
on the quasi-familial blood-ties of memory and place.  In this sense, archaic democracy is 
self-defeating - quite literally a lost cause.                
The dilemma follows of how to envision a mode of “organization” and power 
generation wherein democracy rather than economy, with its greater efficiency, serves as 
the integrating agent.  The difficulty lies in formulating a mode of association that does 
not efface difference, and that does not follow from economic abstraction and liberal 
formalism and institutionalization.  To be effective, democracy needs to realize its power; 
to be authentic, this mode of realization must not fall into materialism or be co-opted into 
the economic language of organization, systematization, and so forth.     
To this end Wolin theorizes democracy as fugitive.  Wolin writes that “a range of 
problems and atrocities exists that a locally confined democracy cannot resolve.  Like 
pluralism, interest group politics, and multicultural politics, localism cannot surmount its 
limitations except by seeking out the evanescent homogeneity of a broader political.”134  
The solution to the problem of envisioning a powerful but essentially non-economical 
collective actor is to render its homogeneity evanescent.  Democratic association and 
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action are effective but incorruptible because they come into material existence for only a 
moment.  The demos rides into town but doesn’t stick around to govern.         
Far from encouraging or empowering political activity at the grassroots level, I 
argue that fugitive democracy undermines such activity.  Indeed, in many respects 
fugitive democracy seems more in accord with postmodern power than with archaism.  
The radicalism of fugitive democracy takes shape not as conservation but as 
revolutionary rupture with the patterns of everyday existence.  It is a matter not of 
preserving cultural counter-formations against constitutional formalism but of 
transgressive form-breaking.  A wholly extraordinary politics, its momentary quality 
stands in sharp contrast to the continuity of memory and the biography of place so central 
to archaism.  Revolution replaces inheritance as the “master notion” of democracy; the 
metaphor of “overflowing” supplants that of grass-“rootedness.”  Ultimately, I argue that 
fugitive democracy amounts not to an imposition of limits upon power, but to a sort of 
counter-limitlessness.  As we shall see, where archaic democracy is allied with feudalism 
and fundamentalism, fugitive democracy is allied to imperialism - the demos’ 
squandering passion for empire.              
I conclude by suggesting that all three forms of democracy Wolin identifies - 
liberal, archaic, and fugitive - do have one basic similarity, though: they are incapable of 
envisioning political associations that take shape despite differences.  Liberal democracy 
abstracts from deep difference even while formulating “association” as mere 
aggregation; for the system to work individuals need to act similarly but not necessarily 
collectively.  Archaic democracy formulates association as the community of memory and 
place, as a sort of tribalism.  Fugitive democracy takes shape not as the community of 
memory and place, but as the community of victims; the demos coalesces around the 
shared experience of oppression.  The options seem to be individualism or communalism, 
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(whether continuous or momentary) with nothing in between - association via abstraction 
or in terms of authenticity with nothing in between.  Collective action is either tallied by 
a third party in terms of demographic and behavioral statistics, or it comes about through 
a sort of spontaneous affiliation with (in one way or another) identical others.  All three 
modes of association are thus in effect unspoken, with no need for mediating words and 
arguments.          
PART IV: FUGITIVE DEMOCRACY 
Democracy as Revolution 
Democracy, Wolin writes in a key passage, contains within it “two diametrically 
opposed notions that symbolize two equally opposed states of affairs.  One is the settled 
structure of politics and governmental authority typically called a constitution, and the 
other is the unsettling political movement typically called revolution.  Stated somewhat 
starkly: constitution signifies the suppression of revolution; revolution the destruction of 
constitution.”135  Wolin urges us to recognize that authentic democracy takes shape 
exclusively around the latter pole.  We should embrace “the familiar charges that 
democracy is inherently unstable, inclined toward anarchy, and identified with 
revolution… Instead of assuming that … the problem is to adapt democracy to the 
requirements of organization, we might think of democracy as resistant to the 
rationalizing conceptions of power and its organization.  This democracy might be 
summed up as the idea and practice of rational disorganization.”136     
Historically, democracy has been associated with the revolt of the many over the 
few or the one. The “democratic agon” is “performed,” as Wolin puts it, in “revolution or 
popular uprising, collective disobedience, and mass protest.”137  In turn, democracy is 
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metaphorically represented as passion over reason, energy over order, movement over 
settlement, flux over form, openness and closure, anarchy over tyranny, and so forth.   
Conceptualized along these lines, democracy necessarily comes to a cross-road 
when it is time to transition from the revolt of the many to the rule of the many - from 
questioning to decision-making, as it were.  Democracy can stay true to itself, to its 
original vital impulse, and remain in the street, or be housed in attenuated form in 
conventional forum. During revolution the “demos as autonomous agent … gathers its 
power from outside the system” as the “political challenge of the demos inevitably 
overflows … customary and institutional boundaries.”138  When the revolt ends and “the 
permanent institutionalization of politics” begins, the “democracy carried along by 
revolution comes to appear as surplus.”139  In ordinary times democracy’s dynamic 
appears “undisciplined,” “excessive, irregular and spasmodic.”140  Similar to Superpower, 
democracy’s characteristic virtue is its own overflowing excess, which is deemed out of 
order after the revolution.         
Liberal constitutionalism is precisely that mechanism whereby democracy is 
disciplined.  The avowed ambition is to tame “continuous struggle” by means of “reified 
law.”141  With its discourse of objective reason - impersonal, impartial, higher - as vulgar 
passion’s harness, constitutionalism has always been as opposed to democracy as to 
absolutism.  It amounts to an “attack upon the vitality and energy displayed by a demos.  
It is no exaggeration to say that one of the, if not the, main projects of ancient 
constitutional theorists, such as Plato (The Laws), Aristotle, Polybius, and Cicero, as well 
as of the modern constitutionalists, such as the authors of The Federalist and Tocqueville, 
was to dampen, frustrate, sublimate, and defeat the democratic passions.  The main 
devices were: the rule of law and especially the idea of a sacrosanct ‘fundamental law’ or 
constitution safeguarded from the ‘gusts of popular passions’; the idea of checks and 
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balances; separation of powers with its attempt to quarantine the ‘people’ by confining its 
direct representation to one branch of the legislature; the ‘refining’ process of indirect 
elections; and suffrage restrictions.  The aim was not simply to check democracy but to 
discourage it by making it difficult for those who, historically, had almost no leisure time 
for politics, to achieve political goals.”142   
Archaism too would seem to constrain democratic excesses.  In the dichotomy of 
“settled structures” versus “unsettling movement,” archaic democracy’s discourse of 
complexity and local tradition no less than liberal democracy’s abstract and universal 
reason frustrates revolutionary democracy’s simplifying and overflowing passions.  “The 
rhetoric of the desperate is likely to be a simplifying one, reflective of conditions reduced 
to essentials.  A rhetoric of complexity, ever since Burke, has found favor with those 
whose expectations are secure.”143  Complexity obstructs democratic power just as with 
economic power; simplification - the reduction to oneness - remains above all a metaphor 
for power.  Settled structures, whether constitutional or culture, threaten authentic 
democracy’s basic unruliness and restlessness.  And democracy’s unsettling movement 
threatens archaic memory and place.  “Revolution might be defined,” Wolin writes, as the 
“transgression of inherited forms.  It is the extreme antithesis to a settled constitution, 
whether that constitution is represented by documents (‘basic laws’) or by recognized 
systems or practice.”144  Indeed, revolution means “snapping the continuity between past 
and future” and “the destruction of … prior identity.”145  Revolution “wants to begin 
history, not continue it.”146  
On Wolin’s account, then, the inevitable course of democratic movement is from 
youthful and wild squandering to economization and domestication.  Wolin identifies the 
overthrow communism in central and Eastern Europe as a leading example.  During the 
revolt, “politics was primarily the affair of ‘civil society,’ not of conventional political 
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parties or parliamentary processes.  Various extralegal groups of … ordinary citizens 
energized and sustained revolutionary movements whose internal politics was remarkably 
participatory and egalitarian.  After the success of those movements, a different politics 
began to take shape, a politics of organized parties, professional politicians, and 
economic interest groups.  Above all, it was a politics in which the overriding problems 
were declared to be economic.”147  Paradoxically, democracy’s success marks the 
beginning of its own attenuation.  Democratic revolutions “seem to lose their dynamic 
once they succeed.”148  We return to this point below.        
Momentary Democracy  
With the association of democracy and revolution, it becomes unclear whether 
democracy’s fugitive character follows from the post/modern conditions of the economy 
of power or from democracy’s own principle.  Is democracy on the run from Superpower 
or of its own accord?  Is democracy contingently rendered “rare” and “episodic” or is it 
intrinsically so?149  In theorizing democracy as an overflowing but fleeting moment is 
Wolin attempting to capture its current limits or its essence, its failure or its zenith?       
At times Wolin suggests that democracy need not be merely episodic, and that the 
democratic practice of politics might continue after the revolutionary moment.  
Democracy and revolution are not synonymous; revolution is just the negative first stage 
in the realization of democratic politics.  “Revolutions activate the demos and destroys 
boundaries that bar access to political experience … . Thus revolutionary transgression is 
the means by which the demos makes itself political.”150  Once the barriers to the political 
have been overturned and the people have assumed their rightful political place, 
democracy’s initial oppositional “dynamic” is no longer needed and so is less “lost” than 
superceded by some other democratic mode of politics.  In our age of economy, 
unfortunately, democracy is seduced, overawed, and outspent at the very moment it 
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attempts to organize its energies into political practices.  Thus, democracy “in the late 
modern world cannot be a complete political system.”151  It is rendered fugitive, “doomed 
to succeed only temporarily.”152   
At other times Wolin suggest that democracy simply is revolution, and so by 
nature fugitive.153  Sounding a Madisonian note, Wolin writes: “the fugitive character of 
democracy is no mystery.”  It is explained by the factional “heterogeneity (that) is a 
consequence of liberty and equality, the two values that since antiquity have been 
associated solely with democracy.”154  In its liberty and equality, democracy makes 
“unequal power” possible, and can “eliminate (it) only by betraying its own values.”155  
Moreover (and here we might recall Alan Keenan’s argument about the tension between 
inclusion and exclusion - legitimacy and effectiveness - at the center of democratic 
collective action), insofar as democratic “inclusion is expanded to legitimate new 
differences common action is rendered more difficult.”156  Liberty and equality produce 
unequal power; legitimate democratic agency requires both inclusion and exclusion: in 
either case democracy is destined to betray itself.  Democracy is “doomed to succeed 
only temporarily” because of its own tragic internal tension.   
This tension is resolved within the idea of democratic revolution, wherein the 
passion for rather than the product of liberty and equality dominate, and wherein 
differences are bracketed in the struggle for inclusion.  The spirit of democracy and 
material reality coincide in that singular moment of revolt against anti-democratic norms 
and forms, in Lefort’s “operation of negativity” or Wolin’s “rational disorganization.”  
Principle and practice, authority and power, legitimacy and effectiveness, can be made to 
coincide episodically but not institutionally.  Democracy can be kept from being co-opted 
but also from betraying its own principles by burning itself out.  It is doomed to succeed 
only temporarily, but its temporality preserves its untouched and uncompromised purity.  
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Each new moment is pristine and full of youthful vitality.  Democracy remains authentic 
on condition that it is not enduring.  The practice of democratic politics is thus reconciled 
with the principle of democratic openness by theorizing democratic politics as revolution.  
Democracy’s momentary nature guarantees its perennially return to a state of openness.       
The question then becomes not whether democracy can be made “a complete 
political system” in the late modern world, but whether democracy and politics are 
mutually exclusive.  The “true question is not whether democracy can govern in the 
traditional sense, but why it would want to.  Governing means manning and 
accommodating to bureaucratized institutions that, ipso facto, are hierarchical in structure 
and elitist, permanent rather than fugitive - in short, anti-democratic.”157  Established 
democracy is oxymoronic, and at least insofar as politics has something to do with 
government a schism opens up between democracy and politics.  Authentic democracy 
amounts to the revolt of the people, and economized democracy to the rule of the people.  
Robust democracy is therefore an “ephemeral phenomenon,” “protean and amorphous,” 
rather than a “settled system” or “institutionalized process.”158  Robust because 
ephemeral, diminishing democracy’s apparent strength makes it more powerful.  Protean 
and amorphous, democracy never falls from openness into materiality; its unquestioned 
authority is premised on the impermanence of its power.  While democracy can no longer 
be considered a form of government, or a way of life, it is a fleeting, elevating “moment 
of experience” against which government and society are judged.159   
Democracy and Necessity 
Perhaps the most central of Wolin’s philosophical presuppositions is that 
“commonality” is “fugitive and impermanent” - a matter of sharing “in a common 
experience rather than in a common life.”160  Commonality is not located in shared 
historical memory or cultural place; rather, it is something comes into being and passes as 
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quickly as an experience.  There are “historical moments” of upheaval “when collective 
identity is collectively established or reconstituted,” but no “pre-existent, continuous 
entity” of “the people.”161  As much descriptive as normative, commonality both cannot 
and should not be permanent - commonality is and should be uncommon.  Since it is 
momentary, commonality is in accord with the truth and good of openness.  It is a 
formless or informal sort of commonality, neither constitutional nor cultural.   
Distancing his theory from the language of “organization,” Wolin describes this 
fugitive commonality as “spontaneous” - arising as if ex nihilo.  This spontaneity 
translates into the notion of association not through deliberation, nor through 
socialization, but through the experience of necessity - and in particular, material 
necessity.  A phenomenon rather than a regime, democracy is founded/caused not by a 
law-giver but by crisis - e pluribus unum via oppression.  As Wolin writes: “Corporate 
solidarity and self-consciousness are … responses to oppression,” and “resistance brings 
with it a heightened sense of self-awareness, of distinctive identity.”162  The equality or 
“sameness” required for collective action follows from “a common condition of 
oppression, of injustice, which is to say that sameness is created not by democracy when 
it is installed as a construction, but by a predemocratic experience… .  Misery creates the 
basis for a … conception of the political based on community.”163    
Authentically democratic association is a function not of the abstract congregation 
of the market, nor of the solid community of settled tradition, but of periodically shared 
commiseration - a community of misery.  The democratic “we” is revolutionary rather 
than economic or quasi-religious.  Democratic commonality “begins with the demos 
constructing/collecting itself from scattered experiences and fusing these into a self-
consciousness about common powerlessness and its causes.  The demos is created from a 
shared realization (of) powerlessness … .”164    
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This raises two interesting points.  First, representing democracy in terms Carl 
Schmitt would recognize, democratic association and action become contingent upon a 
common enemy.  Far beyond Wolin’s work, the idea that we come together and are 
roused to action only in response to some common problem or common evil seems fairly 
ubiquitous today.  Inverting Aristotle, it is precisely in an alliance of mutual defense (or 
in relations of exchange and commerce) rather than in pursuit of some common good that 
the demotic city identifies itself.  The social bond is not a shared conception of justice but 
the simultaneous experience of injustice, which is partitioned off from questions of 
justice by being reduced to “objective” harm of one sort or another.  The odd conclusion 
of premising democratic association and action upon the struggle with evil rather than 
upon the pursuit of good, however, is that as evil and democracy wax and wane in 
unison.  Inherently responsive, democracy loses steam as it advances.  Born of 
deprivation and oppression, the paradoxical prerequisite of democracy is the lack or loss 
of democracy.  The less we are victimized, the less we are capable of democracy.  If 
democracy is “created from a shared realization of powerless,” then powerlessness is the 
precondition of democracy.  Along these lines, we might conclude that today Superpower 
empowers democracy.                         
Second, on Wolin’s account fugitive democracy seems largely like a 
radicalization of liberalism.  The occasional quality of the “revolutionary we” mirrors the 
“electoral we” in both cause and effect.  Wolin writes that the fugitive character of 
democracy is in part related to the fact that “democracy’s politics is the creation of those 
who must work.”  It is the act of “the leisureless,” for whom “participation, as 
distinguished from voting, is necessarily a sacrifice.”165  Collective action is the 
“crystallized response to deeply felt grievances or needs on the part of those whose main 
preoccupation - demanding of time and energy - is to scratch out a decent existence.”166  
 262 
“Given the material conditions of the demos,” then, “the actuality of democracy is 
necessarily episodic and circumstantial.”167    
 Material necessity is both the cause of democracy and the cause of its 
devitalization.  We band together and take the public stage to protest or resist oppression, 
then we disband and return to our private business.  Need explains why we become 
political beings and why we fail to remain political beings.  Wolin thus seems to accept 
the idea of an ordinarily apolitical and disengaged populace.  The assumption that 
democracy was to be “a form of government in which the people governed” on an 
ongoing basis was mistaken “in part because it assumed that the authority and power to 
govern was what a people would aspire to.”168  The demos, like a liberal citizenry, is 
“unable to rule yet unwilling to be ruled.”169                
In liberal democratic theory, the solution is an ordinary politics by proxy 
punctuated every number of years by the people speaking for themselves.  Wolin rejects 
this notion for its failure to “promote participation,” and in turn for its reliance on “the 
political forays of an occasional citizenry.”170  Yet, fugitive democracy is itself based on 
such and occasional, momentary citizenry.  The fugitive moment is the radicalization of 
the electoral moment, which “involves the taking back of one’s power, not just the 
revocation of legitimacy.”171  Eventually, though, the people relinquish their power and a 
new equilibrium sets in.  Fugitive democracy amounts to a more forceful throwing of the 
bums out.       
Democracy as Instinct 
We have seen how fugitive democracy is limited in duration and power, both by 
Superpower and by its own internal dynamic.  Yet, on Wolin’s account this 
ineffectiveness belies the ambitions of the fugitive demos.  In its passion for revolution, 
in its striving to transgress all limits, Wolin’s authentic demos (like Tocqueville’s men of 
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’89) displays a rapacity and audacity of epic proportions.  The demos harbors 
Superpower’s desire (if not its capacity) for (self)-creative/destructive limitlessness.       
“The demos exists as striving,” Wolin writes, “but that drive may be directed not 
at assuring duration to its existence but at challenging its own finitude.”  In a striking 
parallel to the metaphor used to characterize Superpower, Wolin describes the demotic 
return of the repressed at its most basic level as “a barely civilized, almost raw force - the 
demos as Id and crude Superego…”172  Where archaism was a means of escape, the 
demos of fugitive democracy seeks mastery.  Where archaic democracy was cast in the 
language of loss, fugitive democracy is a matter of sublime struggle and suffering.  
Where archaism tended to domestic memory and place, fugitive democracy is 
undomesticated savagery.  Where once democracy was to preserve a condition 
reminiscent of Rousseau’s state of nature, the fugitive demos is in accord with 
Superpower in seeing the world in the terms, if not the extremes of Hobbes’ state of 
nature.  Peace is impossible and power is the only currency.     
Wolin adopts a term from Spinoza - conatus - to theorize this overreaching, 
overflowing demos.  The formula, Wolin writes, “of actor-action, with its clear-cut notion 
of agency, excludes the demos, always a somewhat shadowy, inchoate identity, always in 
need of the crystallizing energy of a ‘leader.’”173  The notion of conatus - the striving 
inherent in any living thing for the power “’to persist in its own being (and oppose 
anything) that would take away its existence’” - enables Wolin to envision a purely 
democratic source of democratic action.174  The “continuing self-fashioning of the 
demos” is driven exclusively by its own conatus.175  The idea here is that the demos 
becomes self-aware and gains a distinctive sense of identity not by means of leadership, 
but through the crystallizing effect of external events.  More specifically, opposition to 
the event of its own negation imbues the demos with self-awareness.  Democratic 
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organization is spontaneous in that it is caused only by the impulse to collective self-
preservation.  Democratic action becomes instinctive.  And this instinct becomes the 
great equalizer, providing for the many what “wealth, status, education, and tradition” 
provide for the few.176 The primal power of a demos is a consequence of its primal fear: 
backed into a corner, the people “threaten because their existence is continuously 
threatened.”177 
Wolin explicitly sets out here to use for democratic purposes the resort throughout 
history to “physical or animalistic imagery to describe the multitude” - the tendency to 
associate the demos with the passions and “’things of the body,’” and to identify “the 
Many with a natural power,” a “raw power,” and an “elemental force.”178  For Wolin, “the 
demos represents the existence and vitality of a natural entity.”179  We should “reconceive 
democracy as an elemental politics about the needs and the aspirations of the Many…”180  
And we should think of the demos as “agonistic,” “driven by the needs of its nature to 
strain at constitutional restraints.”181  Thus the “possibility of a popular sovereignty as a 
will to power on the part of an actor struggling to be both collective and autonomous” 
resides precisely with its heteronomous, savage nature.182     
Not only is the demos driven by its instinctive nature, but its revolutionary actions 
deliver the many from the constraints of conventional forms back the Lockean state of 
nature.  In Locke’s formulation, Wolin writes, nature “is a condition of commonality and 
‘equality … without Subordination or Subjection.’  We might call Locke’s construct a 
democracy without form.”183  In its “suspension of heterogeneity” it is “a metaphor of lost 
commonality, an exceptional moment that keeps returning in times of revolutionary crisis 
when power returns to ‘the Community and agency to ‘the People’”184  This return to 
nature is “the truly democratic moment.”185                    
 265 
 Divorcing this conception of agonistic democracy from the post/modern threat to 
democracy, Wolin writes that ancient Athenian democracy above all exemplified the 
conatus driven character of the demos.  “Before its fourth-century institutionalization, 
Athenian democracy was less a constitution in the Aristotelian sense of a fixed form than 
a dynamic and developing political culture, a culture not only of participation but of 
frequent rebellions.”186  This culture of rebellion took institutional form as rotation in 
office and selection by lot, the function of which was to “limit the effects of 
institutionalization.”  They are, Wolin writes, “paradoxically institutions that subvert 
institutionalization” - the institutionalization of rational disorganization.  They ensured 
the continuous “disruption in continuity.”187  Even as the “elemental, physical quality of 
democratic power” was “condensed and institutionalized,” then, Athenian democracy did 
not lose its transgressive character.188   The “beast,” as Wolin puts it, is institutionalized 
without being domesticated.  “The beast has become the citizen without losing its vitality, 
truly a politikon zoion.”189     
 
Theorizing democratic action and association in terms of the “vitality” - rooted in 
passion and instinct - leads Wolin to a notion of democracy that actually mirrors many of 
the characteristics of the economy of power.  Democracy comes to seem both natural and 
(at least in aspiration) limitless.      
First, describing democratic action as an instinct makes it seem given and 
spontaneous, not unlike capitalism and liberalism in that it is without need of any process 
of regimentation, socialization, or education.  Capitalism is based on the assumption of 
the competitive and acquisitive individual, and liberalism on the private and self-
interested individual.  Both are premised upon our supposedly native characteristics.  We 
do not need to learn to be acquisitive or self-interested, but are assumed to be so.  For 
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Wolin, democracy is similarly premised upon our native - one might say primitive - 
characteristics and the assumption of the essentially power-asserting self.  We arrive at 
the democratic moment as already democratic, just as we arrive at the market as 
acquisitive and at the voting booth as self-interested.  Put differently, as a matter of 
unleashing our animal instincts in the face of fear and desperation, democracy is as 
natural as fear and misery and suffering.  And as long as a democracy rests solely on 
sentiments that console man in his misery, it can win the affection of the human race.   
Second, Wolin readily acknowledges that the outcome of institutionalizing a 
power that by nature strives to challenge its own finitude is empire.  Materially 
empowered, the barely civilized democratic Id turns from self-preservation to self-
expansion.  A “testimony to both the transgressive and aggressive impulses of the 
Many…” empire is at once the negation of democracy as well as a manifestation of its 
original nature.190  The only limits authentic democracy knows are those imposed upon it.  
At the same time, he attempts to distance this overflowing of all conventional forms and 
territorial boundaries from its potential for violence.  The emphasis shifts from 
destruction to creation.  “Democracy is a rebellious moment that may assume 
revolutionary, destructive proportions,” yet the “fugitive character of democracy (does 
not) stand for a pent-up revolutionary fervor waiting for an opportunity to wreak 
havoc.”191  It is true that nothing “short of a long revolution … makes much sense today,” 
but “a campaign of violent insurrection,” while “politically and morally justified by 
democratic standards of legitimate authority, is neither possible nor prudent … 
Revolutions of that nature are plainly pathological under contemporary conditions of 
interdependency.”192  While warranted, violent revolution is simply not practical.  
“Democrats,” in turn, “need a new conception of revolution” - one conceived in terms of 
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“creativity rather than violence.”  The right to revolution is not “solely a right to overturn 
and destroy institutions but to fashion new ones;” it is a “right to create new forms.”193   
Of course, capitalism too is as creative as it is destructive.  Given their shared 
challenge to finitude and lawfulness, one wonders whether the forms democracy and 
economy create (only to eventually destroy) will be much different.  Superpower strives 
for the formless forms conducive to globalization; fugitive or agonistic democracy strives 
for the formless forms conducive to empire.  Both employ the rhetoric of oneness, which 
Wolin himself characterizes as the rhetoric of limitless - whether phrased in terms of 
economic “power” or democratic “energy.”  Granted, the rational systematization of 
economy is efficient while the wild passion of democracy burns itself out and suffers set-
backs, but the spirit seems the same.  One wonders if there isn’t a more human mode of 
politics and society in between the mechanistic artificiality of economy and the 
animalistic nature of fugitive democracy.  One wonders if there isn’t a language of 
human association in between those of abstraction and authenticity.     
 
Conclusion: Heroism and Cynicism 
 “Although the desire to acquire the goods of this world is the dominant passion 
of Americans,” Tocqueville writes, “there are brief intervals when their souls seem 
suddenly to cast off all material bonds and fly impetuously toward heaven.”194  The 
description of American’s “impassioned, almost wild spiritualism” is perfectly analogous 
to Wolin’s formulation of the fugitive democratic moment or revolution.  The dynamic is 
one wherein ordinary material existence is punctuated by extraordinary events of 
transcendence.  For Wolin, transgression is the mode of transcendence - elevation as 
breaking out of inhibiting conventional norms and forms.  Ordinarily we are wholly 
unfree, but we are able to transmute oppression and necessity into brief intervals of total 
 268 
freedom.  Here again we see the dialectic of idealization and devaluation that seems so 
characteristic of our democratic way of life.          
Wolin’s theory of democracy helps us identify the dialectical counterpart to the 
cynicism (or so-called “realism”) so prevalent in Wolin’s work and in American society 
regarding our everyday lives.  Extreme heroism - one might say super-heroism - is the 
solution to extreme cynicism.  Wolin equates the fugitive demos with the Nietzschean 
aristocrat.  The former is the collective version of the “vigorous warrior-type, a man who 
takes risks, provokes strife, overflows with vitality, in short, a natural transgressor of 
conventions.”  This “figure of primal energy and demonic will … delights in the images 
of ‘smashing’ restraints.”195  And “spectacular types of action” are the product of the 
“agonistic impulse of heroic actors.”196  Given the extraordinary degradation of our 
material existence, this appeal to action movie heroism is the only thing that makes sense.  
In a world mired in systematic corruption, the appeal to an agonistic demos would be 
rendered more fully intelligible in terms of “vigilante democracy” rather than fugitive 
democracy - we need to step outside the systematic corruptions of the world to get things 
done and set things right.             
          Wolin adapts the notion of aristocratic actor to democracy not only by 
rendering it collective, but also by depicting heroism as a function of victimization.  
Central to Wolin’s theory of fugitive democracy, and I suggest to American thought in 
general, is the idea of ordinary people forced to rise to the occasion.  In the face of crisis 
or oppression the victim/hero is called to service out of everyday private life.  Elevated 
less by his or her own virtues than by events, the ordinary person proves capable of 
extraordinary deeds.  Coming from and returning to equality, the common man of 
democracy momentarily becomes an aristocratic actor.  As the momentary response to 
events beyond our control, rather than a product of superior character or virtue, 
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aristocratic action is made safe for democracy.  The hero did what any of us would have 
done under similar circumstances.       
The consequences for the practice of democratic politics are two.  First, the 
dialectic of ordinary/extraordinary leads to what we might call a two-tiered notion of 
citizenship.  While the people retain the authority to rule at all times, only occasionally 
do they attain (or need to attain) the capacity to rule.  In liberal democratic theory, the 
occasion is routinized as periodic elections.  Increasingly, though, the view is that 
ordinary elections do not sufficiently induce the elevation of the people, who just vote 
their wallets (if they vote at all).  However there are certain extraordinary, epic elections 
wherein people come together as a demos in revolutionary action.  Along these lines we 
might say that Bruce Ackerman, for instance, offers the liberal version of Wolin’s 
fugitive democracy - the electoral moment radicalized.  The key to both theories is that 
crisis or necessity does not reduce people to their base and conflictual natures, but rather 
induces the overcoming of mundane limitations and self-interested preoccupations.  But 
is the political practice of democracy the likely response to necessity and crisis?  Or is 
democracy more likely to be sacrificed in times of trouble?     
This two-tiered notion of democracy and citizenship is so appealing, I suggest, 
because it allows us to combine into one coherent picture both sides of democracy’s 
dualism discussed in the first chapter.  Ordinary degradation and materialism is 
punctuated by intervals of extraordinary elevation and freedom.  For long stretches 
democratic society is characterizes by banal neediness and bourgeois mediocrity, but it is 
never without revolutionary possibilities.  Literary events burst forth from commercial 
society, and under the right circumstances the man of business might become the artist - a 
fugitive creator.  If only for a moment, the prosaic gives way to the epic poetry of 
democracy.                 
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Second, democratic association and action come to be represented as unity and 
energy in response to crisis, which is to say in executive rather than legislative or judicial 
terms.  Deliberation and impartial judgment fall by the wayside as political agency is 
reduced to a Lockean sense of prerogative - democratic “vitality” as emergency power, 
whether of the elected leader or the demos itself.  Indeed, in relation to heroic executive 
action the demand for deliberation and impartiality might well seem absurd and 
obstructive (or impossible, given fundamental difference; or dangerous, given our power-
driven world).  In any case, argument stands in opposition to decision and action.             
  
Wolin writes that despite the almost complete “evisceration of democracy” today, 
there “appears to be no widespread public recognition of crisis.”197  All of the “elements 
for radical protest appear to be present,” and yet “there has been no general mobilization 
of outrage… (only an) astonishing passivity.”198  I suggest that thinking of democracy 
along the lines Wolin lays out actually contributes to this astonishing passivity.  Wolin 
celebrates the radical democratic potential for disorganizing the liberal democratic 
constitution of government.  But as we have seen, this spirit of disorganization subverts 
the culture of grassroots organization.  Both in principle and in practice, the fugitive 
democratic moment cannot be institutionalized at the level of ordinary local politics.  
Interestingly, James Miller’s great historical work Democracy is in the Streets: From 
Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago can be read as charting precisely this self-radicalizing 
and so self-subverting course of participatory democracy in America: from the archaic 
radicalism that underlay the 1962 Port Huron Statement; to the late 1960’s embrace of 
revolutionary transgression of middle-class conventionality as such; to the disengagement 
and quietism of that took hold in the 1970’s.199          
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Further, Wolin’s agonistic democracy seems like a radically potent and robust, if 
inherently short-lived, notion of popular power.  But precisely in its idealized rhetoric of 
the extraordinary it subverts the ordinary practice of democracy - arguing and acting in 
association with equal others.  Democracy is not something we learn to do, but something 
that erupts.  And as such it is not something we undertake, but something for which we 
wait to happen.  We wait for the hero of the revolutionary moment.  The everyday world 
is taken to be corrupt, and so the everyday practice of democracy is taken to be corrupt.  
The world in which we live cannot be reformed from within, and so transcendence and 
revolution are the only solution.  And so we bide our time until the “tipping point.”   
Tocqueville famously argued that great revolutions will become rare as 
democracy matures.  Following on the critique of Wolin presented here, I suggest that 
perhaps the case is less that the democratic passion for revolution subsides into middle-
class caution and conservatism than that revolution is deprived of a political venue.  The 
devaluation of and contempt for ordinary politics means that political change, whether 
great or small, must somehow come from without.  Revolution seems like the only 
solution but we cannot see any possible way to politically constitute the revolution.        
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Conclusion: Constitutional Veneration and Democratic Vitality 
It is the political man that we have to develop in ourselves     
     - Tocqueville  
 
 The fact that we hate politics seems beyond dispute.  We declare our contempt 
daily in interviews and polls.  Disrespect for all-things political pervades our rhetoric.  
Even our politicians seem to hate politics, presenting their call to public service as an 
anti-political crusade.  I have attempted to diagnose the sources of this civic spirit.  
Contesting the conventional view that our anti-political disposition is sufficiently 
explained in the terms of either “market society” or “liberal politics,” I argue that 
democracy’s discontents are generated within the principle of democracy itself - more 
cancerous than viral, as it were.  My analysis uncovers the democratic sources of political 
cynicism.       
Going beyond the reduction of our “culture” or “age” to its market aspects, we 
perceive the constitutive dualism of our times.  Our lives take shape around the disparate 
poles of power and love.  Political thought rarely deals with the latter term, preferring an 
illusory realism that eliminates from view or cordons-off as private whatsoever cannot be 
represented as the struggle for power.  To say this misses half the picture of what is 
experienced as meaningful and motivating in our culture or age is the greatest of 
understatements.  Unfettered intimacy is as central as unfettered competition to our idea 
of human association.              
Situated by these polar opposites of intimacy and competition, we come to 
experience a sort of schism in our lives.  There is love and there is power with nothing in 
between.  Such is the relationship between these master-terms that there can be no 
mediation.  Such are these ends that they admit of no moderation.  In turn, we tend 
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toward extremes.  Human relations take on a borderline - “sex-object” or “soul-mate” - 
quality.  We are either absolutely free, enjoying the untouched and uncompromising 
liberty of the savage, or we are domesticated.  We see ourselves elevated to super-heroic 
levels or degraded below the level of humanity.  Our idealism is as uncompromising as 
our realism.  Our materialism is as radical as our spiritualism, and our neediness as vast 
as our sense of possibility.                  
Along these lines, a dialectic of idealization and devaluation sets in.  A gap opens 
up between principle and practice, which we take to be irreconcilable.  We see the naïve 
man of principle and the unprincipled man of action and nothing in between.  This 
dialectic, I argue, is the source of our political, and social, cynicism.  We experience the 
material world in the terms, if not the extremes, of Hobbes’ state of nature.  We imagine 
the immaterial world as a sublime state of openness.  In relation to this power-free world, 
the present seems all the more petty and degenerate.  At the same time, the realization of 
our dream of openness in this world would signify its collapse from transcendence into 
mortality and materiality and particularity.  This counter state of nature is essentially 
absent or fugitive, a purely critical standard of the conventional world in which we are 
stuck.      
The expanding gap between the near-universal acclaim accorded democratic 
principles and the near-total absence of democratic political practices is thus no 
coincidence.  The principle of democracy - the conjoined freedom and equality of 
openness - seems natural and normative: given and inevitable, good and true.  But this 
principle cannot be represented or institutionalized or organized without betraying its 
spirit.  Its authority cannot be made manifest without becoming mere power.  Democratic 
legitimacy and political effectiveness are mutually exclusive.  The closest we can come to 
incorporating democratic openness is in what we might call phoenix-events of 
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revolutionary rupture.  Fugitive democracy is the sole politics of democratic openness.  
Democracy is made compatible with openness by being rendered a moment in time rather 
than a form of government, and this moment takes shape as the bursting out of settled 
forms.  Principled upon openness, democracy is the regime of revolution.  Democracy is 
thus literally self-subverting.   
 
Our aversion to democratic politics follows, then, not so much from our apathy 
and “rational ignorance,” or even from the view that we the people are locked out of a 
basically corrupt political system.  Rather, the practice of politics is increasingly taken as 
absurd - devoid of meaning and so deprived of respect.  Democratic politics is a game.  It 
can be more or less fair and within the rules, to be sure, and it can be more or less 
dramatic, but ultimately politics is something that is played.  Like any game, it seems 
bizarre and sort of silly to the outside observer.  On this interpretation, our predicament is 
much worse than if apathy or corruption were at its root.  An apathetic people can always 
be stirred, and a corrupt system can always be reformed.  But what is to be done when 
democratic politics has lost meaning?  Or when the effort to make politics more 
meaningful apparently leads to an undemocratic politics and/or a politics of the 
impossible?     
 In the American context, at least, I suggest a remedy might be found in the 
historical narrative of constitutionalism.  The rhetoric of American constitutionalism can 
serve as a means to the end of the robust (if not “radical”) political practice of 
democracy.  By rhetorically reorienting self-perceptions about what we are doing when 
we engage in politics around the elevated but not transcendent notion of participating in 
an ongoing constitutional project, we can transform our anti-political dispositions.  The 
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political culture of constitutionalism, with its “constitutional mores,” can serve as a 
remedy to political cynicism.   
 
There is a long-standing (if perhaps oversimplified) division in American political 
thought between Jeffersonian radicalism and Madisonian constitutionalism.  Thomas 
Jefferson authored the Declaration of Independence and James Madison authored the 
Constitution.  Conventional wisdom holds that “Jeffersonian democracy” is authentic, 
full-fledged, robust democracy.  I’m not sure if anyone has ever used the term 
“Madisonian democracy.”  Madison is the advocate of constrained democracy - only so 
much democracy as stability and good administration and a national politics will allow.  I 
want to suggest, conversely, that the drafting and ratification of the Constitution rather 
than the declaring of independence is a better model for democratic political practices.  
Constitutional democracy can be a more “vital” mode of political action and association 
than Jeffersonian radical democracy.         
Historian Joseph Ellis perfectly captures the thrust of this radicalism in his 
description of Jefferson’s “doctrine of generational sovereignty.”  Jefferson’s “essential 
obsessions and core convictions” take shape in the “the vision of each generation starting 
from scratch, liberated from the accumulated legacies of past debts, laws, 
institutionalized obligations and regulations.”  In his “utopian radicalism,” Jefferson 
longed for a world where “innocence had not yet been corrupted.  This was the world of 
… the prepolitical Indian tribes, the world of the independent yeoman farmer on the edge 
of the frontier, the world after a rightful rebellion has cleared the air.  It was a world … 
where coercion was unknown and government unnecessary.  Though transient - history 
would begin to make its inevitable inroads almost immediately - the idyllic harmonies 
sustained themselves for that one brief, shining moment… (It was) a society devoid of 
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contaminating institutions and laws; an effort to routinize their removal so that the 
deadening hand of history was regularly slapped away in order to make room for a 
pristine encounter with what he believed to be the natural order.”1  Could we hope for a 
more apt account of the fugitive politics of democratic openness?     
This utterly principled stance and uncompromising notion of freedom led 
Jefferson to embrace the French Revolution, at least in its early days.  In one of his more 
radical Parisian moments he would famously write: “I hold it that a little rebellion now 
and then is a good thing, & as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical.”2  
“God forbid we should ever be 20 years without such a rebellion.”3  In turn, in the same 
dialectic of revolution/constitution so central to Wolin’s thought, Jefferson goes on to 
argue for a constitutional “law of limited duration.”  No “society can make a perpetual 
constitution,” and so a sort of generational expiration date should be written into the 
constitution itself.4  Much later in life Jefferson thus looked with regret upon the quasi-
religious status the American Constitution had achieved.  “Some men look at 
constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the covenant, 
too sacred to be touched.”5 
This radicalism is only one aspect of Jeffersonian democracy, though.  The other 
aspect is the local, participatory democracy Jefferson most famously described in his idea 
for a “ward system.”  Far from analogous to storms in the physical world, this everyday 
practice of politics was continuous rather than eruptive, conservative in spirit rather than 
rebellious.  It is as distant as one could imagine from the politics of the French 
Revolution.  It is as distant as Wolin’s “archaic” and “fugitive” democracies.  This 
second aspect of Jeffersonian democracy is better served, I argue, by Madison’s 
constitutional theory, and in particular by its rhetoric of “constitutional veneration,” than 
by Jefferson’s “utopian radicalism,” with its veneration of revolution.   
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Liberal constitutionalism has long been justified as a breaking mechanism upon 
the “excesses” of democracy.  A constitution is a floodgate to protect against the storms 
of free-flowing democracy, insulation against the electrical surge and shock of popular 
currents.  Standing outside of and above the power of the people, constitutional rights 
trump the will of the majority when it turns tyrannical.  The institution of representation 
removes the people from their power, thereby filtering out the base elements of passion 
and interest and enabling reason to rule.  A constitution, in other words, domesticates 
democracy.        
More recently, though, liberal rights and representation have been 
reconceptualized as essential prerequisites of popular power.  Constitutions are not so 
much obstructions to the rule of the people, but the institutional precondition of 
legitimate and effective collective decision-making.  Rights maintain “open channels” for 
the expression of the people’s voice, particularly in criticizing those in power.6  
Representation becomes a matter of institutionally realizing the otherwise abstract notion 
of “the people.”  Here, a constitution less domesticates than houses democracy.     
   The two key innovations in this notion of democratic constitutionalism are: 
constitutions help to ensure the rule of the people rather than of just some majority (the 
notion of a “higher people” replaces that of “higher law”); and constitutions enable the 
deliberative decision-making of the people (rather than just their vote aggregation).  
Stephen Holmes, for example, writes: “The common metaphors of checking, blocking, 
limiting, and restraining all suggest that constitutions are, in the main, negative devices 
used to prevent abuses of power.  But rules are also creative.  They organize new 
practices and generate new possibilities which would not otherwise exist.”  Constitutions 
may be compared to “the rules of a game and even to the rules of grammar;”  they are 
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less “regulative” than “constitutive,” making “a practice possible for the first time.”  
Above all, constitutions serve “self-government by helping create the ‘self’ (or national 
unity) which does the governing.”7  How else but in and through a constitution “could a 
large democratic community manage its own affairs?  A collectivity cannot formulate 
coherent purposes apart from all decision-making procedures.  ‘The people’ cannot act as 
an amorphous blob… .  In practice, liberal democracy is never simply the rule of the 
people but always the rule of the people within certain predetermined channels, according 
to certain prearranged procedures … .”8     
Christopher Eisgruber offers a similar reconciliation of democracy and 
constitutionalism.  For Eisgruber, the practices and institutions of constitutionalism have 
both democratic sources and democratic consequences.  Differentiating a present and 
simple majority from “the whole people” conceptualized in its full past, present, and 
future complexity - and so majoritarianism from “self-government” - Eisgruber concludes 
that “’The people’ cannot act except through institutions.”9  The “self” of self-
government, imagined as a single and unified over time, but internally complex and 
multi-tiered entity (analogous to the Freudian layering of superego, ego, and id), can only 
represent itself in a temporally continuous and multi-tiered form.  In turn, a constitution 
might be “regarded as serving a pro-democratic purpose: it creates a range of institutions 
to represent a people who would otherwise have no satisfactory way to act collectively.”10  
Moreover, if properly constructed and implemented to facilitate and prolong the process 
of communication, these constraints will “encourage (the people) to deliberate about 
long-term consequences of their choices.”11  A constitutional inheritance, Eisgruber thus 
concludes, is not a burden but a blessing; it “makes self-government easier” and 
“democratic ideals easier to achieve.”  “We get what we want without having to do the 
work to create it.”12 
 286 
Holmes and Eisgruber draw their arguments from the “paradoxical insight that 
constraints can be enabling.”13  But what exactly is enabled?  While the very boundaries 
of the constitutional system lend at least a limited embodiment and so sense of collective 
agency to an otherwise wholly abstract and nonexistent “people,” there is not much said 
about actual people’s role in this system that constitutes “the people.”  Whatever the 
virtues of synthesis of constitutional law and popular sovereignty, it seems at best a 
necessary and not sufficient enabler of the democratic political association and action.  
The right of association is necessary but not sufficient to the robust practice of 
association.  Put differently, while this synthesis might enable a democratic political 
system it does not necessarily enable a democratic political citizenry.  Holmes implicitly 
testifies to this formalism when he refers to the “routinization” of the “right of rebellion” 
in the notion of regular elections, especially in conjunction with his emphasis on 
institutionalized “gag rules” that preclude “uninhibited” and “cooperation-shattering 
debate of emotionally charged issues.”14  And that Eisgruber embraces the idea of us 
getting what we want “without having to do the work to create it” signifies the role of 
political participation in his theory.          
 
I turn to Madison’s constitutional theory not as a means of protecting the minority 
rights against a tyrannical majority, nor even as a means of better representing a spatially 
and temporally “complex” people in deliberative institutional forms.  While I certainly 
recognize the significance of such issues, my work is concerned less with the justice and 
quality of participation once it occurs than with the lack of participation; less with 
ensuring political legitimacy than with promoting political vitality; less with the 
institutional design of “the people” in abstraction than with the political beliefs and 
motivations of people.  I propose the “enabling” and not merely “disabling” effects of 
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constitutionalism in that the American Constitution frames a politics potentially 
experienced as meaningful and worthy of respect.15  Specifically, I argue that the rhetoric 
of constitutional veneration can sustain rather than stultify the political practice of 
democracy.    
This seems counterintuitive.  Insofar as men look at the Constitution with 
sanctimonious reverence and deem it too sacred to be touched, wouldn’t certain wide 
avenues of action be closed off, and a wide range of arguments obstructed?  Wouldn’t we 
enable a much more robust mode of democracy by opening the Constitution itself up to 
question and debate, revision and even rejection.  Jefferson offers the metaphor of 
constitution-as-winter-coat to constitution-as-ark-of-the-covenant: a constitution serves a 
particular utilitarian function, and when it no longer fits that function we should feel free 
to return it for a new one.  Wouldn’t such an economical rather than civil religious view 
of the Constitution work to return political power to the hands of actual people?  
Wouldn’t people, like consumers in the market, be empowered to shop around rather than 
being overawed and cowed before the divine right of the Constitution?    
Consider this question in the context of the liberal argument for the separation of 
church and state, though.  One of the central reasons for rendering religion a private affair 
was to promote peace and political stability by distancing matters of such weight and 
meaning from the sphere of politics.  More specifically, the people would turn their 
attention from government and view it in exclusively utilitarian terms because that which 
they experienced as most significant was placed elsewhere.  Reason - or rationality - 
would be allowed to rule because the people would grow dispassionate about politics.  
From this point of view, would reducing the Constitution from the status of ark to that of 
coat serve to vitalize or devitalize politics?     
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I have argued that a reflexive cynicism is the primary source and symptom of 
what ails democracy today.  That which we experience as meaningful is wholly anti-
political and anti-conventional, and conventional politics is wholly without meaning.  A 
self-expanding gap, as it were, has opened up between overwhelmingly authoritative 
democratic principles and utterly degraded democratic practices.  Interestingly, this 
phenomenon is often depicted in religious terms.  “Simply put, most Americans have lost 
faith in their democracy.”16  In this context, I argue that a venerable constitution can serve 
as a sort of super-conventional place for the democratic practice a politics, partially 
closing the gap between transcendent principle and petty practice.  Neither divine nor 
mundane - like neither the ark of the covenant nor a winter coat - the Constitution can 
serve as a point of mediation in between our realism and our idealism.  The Constitution, 
understood as both a written document and as what this document has come to 
symbolize, is uniquely situated to be a point of articulation between the particular and 
universal, mortal and immortal, ordinary and extraordinary.     
When the problem is that we have come to see politics as just economics by other 
means, the rhetoric of Madisonian constitutional veneration might be understood as 
enabling rather than disabling.  When Madison speaks of its veneration he clearly does 
not mean that the Constitution should be treated as some sacrosanct and untouchable 
artifact, ritually worshipped from afar.  Nor is veneration a disposition that would halt 
innovation in reactionary traditionalism.  “Is it not the glory of the people of America, 
that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other 
nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for name, 
to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, 
and the lessons of their own experience?”17  Rather, Madison seems to suggest that the 
Constitution should be treated as a document wherein a free people had attempted 
 289 
through a process of deliberation to incorporate and put into practice the first principles 
and the structure of republican government.  Amendable but enduring, the Constitution 
should not be considered divine or discarded like old clothing.   
  
Two possibilities follow.  First, insofar as we view our everyday practice of 
politics as inscribed in this venerable symbolic order we might demand that it be worthy 
of respect.  Rather than being resigned to the fact that our politicians, and we in our 
political roles and capacities, are inevitably petty and degenerate, we might be outraged 
by the desecration of republican principles in the playing of politics.  Constitutional 
veneration might be motivating in the way (if not of course to the degree) that religious 
worship is motivating, stirring us to action when something meaningful is being 
corrupted.  Second, the historical event of constitutional debate and ratification stands as 
an elevating example of the type of politics of which we might still be capable.  The 
image of audacious quasi-aristocratic action conjoined with democratic deliberation sets a 
precedent for and allows us to envision a mode of politics at once principled and possible.  
And by participating in their constitutional project, we can participate in the pride we feel 
for our “Founding Fathers.”     
Over the past decade or so there as has been a growing, if still minute, movement 
in favor of a new constitutional convention.  Sanford Levinson above all has issued a 
powerful call for reform.  And given the systemic problems of an illegitimate Senate, an 
undemocratic Electoral College, a too-powerful president, to name a few, along with the 
near impossibility of amending the Constitution, extraordinary action is required to 
achieve reform.  We need to step outside of our form of government to inaugurate the 
necessary changes.  Levinson does not hold much hope for such a project, though, in part 
because many will “find it difficult to accept even the possibility that our Constitution is 
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seriously deficient because they venerate the Constitution and find the notion of seriously 
criticizing it almost sacrilegious.”  Contrasting the Jeffersonian spirit of “relentless 
examination” to Madisonian uncritical veneration, Levinson implicitly adopts the 
Madisonian line that passions and prejudices will override reason, leaving us stuck in the 
mess were in.18 One wonder why, if the people are prone to blindly venerate such a 
deficient document, we would turn its revision over to them or their representatives.         
As discussed above, I would question this opposition between veneration and 
critical political engagement.  Regardless, in discussions with students, colleagues, and 
others, veneration seldom comes up as the source of resistance to opening the 
Constitution to relentless examination.  (Indeed, it comes up so seldom that I question my 
own prescription of utilizing the meaning generated within the symbolic order of the 
Constitution to rehabilitate contemporary political practices).  Rather, most everyone says 
that they simply do not believe themselves, their politicians, or those likely to be elected 
representative to a new convention to possess the requisite moral or intellectual virtues.  
Political cynicism rather than constitutional veneration is the espoused obstruction to 
reform.       
I would nonetheless endorse Levinson’s proposal for a new constitutional 
convention.  His reasoning as to its defects are certainly sound.  But further, perhaps 
opening up such a discourse would serve to reconstitute politics itself as a sphere 
deserving of respect.  Would such a forum for what Tocqueville called “great political 
parties” elevate our political rhetoric and introduce us to a mode of politics experienced 
as more than economics by other means?  Would it render the democratic practice of 
politics itself venerable?  Were we “invited to deliberate upon a new Constitution for the 
United States of America” and to “decide by (our) conduct and example, the important 
question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good 
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government from reflection and choice,” perhaps our time would rise to the occasion, as 
Madison and Hamilton held of their own.19                 
 
I thus argue that the Constitution creates something of a place apart for the 
practice of politics.  Elevated but not detached from ordinary politics, the rhetoric here is 
one of constitutional mediation rather than revolutionary rupture.  Constitutional form, 
we might say, mediates commercial society and literary society - materialism and 
revolutionism.  As a remedy to cynicism, meaning is introduced into politics via 
veneration rather than heroism.  The citizen is given a meaningful social place, in 
between those of the artist and the businessman - the creator and the consumer.  In this 
constitutional political preserve, citizens, viewing their political role as a matter of 
holding constitutional office, take their place in America’s founding debates.  Situated in 
this social symbolic order, citizens associate and argue and protest and vote in reference 
to the crucial constitutional issues of the day.  And perhaps the formulation of politics as 
an independent sphere of activity, at bottom neither economic nor religious, would create 
a theater for the expression of a mode of freedom that takes shape outside of the dialectic 
of mastery and escape - what Tocqueville called “political freedom.”           
I began by suggesting that unfettered competition and unfettered intimacy have 
become the dominant norms of human association today.  For all of their polar 
oppositions, what both have in common is the devaluation of the status of argument in 
association.  Indeed, both can do without words.  In the struggle for power, arguments are 
at best a useful strategy for manipulation and success, and at worst a useless waste of 
time.  In the unspoken bonds of intimacy, arguments simply have no place.  Argument, 
and even speech, signifies the dissolution of intimacy.  But perhaps within the social 
symbolic order harbored by America’s constitutional narrative the status of argument can 
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be rehabilitated.  Perhaps the text and the context of the Constitution would provide the 
rhetorical means to come together in argument, and something experienced as worth 
arguing about.  If a constitutionalized politics can carve out a place for the citizen, 
perhaps it can create a venue for the activity par excellence of the citizen. 
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1 Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1998), 133, 136. 
2 Thomas Jefferson, Political Writings, Ed. Joyce Appleby and Terence Ball (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 108.   
3 Jefferson, Political Writings, 110. 
4 Jefferson, Political Writings, 596-597. 
5 Jefferson, Poltical Writings, 215.  Of course Jefferson’s argument draws on the idea of 
the inevitability of progress and enlightenment, which is entirely absent from many 
contemporary advocates of anti-constitutionalism.  As we learn more, become more 
experienced, and grow wiser, Jefferson writes, we should be able to improve upon the 
Constitution.  Wolin, on the other hand, rejects constitutionalism as such and holds 
revolution to be something of an end in itself.      
6 Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1993), 24. 
7 Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 163-64.   
8 Holmes, Passions and Constraint, 167.  “Decisions are made on the basis of 
predecisions.  Electoral choices are made on the basis of constitutional choices.  When 
they enter the voting-booth, for instance, voters decide who shall be president, but not 
how many presidents there shall be.  Similarly they do not decide, at that moment, the 
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9 Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 13, 18-20.  Eisgruber pitches the idea of “constitutional self-
government” as somewhere above unfettered majoritanarianism, but as nonetheless 
“relatively ordinary” and practical, somewhere below utopian and romantic notions of 
direct participatory democracy.  Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government, 11.    
10 Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government, 205. 
11 Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government, 207.  In stressing this “forward-looking” or 
aspirational aspect of the Constitution, as well as the indeterminate “open texture” of its 
abstract provisions despite its otherwise “inflexible” nature, Eisgruber goes furthest in 
reconciling the idea of a liberal constitution with that of revolution.  Eisgruber, 
Constitutional Self-Government, 6.   
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18 Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
Inc., 2006), 17. 
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